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The development and application of Non-Technical Skills (NTS) in managing safety in 
high-tech industries is expected to yield possible results if properly harnessed. 
Accidents in high-risk organisations are often triggered by human errors, and have 
been destructive to life, equipment, organisations, and the environment at large. 
Therefore, urgent attention is needed to reduce the incidence of catastrophic events 
by guaranteeing that operators in these high-tech industries receive NTS training to 
deal with and counter risks associated with their tasks. Additionally, isomorphic 
lessons, organisational learning and risk characterisation are equally important when 
organisations become learning institutions by encouraging and promoting learning in 
a practical, methodical and synergistic manner. This involves the entire staff of the 
organisation in managing safety. As a result, this research revealed that the use of 
NTS, isomorphic lessons, organisational learning and risk characterisation in 
managing and improving safety performances are not common features in the nuclear 
industry. A comparative approach employing critical evaluation is drawn by comparing 
and cross-examining other industries such as aviation and oil and gas sectors; and if 
lessons learned in those sectors could be applied in the nuclear industry. Primary and 
secondary data comprised of 6 activities were used to critically investigate the three 
sectors, using 4 pillars which are NTS, isomorphic lessons, organisational learning 
and risk characterisation. The line of inquiries used are (1) 15 interviews; (2) online 
surveys on the four pillars and the three sector; another survey on impact of Covid-19 
on the three sectors (3) review of six examples of accidents/incidents using cross-
industry documents; (4) examination of documents from regulators from each sector; 
and (5) focus groups to test findings for validity. The population researched are safety 
experts from nuclear, aviation and the oil and gas sectors; while the sample size are 
nuclear (n=124, 54%); aviation (n=59, 25%) and oil and gas (n=49, 21%).   Firstly, 
untapped opportunities exist for the nuclear industry to further advance and review 
their frontline training and awareness in NTS and boost the effectiveness of their 
internal learning capacities. Secondly, the research was designed to identify the value 
of cross industry benchmarking in safety training using a range of novel created 
outputs including industry toolkits, indices of industries publications, cross-industry 
accident analysis. There remains greater scope to share ideas, acknowledge common 
domain issues and implement better co-operation for shared benefits. Despite these 
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1 Background of Study 
 
1.1 Accidents in High-Risk Industries (Nuclear) 
 
The consequences of accidents in high-risk industries can be damaging to humans, 
organisations, equipment and the environment in general (Perrow 1984). Studies 
have shown that 80 per cent of accidents (Turner 1994) in industries are mostly 
caused by human errors (Sheridan 2008; Reason 1990; Helmreich 2000). The fact 
that human errors cannot always be eliminated, therefore means extra efforts should 
be made to reduce accidents by ensuring that staff receive adequate and appropriate 
Non-Technical Skills (NTS) training to deal with risks associated with their jobs (Flin 
et al. 2008); and if there is better understanding of risk, it will be possible to reduce or 
remove the observable dangers (Perrow 1984: 3). 
 
Major accidents, such as the explosion of the Texas City refinery in 2005, the Macondo 
Well Blowout of Gulf of Mexico in 2010 (OSC 2011); the damage of the Piper Alpha 
oil rig platform of North Sea of 1988 in which 167 people died (Cullen 1990); and the 
Bhopal methyl isocyanate accident of 1984 are accidents that point to the need for 
process safety; and use of social and individual resource skills (NTS) which, added to 
technical skills lead to safe and well-organised work performance (Kilskar et al. 2016; 
Christou et al. 2012; Flin et al. 2008).  
 
Other accidents worthy of note are the Space Shuttle Challenger of 1983, the overturn 
of the Herald of Free Enterprise in 1987, the King’s Cross underground (tube) station 
fire of 1987, and the Tenerife airport disaster of March 1977. In contrast, the Hudson 
River landing of 2009 showed good use of NTS. Others are examples of failures in 
high-risk industries in lack of NTS has a contributing factor (Flin et al. 2008; Reason 
1990; kletz 2001). 
 
The Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) is not immune to accidents despite the great benefits 
people and society derive from it, ranging from energy supply and provision of nuclear 




caused death and destruction of properties in high magnitude (Shultz and Drell 2012). 
The highest impact accident in the nuclear sector was the April 1986 Chernobyl 
accident in Ukraine (USSR), classified as one of the worst accidents in the history of 
nuclear power plants on the International Nuclear and Radiological Event Scale (INES) 
(IAEA 2014). 
  
According to Fitzpatrick (2017), human faults and natural disaster contributed as major 
events that led to the Chernobyl and Fukushima accidents respectively. The two 
separate accidents occurred when the plants were no longer able to cool the reactors 
sufficiently (Fitzpatrick 2017). Miyagi (2005) noted that if the Soviet Union had paid 
all the compensation for the economic loss affected by other countries due to the 
accident, the Soviet economy would have collapsed. This indicates the seriousness 
and aftermath of any accident in a big-scale complex industry or system (Miyagi 
2005); hence recurrent training of operators is important (Perrow 1984). 
 
Another serious event was the Three Mile Island (TMI) nuclear power plant accident 
which occurred near Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, USA in 1979. The third major accident 
was at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant, triggered by the tsunami arising 
from the Tohoku earthquake in 2011. Backup generators or machines that should have 
kick-started the cooling pumps were seriously damaged (Fitzpatrick 2017). This is the 
second disaster to measure Level 7 on the INES (Power Tech n.d; WNA 2017). 
  
Nuclear accidents of such magnitudes mentioned above have not occurred in UK 
power plants. The Windscale fire of 1957 is regarded as the worst nuclear accident in 
the UK ranked at severity level 5 on INES record (Wakeford 2007). Apart from 
numerous accidents that have occurred in nuclear power plants, there are other risks 
commonly linked to them. These risks are radiation release, reactor accidents, 
radioactive waste and other radiation related problems (Cohen n.d; Fitzpatrick 2017). 
 
Therefore, there is an urgent need for this research to critically look at what UK nuclear 
power plants have put in place in terms of their knowledge of the use of NTS in training 
exercises, isomorphic lessons, organisational learning and risk characterisation to 
build a safety culture aimed at mitigating possible occurrences, since a disaster can 





Based on these disasters that have occurred in the nuclear industry, this research 
looked at other high–risk industries such as the aviation and the oil and gas sectors to 
draw lessons on how accidents were either successfully or unsuccessfully managed, 
with the aim of transferring such lessons to the UK nuclear sector as part of its 
recommendation. To achieve this, the research topic focused on: “Non-Technical 
Skills: A Critical Evaluation of Organisational Learning for the UK Nuclear Industry 
from Aviation and Oil and Gas Sectors.” 
 
The research extensively incorporates models made by different authors on how risks 
progressively become disasters. The System Failure and Cultural Readjustment 
Model (SFCRM) developed by Toft and Reynolds (2006) is an example. The duo 
pointed out that the model has three different but connected areas. First is the 
incubation stage, regarded as the starting point before a disaster occurs. This is 
followed by the event that starts the disaster proper and the aftermath of salvaging the 
situation. The third stage is focused on the learning procedure which comprises 
investigation and inquiries and report production, after which is recommendations. The 
model noted that the most important aspect of the third stage is the feedback channel 
which helps to understand the incubation stage (Toft and Reynolds 2006).  
 
 
1.2 Non- Technical Skills (NTS): The Roadmap 
 
A substantial body of academic and professional research has identified the vital 
importance worldwide of NTS spanning cognitive, interpersonal, and personal 
resource skills as essential human factor traits for managing accidents, emergencies, 
and incidents effectively (Flin et al. 2008). However, additional research shows there 
is still room to markedly improve responder competences, interoperability (ability to 
use equipment), and to act on and implement persistent lessons identified from critical 
emergencies, incidents, and accidents in the United Kingdom (Pollock 2013). 
                                                                                                                                                                        
Many scholars have raised concerns over the risks associated with nuclear industries 
and noted that there is urgent need to determine if the UK nuclear industry has 
maximised its human learning potential, taken on-board an organisational learning 
culture (for example isomorphic lessons), optimised the value of NTS in key segments 
of its workforce and committed to understand the importance of managing its own risk 





This research looked at three accidents of high magnitude and another three incidents, 
one from each of the three sectors, and critically evaluated the probable causes 
relating to them. In doing so, the research employed four pillars, which are NTS, 
isomorphic lesson(s), organisational learning and risk characterisation to set 
standards for the nuclear sector.  
 
Furthermore, the project looked at various achievements/failures made from the 
aviation and oil and gas sectors as two independent environments and controls on 
how they managed risks (Wiener, Kanki, and Helmreich 1995; Hudson 2003). 
Findings from the aviation and the oil and gas sectors were used as a framework for 
the UK nuclear sector. Thereafter, a toolkit was developed on how risk characterisation 
can be optimised and the use of NTS, organisational learning and isomorphic lessons 
to manage the UK nuclear sector. 
 
Thus, the study provided the following outputs:  
 
I. Framework: (People, Process, Technology, Infrastructure, Stakeholders, and 
Governance). 
II. Toolkit: (Nuclear Toolkit – Learning and fine-tuning opportunities). 
III. Benchmarking exercise: (Online surveys, review of regulatory data, interviews, 
accidents/incidents examples and focus groups were used).  
  
The research adopted different approaches aimed at harnessing useful information 
which was critical to safety management in the nuclear industry. Firstly, high impact 
related journals, publications and studies were reviewed to get detailed information on 
approaches taken by the nuclear industry, aviation, and the oil and gas industries to 
manage risks. The research also incorporated seminal literatures and theoretical 
approaches connected with High Reliability Theory (HRT) (Weick and Sutcliffe 2011) 
and Normal Accident Theory (NAT) (Perrow and Sagan 1998) alongside human 
factors, safety systems, and error management to build and benchmark a 
comprehensive picture of the risk and hazard factors associated with the nuclear 





1.3 Defining the Four Pillars used in this Research 
 
1. Non-Technical Skills (NTS): This are cognitive and social skills which 
complement workers’ technical skills (Flin et al. 2008); they are vehicles 
through which technical skills and knowledge can be applied (Thomas 2018). 
 
2. Isomorphic lessons: This describes a responsive procedure, comprised of 
analysis of past understanding to shape a 'hazard model' of what is expected 
to happen in the foreseeable future (Kirkwood 1999).  
 
3. Organisational learning: This refers broadly to an organisation’s acquisition of 
understanding, know-how, techniques and practices of any kind and by any 
means (Argyris and Schön 1978). 
 
4. Risk characterisation: Is a step forward before decision making, which depends 
on an iterative, analytic-deliberative process (US NAS 1996). 
 
1.4 Aviation and Oil & Gas as Key Sectors for Discussion 
 
The research used an online survey to draw lessons from aviation and oil and gas into 
the nuclear sector, but deriving understanding from NTS, isomorphic lessons, 
organisational learning and risk characterisation. The two-key independent (control) 
sectors, which are aviation and oil and gas were utilised for the purpose of 
understanding applicable lessons for the nuclear sector. Efforts were made to look at 
how a series of notable accidents not involving technical faults led to wider 
consultations and investigations of further contributing factors (O’Connor and Flin 
2003; Reason 2016; NTSB 2010).  
 
Safety management in the aviation industry is a key issue which cannot be 
compromised whatsoever. A chief concern of the aviation industry is to improve global 
civil aviation safety which has led to the development of a strong process safety culture 
(Scott and Wiegmann 2012; O’Connor and Flin 2003). In aviation, human error in 
the cockpit can trigger multiple incidences, which could lead to fatal consequences 





Since the 1970s, the aviation industry has identified the importance of human 
inaccuracies resulting to errors and has developed training programmes designed to 
reduce accidents and errors to increase the efficiency of flight crew. Therefore, Crew 
Resource Management (CRM) system covers different issues on knowledge, skills 
and approaches that include communications, situation awareness, problem solving, 
decision-making and teamwork and other disciplines (Harris 2014); and to manage 
safely (Flin, O’Connor, and Mearns 2002; Wiener, Kanki, and Helmreich 1995).  
 
Likewise, the oil and gas sector, which is also a high-risk industry has recorded 
numerous disasters such as Piper Alpha (UK), Alexander Keiland (Norway) and 
Longford (Australia) (Mearns and Yule 2009). The Piper Alpha oil platform disaster 
was caused by lack of or poor communication (NTS) during shift handover. The 
disaster was also aggravated by leadership failure in the emergency response (Cullen 
1990). The current study comprehensively looked at these chains of accidents in both 
sectors to see how they were effectively managed and if lessons could be learned 
from them to boost nuclear sector safety performance.                                                            
 
1.5 Scope of the Study 
 
The study critically evaluated NTS for the UK nuclear industry from the aviation and 
the oil and gas sectors. It also examined organisational learning, isomorphic lessons 
and risk characterisation using an online survey to evaluate, benchmark and 
determine applicable transferable lessons from aviation and oil and gas sectors, to 
apply such findings to the UK nuclear industries for better safety management. 
 
1.6 Research Gap 
 
The challenge for this research was to examine if organisational learning is prevalent 
in the nuclear sector.  So, the project was planned to close this knowledge gap with 
new research findings, as there was no composite research that is known to have 
existed regarding the cross-industry lessons between aviation, oil and gas and the 
nuclear industry.  
 
Furthermore, there is no immediate evidence showing the compound effects of all the 
above areas of four pillars of focus being studied at the macro level within industries, 




successfully managed in aviation and oil and gas were used as a real conceptual 
structure (framework) to support and produce a learning plan or toolkit to better 
manage and guide the UK nuclear industry. 
 
 
1.6.1 Research Contributions 
 
The research undertaken provided a platform for contributions spanning industry and 
academic applications. The principle contributions consisted of a toolkit comprising of 
the following deliverables: Lexicons; Benchmarking; Accident/Incidents examples, 
Training logs, List of publications and Archiving of incidents. The explanation is as 
follows: 
 
(a) Lexicons: This is a comparison of terminology used in different sectors, which 
could mean the same thing in another sector. Therefore, this research 
suggested that there is need for the three sectors to adopt a common language 
or lexicon on NTS, despite having some similarities in meaning. 
 
(b) Benchmarking: These are findings derived from the online survey on how 
each sector uses the four pillars to manage safety across the three sectors. 
Information was provided that meet the needs of managers and planners in an 
unpredictable environment. It also offered possible solutions gathered from 
best practices in either aviation or oil and gas. Benchmarking provide a means 
of improving competence through learning both within and outside 
organisations and between organisations. 
 
(c) Accident/Incidents examples: This includes 3 accidents and 3 incidents 
examples. A3 is used to indicate that where there are lapses on NTS, 
isomorphic lessons, organisational learning and risks characterisation, 
accidents are bound to happen in such sectors. Therefore, this will be used by 
organisations to manage safety. 
 
(d) Training Logs: Training/Reflection logs across the three sectors is expected 
to enrich workers understanding on the four pillars used in this research. 
However, this research did not develop a training log for the sectors as it may 
not be profitable to organisations on how its training logs should look like. 




and recommendations they made, training logs produced by the three sectors 
should be shared within the three industry regulators for the purpose of safety 
management. 
 
(e) List of Publications: This are different articles that are related to the three 
sectors on the four pillars. The list served as reference points to industries on 
different types of publications that supports industry learning which will 
invariably lead to managing safety. 
 
(f) Archiving of Incidents: This again served as reference point to industries on 
the type of low incidents that has occurred in the sectors and contribute to 
isomorphic lessons or organisation learning. However, the stand of this 
research is that the three sectors should as a matter of facts archive incidents 
for future referencing should the need arise. 
 
Another form of contribution from this research is that it has produced two journals 
which will further help industry learning (though awaiting publication). They are: 
 
(a) Isomorphic Lessons & Organisational Learning: Prerequisite Tools for 
Managing Safety in High-Risk Industries (UK Nuclear Sector). 
 
(b) Improving Nuclear Safety: Comparing the use of Non-Technical Skills and 
Organisational Learning in the Aviation and Oil & Gas sectors. 
 
Additionally, the research has revealed that potential gaps exist in the use of the four 
mentioned areas or pillars to manage workplace safety for the nuclear sector. 
Furthermore, the nuclear sector has not fully familiarised itself at promoting all the 
elements of NTS in the workplace environment, therefore, there is need for the nuclear 
sector to train staff effectively to bridge those gaps, which will equip the workers earlier 
to manage safety.  
 
Additionally, the recommendations made in this research has provided new insights 





1.7 Research Aim 
 
The aim of the research was to undertake a critical evaluation of the UK nuclear 
industry safety practices, focusing on the use of NTS from an online survey on non-
technical skills, isomorphic lessons, organisational learning, and risk characterisations 
in aviation and oil and gas.  
 
 
1.8 Research Objectives 
 
This research has a broad range of objectives. They are: 
(i) To critically evaluate and benchmark non-technical skills and their values in 
achieving workplace safety in the UK nuclear power industries. 
(ii) To investigate the extent to which isomorphic lessons, organisational learning 
and risk characterisations derived from approaches used in safety-critical 
industries such as aviation and oil and gas informed and/or added value to the 
resilience practices undertaken in nuclear industry. 
(iii) To design and create a holistic framework (with key processes, principles, 
terms, and toolkits) to support isomorphic lesson opportunities, optimise and 
benchmark NTS capabilities, risk characterisations, and organisation learning 






1.9 Research Questions   
 
The research questions revolved around NTS, isomorphic lessons, organisational 
learning and risk characterisation. This was designed to draw out respondents’ views 
and understanding on the four pillars used in this research. 
 
Research Q1: To what extent does the nuclear sector use non-technical skills, 
isomorphic lessons, organisational learning and risk characterisation in training and 
managing safety in the UK? 
 
Research Q2: To what extent could lessons learned from other organisations, such 
as aviation and oil and gas, help shape the UK’s nuclear industry’s safety? 
 
 
1.10 Research Purpose 
 
The overall purpose of this study is to create a framework with key processes, 
principles and toolkits to improve learning opportunities, appraise risk 
characterisations and increase NTS capabilities across nuclear industry stakeholders 
in the UK. This means that findings will be used as a framework for better training, 
development and evaluation, and to determine if isomorphic lessons can be applied 
from aviation and oil and gas into the UK nuclear industry to better manage the risk of 
critical nuclear incidents. More so, any lapses observed during the research were 
transformed using a framework of training development to train individuals, reshape 
their characters (behaviour), plan routine work and increase worker’s technical skills 
aimed at achieving a safety environment. Figure 1 indicates the research context 
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                                              Figure 1: Research context 
 
 
1.11 Limitations of the Study 
 
The following sub-sections highlight the limitations of the study and the reason for 




1.12 Reason for Focusing on NTS, Isomorphic lessons, Organisational learning 
and Risk characterisation 
 
As stated, the use of NTS to manage safety in high-risk industries has proven to be 
effective. For instance in the aviation industry, the use of NTS to train pilots and other 
crew members is made compulsory as this is aimed at reducing risks and accidents 
(Harris 2014; Scott 2018). 
 
On isomorphic lessons, Toft and Reynolds (2006) stated that no specific accident ever 
happens twice, as each separate disaster is completely unique (Toft and Reynolds 
2006). Therefore, isomorphic lesson is needed for organisations to avoid making 
similar mistakes that could lead to disaster. 
 
Organisational learning, as explained by Maybey and Salaman (1995) is concerned 




potential to influence behaviour. It occurs within the wide institutional setting of inter-
organisational relationships (Mabey and Salaman 1995; Geppert 2000). It also refers 
broadly to an organisation’s acquisition of understanding, know-how, techniques and 
practices of any kind and by any means (Argyris and Schön 1978). How 
organisations respond to information to manage risk was equally important to this 
study.  
 
On risk characterisation, despite the size or type of organisation, something that is of 
essence is that it must face both internal and external factors. Such impact makes it 
uncertain to contemplate if set objectives will be achieved (ISO 31000:2009). 
Therefore, managing risks successfully is vital for organisations to survive. 
 
Put together, these are the reasons why this research decided to find meanings into 
those areas which could probably help foster solutions in high-risk industries. 
 
 
1.13 Structure of the Thesis 
 
The thesis is structured in a manner that will be reader friendly. As a result, each new 
argument or knowledge is introduced and written in a new chapter followed by a brief 
introduction. The thesis is divided into seven chapters, designed to run from 
introduction to recommendation as logically as possible.  
 
The thesis is structured as follows: chapter one is an introduction of what the thesis 
is about including research gaps, aims, objectives, purpose and research questions, 
limitations and focusing on the four cardinal pillars. 
 
Chapter two presents the literature review, where issues relating to human factors, 
the four key domains (pillars), three accident examples (case studies), three near 
misses and how the three key sectors have successfully managed the industries.  
 
Chapter three presents the research methodology, focusing on online surveys, 
interviews and use of accident data as research designs and focus groups.  
 
Chapter four shows all results analysis combined (online results, interviews, focus 
groups and accident data) carried out in this thesis. Chapter four also focused on 




Chapter five focused on the conclusion of the entire thesis. 
 
Chapter six is on research recommendations categorised according to the four pillars. 
There were some recommendations that also originated from general observations, 
toolkits and technology. These are all designed to strengthen the need for the UK 











As noted in chapter one, this research is designed to investigate “Non-Technical Skills: 
A Critical Evaluation of Organisational Learning for the UK Nuclear Industry from the 
Aviation and Oil and Gas Sectors.” Chapter two reviewed relevant literature and 
scholarly articles, as disasters are said to be events that are created by people 
operating in a complex system (Perrow 1984: 8). Evidence suggests that where 
lessons are not learned, there is possibility of similar event reoccurring at that place 
(Toft and Reynolds 2006). 
  
For instance, the use of CRM, an example of NTS adopted by the aviation sector 
(DFSB 2018) served as a reference point for the introduction of NTS in the nuclear 
sector. Therefore, attempts were made by this research to see if lessons could be 
learned from some of the high-risk industries and criss-cross lessons among them, 
focusing on NTS, isomorphic lesson, organisational learning and risk characterisation. 
Also, this research looked at how series of notable accidents not involving technical 
faults led to wider consultations and investigations of further contributing factors 
(O’Connor and Flin 2003; Reason 2016).  
 
Chapter two discussed human factors as aetiology of numerous nuclear accidents 
both within and outside of the UK (Fitzpatrick 2017; Reason 1990); as it is known 
that 80 per cent of accidents are contributed by human error (Turner 1994; Sovacool 
2010). System Failure and Cultural Readjustment Model (SFCRM) developed by Toft 
and Reynolds (1997) was equally highlighted. But theoretical approaches connected 
with High Reliability Theory (HRT) (Weick and Sutcliffe 2011) and Normal Accident 
Theory (NAT) (Perrow and Sagan 1998) was discussed alongside human factors, 
safety systems, and error management to build and benchmark a comprehensive 
picture of risk and hazard factors associated with the nuclear industry (O’Connor and 





2.2 Human Errors in Nuclear Power Plants (NPP) 
 
Human error can occur at every step in the life of a nuclear facility (NEI 2017); as 
accidents typically happen when rules are not followed or broken. Within nuclear 
power plants, 80 per cent of substantial accidents or events can be credited to human 
error (IAEA 2017). However, it has been suggested in different quarters that the 1986 
Chernobyl accident was the ultimate example of human ineffectiveness on different 
areas; and in TMI, human error also had an effect (NEI 2017). It is also noted that 
accident could occur due to the possible failure of a reactor of a nuclear power plant 
and a radiation accident could happen when discharging a radiation source to the river, 
all attributable to human factors (Gordon 1996). 
 
According to Stanton (1996) human error or human factors are concerned with the 
relationships that exist between humans and technology with respect to achieving 
some targeted goals (Stanton 1996). However, Heinrich et al. (1980) stated that 
accidents are not expected to be credited to a single reason, or in most cases even to 
a single person (Heinrich et al. 1980; cited in Shappell and Wiegmann 2000). But 
Turner (1994) noted that if the 80 percent of human error is broken down, it informs 
that errors which relates to events comes from latent organisational weaknesses 
caused by humans in the past and which have been dormant in the system, while the 
remaining 20 percent are caused by individual workers operating equipment and other 
facilities (Turner 1994). 
  
Turner (1994) noted that concentrating efforts on reducing human error will invariably 
reduce the chances of accidents. For instance, the Fukushima Daiichi accident caused 
by tsunami earthquake was not well managed by the workers and due to 
organisational weaknesses, which had increased the chances of human error. 
Nonetheless, human faults and natural disasters contributed as major events that led 
to the Chernobyl and Fukushima accidents respectively (Turner 1994).  
 
The pie chart in Figure 2 indicates the role human performance, technical errors and 
natural disaster played in causing accidents in the nuclear industry from 1998-2018. 
(See secondary data analysis in section 4.7). It is evident in the chart that human 
factors contributed to 49% of the nuclear accidents during the period under review, 
while technical errors triggered 45% and natural factors caused 6% of the accidents. 




average of 1 in 4 nuclear accidents between 1952 and 2010 (Sovacool 2010), then 
from 2011 to 2018 (Laka n.d). Sources of data used in this analysis was derived from 

















                                           Figure 2: Classification of nuclear accidents from 1998-2018 
 
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) review of past events relating to fuel 
damaged in the reactor revealed that human factors were common in 21 of 26 
reactors, which represents 81 percent of accidents. The report indicates that the risk 
is about how staff are trained, the level of professionalism they have, their performance 
at work and the way staff are managed (US DoE 2009). The statement supports Flin 
et al. (2003) thinking on the use of NTS in staff training, as skills acquired help to 
complement workers technical skills. 
 
However, the consequences of human mistakes could lead to negative outcomes and 
could be expensive. Accidents endangers organisation’s capability to keep/protect the 
workforce, physical facilities, the public, and the environment from danger. Human 
mistakes also have negative effect on the economy (Flin et al. 2008). According to 
IAEA (2017), Fukushima accident demonstrated how natural disaster such as 
earthquake and flood combined and led to a continued power failure and the complete 












Although, the US DoE (2009) stated that there is nothing wrong with any system, but 
experience shows that the inability of organisational processes and cultural standards 
are rather involved in most accidents. As a result, a mixture of different factors 
sometimes goes beyond the control of the workforce. So, the organisational context 
of human activities is an important consideration. Accident free entail a combined view 
of human act from those who are interested in achieving success; which involves how 
well staff, supervisory team, and management operates as a team and the extent of 
arrangements of processes and principles in the attainment of the organisation’s 
economic and safety objectives (US DoE 2009).  
 
Kletz (2001) said most accidents are largely due to error caused by people, which 
could be managers or supervisors who take decisions on what to do; or the individuals, 
either operators or maintenance workers that carry out the job which does not lead 
towards active methods of preventing accidents (Kletz 2001). More so, even telling 
people to take precautions will also not avoid errors. What is important is knowing the 
reason why error occurred and act decisively to remove opportunities that will cause 
accidents (Kletz 2001; Reason 2000).  
 
In the aviation industry which is a complex and safety critical environment, still human 
error is suggested to be the major cause of almost 80 per cent of accidents  (Skybrary 
2010). Inappropriate maintenance adds up to a significant amount of aviation 
accidents and incidents. This happens due to a small proportion of maintenance works 
that are executed wrongly due to human error (ATSB 2008). 
  
NEI (1988) noted that the nuclear industry has a complex industrial system and a lot 
of tasks are achieved by machines (NEI 1988). The statement corroborates Charles 
Perrow’s view of tight coupling, where people tries hard to work safely but unexpected 
interaction of two or more failures causes a cascade of failures (Perrow 1984).  
However, man is still involved to a large extent in their design, testing, maintenance 
and operation. Because the performance of the person operating within a complex 
mechanical/automatic system largely depends on the individual competences, 
limitations and behaviours as well as on the quality of instructions and training the 
individual received is important; hence NTS being relevant in staff training (NEI 1988; 





Sheridan (1992) argues differently. He stated that causes of error can be credited to 
flaws in design, procedures, operators training, machine maintenance, and or 
management at the “blunt end”. Though most applications focus at the “sharp end” 
(such as pilot, surgeon, soldier, driver, or other machine operators). Mostly, causes of 
accident are untimely interventions by operators and not providing enough feedback 
when something goes wrong. Sometimes, someone with an improper understanding 
of how a system works, will likely make more mistakes trying to use them (Sheridan 
1992). 
 
Based on literature, it is proven that human error causes accidents due to ineffective 
application of NTS. Though the occurrence of accidents is somehow on the decline, 
however, it remains to be a leading influence which is almost 80 to 85 per cent of 
causes of accidents in high-risk industries (Baker and McCafferty 2005).  It is equally 
believed that failures of situation awareness (NTS) and situation assessment 
overwhelmingly prevail as a causal factor in most of the accidents ascribed to human 
error. Finally, human fatigue and task omission which are related to failures of situation 
awareness and human errors as causes of accidents (Baker and McCafferty 2005). 
Therefore, prompting this research is to investigate (using an online survey) if workers 
in the nuclear sector have received training on NTS and other pillars discussed in this 
research to operate safely. 
 
With the development of technology which has increased system reliability during the 
past years, human reliability has not changed over the same period (Ziedelis, Noel, 
and Institute for Energy (European Commission) 2011). Consequently, human 
error is still considered the most significant causes of accidents in safety-critical 
systems. As a result, there is need to develop methods and techniques that can 
suitably identify causes of equipment failures and human errors, in order to formulate 
effective counter-measures to reduce their future repetition (Ziedelis, Noel, and 
Institute for Energy (European Commission) 2011).  
 
 
2.2.1 Reason’s “Swiss Cheese” Argument on Model of Human Error 
 
Reason (1990) explained three stages of human failure in aviation. The first includes 
the condition of the aircrew as it affects performance. This is referred to as 




communication and coordination practices, often referred to as CRM. If fatigued 
aircrew fail to communicate and coordinate effectively, their actions or activities with 
others in the cockpit and even on the external activities to the aircraft (air traffic control, 
maintenance), poor decisions are made and errors often result  (Shappell and 
Wiegmann 2000). 
 
However, the accident model recognised as the “Swiss Cheese model” developed by 
Reason (1990) is regarded as the most significant piece of work in the field of human 
factors. This model has been extensively used to explain the dynamic causes of 
accidents, which explains how complex systems can be affected due to combination 
of simultaneous factors emanating from alignment of the holes on the Swiss cheese 
slices in           Figure 3. 
 
Many Human Reliability Analyses later developed were to some extent based on 
Reason’s model. Some of them are the Human Factors Analysis Methodology (HFAM) 
(Pennycook and Embrey 1993); the Sequentially Outlining and Follow-up Integrated 
Analysis (SOFIA) (Blajev 2002); the Human Factors Analysis and Classification 
System (HFACS) (Shappell et al. 2007), which is widely used to explore military and 
commercial aviation accidents, and then the Systematic Occurrence Analysis 
Methodology (SOAM) (Licu et al. 2007, quoted in Moura 2017). See Appendices on 


















2.2.2 Remedies for Human Error 
 
Sheridan (2008) said the normal remedies to reduce human mistakes are system 
design, to make equipment simple and easy to use by operators. Another solution is 
staff training, active warnings/notices that forestall a system that will possibly lead to 
accident and restricting operators’ exposure to opportunities for mistake. (Sheridan 
2008).  
 
In their view, NEI (1988) noted that other ways to stop human mistakes are by 
distinctive and constant tagging of equipment, documents, control panels and 
exhibiting information regarding the condition of the plant so that the operator can 
simply comprehend without making a faulty analysis; and designing systems to give 
unmistakable answers to enable operators understand incorrect actions. Systems 
should be constructed to reduce the need for human intervention (automation), 
overcome failures due to human attributes or at least lessen their penalties (NEI 1988). 
 
Kletz (2001) noted that TMI reveals that complex plants cannot be operated by writing 
chains of instruction that should be followed to the letter. Problems which were not 
envisaged will also cause the likelihood of instruments manifesting conflicting results. 
Therefore, Kletz (2001) suggests that operators should need:  
 
I. Understand what goes or is happening to the plant. 
II. Have diagnostics skills. 
III. Be given diagnostic aids as support. 
 
Kletz (2001) views equally represents what Flin et al. (2008) noted on ‘Safety at the 
sharp end’ that NTS is a prerequisite skill that complements technical skills to 
managing safely in high-risk industries (Kletz 2001; Thomas 2018).  
 
 
2.3 Safety Culture 
 
According to safety experts, the notion of safety culture arose in the aftermath of 
Chernobyl tragedy (Pidgeon 1991); as safety culture represents a new way of 
conceptualising processes of risk handling and management in organisational and 
other contexts (Pidgeon 1991). However, Booth (1995), cited in (Misnan and 




safety debate by the International Nuclear Safety Group (INSAG) of the IAEA in their 
analysis of the Chernobyl tragedy (Misnan and Mohammed 2007).  
 
Both IAEA (1986) quoted in (Misnan and Mohammed 2007) and HSE (1994) defined 
safety culture of an organisation as: “The product of individual and group values, 
attitudes, perceptions, competencies, and patterns of behaviour that determine the 
commitment to, and the style and proficiency of an organisation’s health and safety 
management.” (HSE 1994; Misnan and Mohammed 2007). Generally, safety culture 
can be termed as a set of beliefs, norms, attitudes and social technical practices that 
are concerned with reducing the exposure of individuals within and beyond an 
organisation to conditions that are considered unsafe or harmful (Misnan and 
Mohammed 2007). 
 
Glendon and McKenna (1995) noted that effective safety management is a 
combination of functional management control, monitoring, executive and 
communication sub-systems; and human which involves leadership, political and 
safety culture sub-systems that are paramount to safety culture (Glendon and 
McKenna 1995). Equally, the notion of safety culture arose from earlier ideas of 
organisational climate, organisational culture and safety climate, as safety culture 
comprises set of principles which define what an organisation is in its health and safety 
(Misnan and Mohammed 2007). 
 
Safety culture affords a global categorisation of some of the common behavioural 
conditions to accidents in high-risk socio-technical systems (Pidgeon 1991), which 
could prove to be a heuristic tool to aid risk management strategies to supplement 
current risk assessment practice (Pidgeon 1991). Turner et al. (1989) noted that 
safety culture is a set of beliefs, norms, attitudes, roles and social and technical 
practices that are concerned with reducing the exposure of employees, managers, 
customers and members of the public to conditions considered dangerous or injurious. 
(Turner et al. 1989). 
 
Culture is conceptualised as mainly an ideational system of meanings, while safety 
culture is regarded as one concerned with the norms, beliefs, roles, and practices for 
handling hazards and risk (Pidgeon 1991). Elements of good safety culture are 
classified under three headings, namely: norms and rules for dealing with risk; safety 




Put differently, safety culture means doing the right thing even when no one is 
watching. However, there are two kinds of safety. One is occupational safety which 
directly focuses on keeping people safe; while the second one is process safety, as it 
refers to the procedures for minimising risk more generally (OSC 2011: 218). 
 
For instance, at British Petroleum (BP), despite the improvement in injury and spill 
rates, the company had caused several disastrous workplace incidents which suggest 
that its approach to managing safety was more focused on individual worker 
occupational safety than on process safety (OSC 2011). The numerous accidents that 
occurred in BP and subsequent analyses point out that the company did not have 
reliable risk-management processes and was unable to meet its avowed commitment 
to safety (OSC 2011: 218). As evidence has shown, for organisation to maintain a high 
safety culture, NTS is expected to be put in place as that has the capability of 
sharpening workers non-technical skills (Flin et al. 2008). 
 
2.3.1 Safety in Nuclear Power Plants 
 
Nuclear safety is concerned with the achievement of proper operating conditions and 
the mitigation of accident consequences, which leads to protection of workers, the 
public and the entire environment from undue radiation dangers (ENSREG n.d). 
Related to the definition by ENSREG (n.d), is that made by WNA (2019): nuclear safety 
is defined as all aspects of protection of humans and the environment from the harmful 
effects of ionizing radiation existing or produced during operation (WNA 2019). The 
organisation further noted that nuclear safety focuses on unplanned conditions or 
events leading to radiological releases from authorised activities. This relates mostly 
to core problems or hazards (WNA 2019).  
 
According to Meneley (2012), nuclear safety is explained as provisions which are 
targeted at limiting as far as is reasonably possible in normal operation as well as in 
the case of an accident the release of radioactivity to the environment and maintaining 






2.3.2 Defence in-depth in Nuclear Safety 
 
The notion of defence in depth which is about the protection of both the public and 
workers is essential to the safety of nuclear power plant (INSAG 1996). To attain 
optimal safety, nuclear plants function using a 'defence in-depth' approach, multiple 
safety systems supplementing the natural features of the reactor core (WNA 2019). 
INSAG (1996) noted that nuclear safety does not depend on one line of defence but 
is attained using a variety of complementary means. These factors commence with 
the design and construction of a nuclear facility which needs choosing a good design 
and appropriate site, use of high-quality construction materials and testing before 
commencing operation (INSAG 1996). INSAG 1996 noted that: 
 
“All safety activities, whether organisational, behavioural or equipment 
related are subject to layers of overlapping provisions, so that if a failure 
should occur it would be compensated for or corrected without causing 
harm to individuals or the public at large. This idea of multiple levels of 
protection is the central feature of defence in-depth...” 
 
According to WNA (2019), key aspects of the defence in-depth approach are: high-
quality design and construction, equipment that prevents operational disorders or 
human failures and errors emerging into problems, broad monitoring and steady 
testing to discover equipment or operator failures, redundant and diverse systems to 
control damage to the fuel and avoid significant radioactive releases, provision to 
confine the effects of severe fuel damage to the plant itself (WNA 2019). 
 
These can be summed up as: prevention, monitoring and action. They are geared 
towards mitigating any consequences of failures. The safety provisions comprise a 
series of physical barriers between the radioactive reactor core and the environment; 
providing of multiple safety systems, each with backup and planned to accommodate 
human error. Safety systems in nuclear stations account for about one quarter of the 





2.3.3 Key objectives of defence in-depth 
 





(i) To compensate for probable human and component failures; 
(ii) To maintain the efficiency of the barriers by preventing damage to the plant 
and even the barriers too;  
(iii) To protect the public, including workers in the industry, and the environment 
from harm should the barriers fail (ENSREG n.d; INSAG 1996). 
 
Overall, the entire strategy for defence in-depth is to prevent accidents. Nevertheless, 
if prevention fails, the strategy restricts the consequence as much as possible and 
averts further escalation to more serious conditions. It is intended to ensure a low 
chance of failures in the systems used, combined with reduction in design should one 
system fail. Other independent diverse lines of defence safeguard an accident from 
occurring (ENSREG n.d). 
 
2.3.4 Five levels of defence in-depth 
 

















Defence in depth is usually organised in five levels. In case one level fails, it will be 










This section fully discusses the four pillars of this research thesis which are: non-
technical skills, isomorphic lessons, organisational learning and risk characterisation 
as useful values to managing safely. These pillars are germane to understanding the 
relevance of the research used to extrapolate lessons from aviation and oil and gas 
into the nuclear sector for safe and efficient task performance. Also, isomorphic lesson 
was used as a yardstick to measure if organisation understands its usefulness in terms 




The International Organisation for Standardization (ISO 31000: 2009) defines risk as 
the “effect of uncertainty on objectives” as its effect could be either positive or negative; 
a total deviation from what is expected. This definition recognises that human beings 
operate in an uncertain world. Whenever there is need to achieve any set objective, 
there are chances that things could go wrong or not according to plan (ISO 31000: 
2009).  
 
ISO 31000 further explained that uncertainty is a condition which involves a lack of 
information that leads to insufficient understanding. Unexpected events happen when 
there is inadequate or incomplete knowledge of an event, consequences or outcomes, 
or its likelihood (ISO 31000: 2009). On the other hand, risk is the outcome of 
unplanned event on set objectives that could be completely different from what is 
planned, as what is already planned and its outcome cannot be predicted because it 
has not happened (Hillson 2007).  
 
Risk is classified as unlikelihood which should raise concern when it has the tendency 
of affecting set plans (Hillson 2007). Conversely, Stanton and Webster (2014) states 
that what is considered as risk by some people could mean different things to other 
people (Stanton and Webster 2014). Bouder et al. (2007) believe that risk means a 
mixture of two mechanisms or things, which could be possibility of a likely result or the 
severity of actions or consequences caused by human error, normal actions or 




consequences that occurred due to risk could either be positive or negative, but 
subject to the values individuals share (Bouder, Slavin, and Lofstedt 2007). 
 
Different authors such as Ewald (1991:199), quoted in Foucault et al. (1991), noted 
that risk from concept was believed not to have been caused by human beings nor 
their actions. It was presumed to be a natural event like flood or other forms of natural 
disasters rather than human factors. It is expected that people should do nothing than 
to estimate the possibility of such disaster occurring and plan how to take actions to 
reduce their influence (Ewald 1991). Ewald (1991) further remarked that the idea that 
risk was not a handwork of nature was disregarded and human beings have to be 
included because of their actions in society (Foucault et al. 1991).  
 
Giddens (1990) noted that with the passage of time, theory of risk symbolises a new 
way of viewing the world and its disordered display of events, its exigencies and fears 
(Giddens 2013); the unexpected consequences could be as a result of human act 
instead of the hidden values of natural or extreme purposes of the deity (Devine-
Wright 2005, Firestone and Kempton 2007). 
 
However, this research takes the view made by Rodgers (2006), quoted in Stanton 
and Webster (2014). They suggest that without risk there will be no innovation, new 
knowledge and nothing like brave adventure. What risk does according to them is to 
help people seek for new ideas, as the utmost risk is taking no risk (Stanton and 
Webster 2014). 
 
Kaplan and Garrick (1981) said whatever people do in life, both business, and decision 
taken are all but risk and its expectant reward. So, risk is relative to the person 
observing it. It is also a subjective thing, and again depends on who is looking (Kaplan 
and Garrick 1981). Countering the above assertion, Beck (1998) stated that risk is 
also an organised way of controlling hazards and uncertainties prompted by 
industrialisation (Beck 1998). As a result, this research will examine if organisations 
such as the nuclear sector characterise risk effectively in the workplace using an online 
survey. 
 
Risks have both positive and negative sides, however, depending on what is being 
perceived as risk. Lupton (1999) stated that strong constructionist believes nothing is 




contingent on people’s perception and constructed in their minds. Risks do not mean 
certainties waiting to happen, but the gatherings of ideas, decisions and views around 
material occurrences, giving those events forms and shapes (Lupton 1999).  
 
This research holds the view that risk is meant to be tolerated. The view is supported 
by HSE (1992) that risk tolerability does not necessarily mean that risk is acceptable. 
Instead, it denotes the preparedness to live and cope with a risk to attain some benefits 
with the assurance that it will be suitably controlled or managed (HSE 1992).  
 
Risk is a concept sometimes used to assist management decision about hazards 
which cannot act on the world itself. Technically, the word ‘risk’ is ordinarily considered 
to involve two components. First, a numerical probability that a hazard will eventuate. 
While the second is a numerical approximation of the consequences which might 
occur if risk is not managed. If the two numbers are multiplied, the product then 
becomes numerical risk value which is associated with specific hazard identified (Toft 
and Reynolds 2006). Therefore, this research examined how the three organisations 
characterised risk with the hope of managing safety. See risk matrix on Table 3. 
 
 
2.5.1 What is Risk Characterisation? 
 
Regardless of the size or type of organisation, it must face both internal and external 
factors; such effect determines if set objectives will be achieved. Basically, the effect 
of achieving set objectives in any organisation, that is, effect of uncertainty on 
objectives is risk (ISO 31000: 2009). Risk can be quite complex and controversial to 
cope with as significant resources are devoted to developing and applying methods of 
risk analysis and risk characterisation to make well informed and more dependable 
decisions about threats to the environment, health and welfare of staff. Yet these 
methods sometimes fail to meet expectations to improve decision making (Stern and 
Fineberg 1996).   
 
Stern and Fineberg (1996) noted that risk characterisation may fail for some reasons. 
It could show the scientific and technical information or evidence that could lead to 
making a rash decision. It could provide scientific and technical evidence in a manner 
that is not valuable for those that take decisions, as risk characterisation should be 
geared towards a decision-driven activity aimed at informing choices and targeted at 




The activities of any given organisation involve risk management, which is identified, 
analysed, and then evaluated to ascertain if the risk should also be modified by risk 
assessors with the hope of satisfying risk criteria (ISO 31000:2009). Risk 
characterisation is a prelude to taking decisions which are dependent on an 
interactive, analytic and deliberative processes (EPA 2000). Risk characterisation is a 
qualitative and/or quantitative approximate which includes attending to uncertainties 
of the possibility of occurrence and severity of known or potential adverse health 
effects in a given population or environment based on threat (hazard) identification, 
hazard characterisation and exposure assessment (FAO and WHO 2009; Williams 
and Paustenbach 2002). 
  
Duffus (2001) noted that risk characterisation is the incorporation of evidence, 
reasoning, and conclusions aggregated in hazard identification, dose-response 
assessment, and exposure assessment and the estimation of the probability (Duffus 
2001); a mixture and summary of information about a hazard which addresses the 
needs and interests of managers and of interested and affected parties. Risk 
characterisation is a step forward before decision making, which depends on an 
iterative, analytic-deliberative process (US NAS 1996). 
 
2.5.2 Tolerability of Risk in Nuclear Power Plants (ToR) 
 
HSE expects that the highest risk that could be regarded as acceptable from any high-
risk industry or plant in the UK should be one death a year in 10,000 members of the 
public. This, according to HSE is 10 times smaller than the limiting risk for workers. It 
is expected that organisation must do what they practically can to confirm that the 
actual risks exposed to workers and members of its public from most plants are much 
lower (DM and P 1996; HSE 1992). 
 
The health and safety watchdog (HSE) hope that maximum risk that should be 
acceptable to the public of any accident in 100 and 1,000 deaths in the UK nuclear 
plant should not exceed at least one in 100,000 per year. This is not to say that the 
nuclear industries have done enough to meet these goals of tolerability; still, they are 
mandated by law to continually reduce the risks as low as reasonably practicable. The 
Nuclear Installation Inspectorate (NII) has the power to decide if the industry have 




safety gains the organisation will derive (HSE 1992). Figure 4 shows tolerability of risk 














           Figure 4: Tolerability of risk, as low as reasonably practicable-ALARP (HSE 1992) 
 
Table 2 is the different categories of risk. 
 
Table 2: Tolerability of risk 
 
Risk characterisation is important to the nuclear industry in managing safely as it 




decisions. This view was supported by EPA (2000) as they noted that it helps a risk 
assessor undertake critical decisions (EPA 2000). It is also of importance because it 
helps to give useful information involving possible hazard situation which terms to 
address the need and interests to take decision. Risk is a prelude to taking decisions 
which is reliant on a cooperating, analytic and calculated process (Stern and Finberg 
1996; EPA 2000). 
 
Sabin et al. (2012), quoting Mitroussi (2003) states that when organisational survival 
is at stake, the people or staff should be willing to surrender old values or standard, 
practices and take up new methods. Therefore, an organisation should be willing to 
change its safety culture practices if there is a suitably strong and pressing internal or 




Risk Calculation Matrix 
 







This research attempts to find out how risk is characterised in the nuclear industry, 
aimed at managing the sector safely. For instance, the Fukushima Daiichi accident is 
rated at 25 x 5 (almost certain at severity of potential injury/damage at 25 and 
extremely unlikely at 5 that is, the likelihood of the hazard happening) according to 








Non-Technical Skills (NTS) is another pillar used in this research. NTS are means by 
which technical skills and knowledge can be applied (Thomas 2018). Therefore, effort 
was made to critically analyse the usefulness of NTS and what lessons the nuclear 
industry should learn from other high reliability organisations such as aviation and oil 
and gas that have used similar strategies such as Crew Resource Management (CRM) 
in aviation to manage safely. 
 
 
2.6.2 Crew Resource Management 
 
Regulators in aviation industry made it compulsory that CRM courses are planned to 
teach pilots on the importance of cognitive and interpersonal skills required to operate 
and manage flights within a required aviation system (Flin et al. 2008).  The notion of 
CRM was initiated in the 1970s which was known as “cockpit resource management.” 
It is the real application of different types of human factors, which includes 
communication, decision making, situational awareness, threat and error 
management (TEM) and team cooperation within the people that are responsible in 
flight operations (Skybrary 2018; Scott 2018).  
 
Though the idea of CRM is a combination of both non-technical and technical skills. It 
seeks to effectively manage human resources with the hope of reducing risk and 
maximising efficiency (Scott 2018). Due to numerous aircraft accidents CRM was 
therefore developed to respond to those insights following the introduction of cockpit 
voice recorders (CVRs) and flight data recorders (FDRs) into modern jet aircraft. 
 
Information gathered from these two devices revealed that a lot of accidents did not 
occur because of technical failure of the aircraft or systems, nor was it a failure of 
aircraft handling skills or lack of technical expertise on the part of the crew officials; 
rather, most accidents are triggered by the failure of crew members to respond 
properly to the situation at hand. Such inadequacies involve communication skills, 
breakdown in teamwork among colleagues, lack of situational awareness, and wrong 





In addition to CRM, other measures taken by the industry to reduce accidents include 
safety management system; new technology for aviation safety; and simulation in 
aviation training (Sabin et al. 2012: 180; Airbus 2017; Griffin et al. 2015; FAA 2007). 
Scott (2018) noted that since the introduction of CRM in the early 80’s, it has been 
made mandatory in most trainings and there have been six ‘generations’ of CRM 
(Scott 2018), adding that each successive generation was improved to build upon the 
successes and lessons learned from previous generations (Scott 2018). 
 
2.6.3 The Sixth Generation of CRM 
 
The sixth and present generation of CRM follows previous generations reflecting the 
fact that pilots should not only cope with human error while in the cockpit but should 
attend to threats to safety emanating from the entire operating environment (Scott 
2018).  
 
According to Scott (2018), the sixth generation of CRM is a set of countermeasures 
against threat and error which is based on empirical evidence gained from positive 
interventions within the operation. Data generated from the sixth generation CRM is 
gleamed from the system wide operation itself and widened the threat error 
management (TEM) through the recognition of the significance in the NTS within the 
operational environment (Scott 2018). 
 
TEM relies on the entire system or process interrogated and probed to possibly identify 
the systematic threats. The idea is that empirical and active management of the 
applicable work environment (cockpit) can prevent threats degrading the level of safety 
(traditional CRM) skills and different methods are applied not only to eradicate, trap, 
or alleviate errors, but also according to systemic-specific threats to safety before they 





2.6.4 Non-Technical Skills 
 
NTS according to Flin et al. (2008) comprise cognitive, social, and personal resource 
skills that underpin technical skills (Flin et al., 2008). The authors emphasised that 
cognitive, social and personal resource skills go with technical skills and contribute to 
safe and well-organised task performance. Quoting Hopkins, Flin et al (2008) stated 
that organisational safety is influenced by regulators and commercial pressures, the 
environment and management demands (Flin, O’Connor, and Crichton 2008; 
Hopkins 2000). The seven NTS elements from Flin et al are: situation awareness 
(attention to the work environment), decision making, communication, teamwork, 
leadership, managing stress and coping with fatigue (Flin, O’Connor, and Crichton 
2008). There is extensive discussion on these elements as indicated on Table 4. 
 
Table 4: Seven elements of NTS and skill categorisations 
NTS Type Skill Categorisation 
Situational Awareness Cognitive Skill 
Decision Making Cognitive Skill 
Communications Interpersonal Skill 
Teamwork Interpersonal Skill 
Leadership Interpersonal Skill 
Managing stress Personal Resource Skill 
Coping with fatigue  Personal Resource Skill 
 
 
Flin et al (2008) noted that to avert accident from occurring is to ensure organisational 
changes are designed to support flow of information, decision-making processes and 
many others. Turner (1994) believes it is this recent tactic that will probably help in 
preventing accidents and counteract socio-technical risks (Turner 1994). Again, Flin 
et al., referring to Reason (1997), noted that while human fault is unavoidable and 
inescapable, humans can also be great by providing the indispensable resilience and 
knowledge capable of creating smooth operation of imperfect technical system in a 
threatening environment  (Fletcher et al. 2003). 
 
For instance, Barnett et al. (2006) said that the use of NTS is a vital ingredient in 
averting accidents, citing the maritime sector as an example. An accident database 
drawn from the UK, Canada, USA, Norway and Australia, state that human fault is 




et al. (2002), maintained that training has put a lot of emphasis on acquiring basic 
knowledge and skills to sustain capable practice. They noted that skills such as 
teamwork, planning, decision-making, communication and resource management are 
inherently used with medical knowledge and clinical performances (Fletcher et al. 
2002).  
 
NTS can therefore be categorised into two sub-groups, namely: cognitive or mental 
skills, which comprise planning, situation awareness and leadership; and social or 
interpersonal skills, which refer to communication, leadership and teamwork (Fletcher 
et al. 2002). (See Table 4 for further explanation). 
 
Endsley (1995) noted that experts must exercise level of control on human work to 
consider human behaviour in high complex cognitive roles that have high rate of 
accident. Because of technological development, it has created many multifaceted and 
dynamic structures that forces people to behave effectively and take timely decisions 
when operating machines (Endsley 1995).  
 
Communication, another element of NTS shows that ineffective communication 
caused some accidents in different organisations. Enough evidence reveals that the 
behavioural causes of accidents and tragedies encompasses not just human mistakes 
and lapses. Turner (1978) stated that pattern of management and failure of some 
organisations is related to failures of information handling, communication, direction 
and error analysis of events or activities (Trim and Caravelli 2008; Turner 1978).  
 
The US DoE (2009) states that irrespective of how efficient machines or equipment 
functions, provision of good training, accurate supervision and procedures, staff will 
never be efficient if they lack organisational support. Therefore, mistakes are not 
caused by typical human fallibility, but by unsuited management and leadership 
performances and weakness in work procedures and standards. As a result, having a 
defence mechanism in place in addition to the human element is required in improving 
resilience and reducing human error (US DoE 2009). 
 
Patey (2015) explained that effective use of NTS is paramount to managing high-risk 
industries, including the nuclear power plant, as evidence has shown that most 
accidents that occurred in the nuclear sector are caused by human error (Patey 2015). 




requires timely selection, application and intervention of non-technical skills; namely 
situational awareness, decision-making, communication and teamwork, to manage 
active outcome (Flin et al 2008:134); where the most effective emergency leaders 
diagnose the situation and select a soothing leadership approach from an authoritarian 
scale to align their individual style to the situation (Flin 1996). 
 
Examining the Rail Safety and Standard Board (2016) report stated that making 
mistakes could be unavoidable, but non-technical skills can be developed to help 
mitigate and manage errors. An instance was when a train dispatcher who is 
meticulous and has knowledge of situational awareness will be more likely to notice 
threats as they occur on the train platform (RSSB 2016).  
 
If staff are good at making decisions, communicating with other team members and 
managing workload, they may act to successfully alleviate any danger (RSSB 2016). 
As a result, analyses of accidents in a range of safety critical industries proves that 
NTS are significant in helping front line/operators’ safety critical staff to identify, 
manage, lessen and improve from threats and errors (RSSB 2016).  
 
2.6.5 Human Factor and NTS Elements 
 
Non-technical skills contribute significantly to the management of everyday human 
error. Thus, it is poor non-technical performance that permits error to compromise the 
safety of a process (Thomas 2018). In any multifaceted industrial facility such as 
nuclear power plant, a lot of tasks are executed by machines. Nonetheless, humans 
are still involved to a great degree in designing, testing, maintenance and operation.  
 
How the individual working in that environment perform, depends on the capabilities, 
limitations and attitudes, and more so on the quality of instructions and training 
provided. So, the interface between a machine and its operators in any given industrial 
project is commonly known as the human factor (NEA 1988). Additionally, in oil and 
gas, human factors are recognised as the major contributor to accidents during drilling 





2.6.6 The Seven Elements of NTS 
 
2.6.7 Situation Awareness (SA) 
 
Situation awareness has been noted in many accidents in high-risk industries 
(Thomas 2008). For instance, operators lost SA as while working at Chernobyl and 
Three Mile Island on a different mental model of the situation; ignored normal safety 
warnings and override the regular protective equipment (Flin et al. 2008: 18; Kletz 
2001). The incident was not properly identified by staff working on the reactor, which 
led to the inappropriate operation of the reactor's control rods (Grishanian 2010). 
 
SA is the ‘perception of the elements in the environment within a volume of time and 
space, the comprehension of their meaning and the projection of their status in the 
near future’ (Endsley 1995). During World War 1, situation awareness was recognised 
as a key tool by military aircraft crew. Thereafter, it received global attention when 
major research on the topic was carried out in the 1980s by aviation and air traffic 
control (Salmon et al. 2009: 7). 
 
SA is used to define the cognitive skills which relates to picking and understanding of 
information to enable people to make meaning of the work environment, which is 
regarded by psychologists as perception or paying attention. It is a constant 
observation of the environment, identifying on-going activities and detecting any 
changes (Flin et al. 2008). SA also means the knowledge and comprehension of what 
is happening within a given environment. In a complex situation and working under 
intense pressure sometimes requires too much information/data to process, as it 
requires front line staff to sieve information (Patey 2015). 
 
Understanding SA helps to form an understanding that is designed to fully explain the 
reason embedded in human behaviour, which helps in designing human machine 






Three Mile Island (TMI) Case Study on Situation Awareness (SA) 
 
In March 1979, some failures contributed to the loss of coolant which affected one of the reactors at 
TMI nuclear power plant. The loss of coolant and the resultant overheating of the nuclear core caused 
a serious problem. That chain of events affected the control room operators as they failed to notice that 
critical valves had remained closed after maintenance work had been completed in the days before the 
incident occurred (Thomas 2018: 170). 
 
The design of displays in the control room misled the control room operators to assume that other valves 
were closed when they were not. So, the failures of SA caused the loss of coolant to the reactor. This 
case includes issues relating to SA which have their origins in system design, display locations and 
formats, also inaccurate mental models of the control operators (Thomas 2018: 170). 
 
 
2.6.8 Models of situation awareness  
 
There are various situation awareness models available in the literature. Endsley’s 
three level model (Endsley 1995); Smith and Hancook’s perception cycle model 
(Salmon et al. 2016) and Bedney and Meisters’ Interactive subsystem approach to 
SA model (Salmon et al. 2016). Situation awareness models vary in terms of their 
basic psychological approach. Endsley’s (1995) three level model represents a mental 
theory model which uses an information processing approach, while Smith and 
Hancook’s model uses the environmental approach and Bedney and Meister’s 
approach is an activity that is based on a model to describe situation awareness 
(Salmon et al. 2009: 12-13).  
 
Endsley’s (1995) three level generic model in Figure 5 focus on the effect of situation 
awareness and decisions made by an operator in crisis conditions. Factors that affect 
situation awareness are recognised in the model. These three levels form a chain of 
information processing, the first level being perception of the elements in the 
environment, the second level understands the information gained at the first level and 
projection of future status forms the third level (Salmon et al. 2009: 10; Flin et al. 






                         
                                 Figure 5: Model of situation awareness (Endsley, 1995: 35)  
 
Level 1: Gathering Information  
 
On Endsley’s (1995b) model, the first stage of situation awareness is regarded as 
‘perception of the elements in the current situation’. A pilot would maintain the 
perception of his information regarding traffic in areas where there are mountains or 
warning lights (Endsley 1995). For situation awareness to be analysed properly, there 
is a need to obtain the right information. It is common to lose focus from one element 
or become focused on another, whereas, some key information is overlooked. For 
instance, in 1978, a United Airlines DC-8 crash was because the fuel ran out as crew 
were busy trying to fix a landing gear problem and did not observe the fuel indicator 
reading (Flin et al. 2008: 24).  
 
 
Level 2: Interpreting Information  
 
Level 2 of situation awareness needs the operator to go beyond information gathering. 
At this level the operator needs to process incoming information and evaluate the 
importance of the information in the light of set goals. Based on the information on 
level 1, those who take decision should form balanced picture of the situation, 
appreciating the significance of the objects and the events. Changes in projected 




get the Level 1 situation awareness information but will not be able to get to the level 
of interpretation. An experienced decision maker will be able to incorporate different 
data elements together with the desired goals to better assess the situation (Endsley, 
1995; Flin et al. 2008: 25).  
 
Level 3: Anticipating future status  
 
The last and third level of situation awareness focuses on looking ahead to the future. 
Based on the current information gathered on the environment and the dynamics, a 
skilled operator can forecast the future and take needed action to circumvent any 
event. For instance, if a military pilot gathers that an enemy aircraft is on the offensive 
in a recognised location, the pilot can calculate the style of attack by carrying out a 
mental simulation (Endsley 1995b).  
 
Three levels of SA are summarised as follows:  
 
Situation awareness is based on more than observing information about the 
environment. It equally includes understanding the meaning of that information in a 
cohesive or integrated form, juxtaposing it with operator goals, and providing 
anticipated future condition of the environment that are essential for decision making. 
Therefore, situation awareness is a wide construct that is applicable across a variety 
of application areas, with shared fundamental cognitive processes (Endsley 1996).  
 
Jones and Endsley (1996) study of the Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) 
database was used to determine situation awareness related accidents. It was found 
that 76.3 per cent of the accidents were related to level 1; 20.3 per cent were related 
to level 2 and 3.4 per cent were related to level 3. The high proportion of level 1 
accidents show that training system is essential to increase the basic level of situation 
awareness in safety critical industries (Jones and Endsley 1996). 
 
2.6.9 Team working 
 
Teams are a set of two or more individuals that relates work toward achieving a shared 
goal, objective, and or mission (Salas et al. 2015); for teams to record success, they 
must accomplish particular tasks (Morgan Jr et al. 1986); communication, co-




effective team-working. As failure of applying teamwork to the situation caused the 
USS Greeneville of 2001 nuclear submarine accident (Flin et al. 2008: 94). 
 
Team working depends mostly on the collective behaviours and what the team 
members are doing. It focuses on attitudes, how staff feel or behave and depends on 
cognitions which rely on what the team members think and or what they know that is 
needed for the teams to achieve tasks. Therefore, it is important to note that both task-
work and teamwork are important to achieving positive team tasks and relying on each 
other to be effective. Teamwork is a changing, lively and sporadic process that could 
compromise thinking, feelings and attitudes within members of a team to be effective. 
It helps staff members to understand how tasks and goals are achieved within a team 
(Salas et al. 2015; Wildman et al. 2012). 
 
 
2.6.10 Teambuilding and maintaining 
 
Psychologists have concluded that giving support to other team members contributes 
to team performance and promotes members comfort (Zaccaro et al. 2001) 
 
Four aspects of team support are identified as: 
 
(1) Emotional: This implies encouraging one another and being sympathetic to 
each other. 
(2) Informational: Team members are expected to exchange vital information 
needed for the work. 
(3) Instrumental: This is practical support that team members give each other, 
which has to do with being useful during either sickness or unforeseen 
challenges. 




2.6.11 Conflict resolution 
 
Although conflict has negative connotations and has the possibility of leading to poor 
teamwork, or even teams breaking up, however, constructive conflict can be helpful to 




promotion of useful debate, while eradicating dysfunctional conflict; combining the 
conflict management strategy to the source and nature of the conflict and using 
integrative strategies, instead of distributive strategies (Flin et al. 2008). Conflict can 
occur due to task, team processes and interpersonal changes. However, explanation 
of roles and responsibilities has the tendency of reducing team process conflicts, and 
sustaining an unbiased, non-emotional focus which reduces the potential for 





Communication is a vital skill to effective and safe task procedures in any safety critical 
or high-risk industry (Clarke 2012). Clear and succinct communication has the 
capability of eliminating any information that will affect successful operation (Kleij 
2009). Communication is a shared procedure of team members that sends and 
receives information which tends to shape and re-shape a team’s way of behaviours, 
and thoughts (Connaughton and Daly 2004; Craig 1999). It is about giving and 
receiving information, response, thoughts and feelings. It gives understanding, 
establishes contacts, creates predictable behaviour forms, upholds attention to tasks 
and serves as a tool for management (Wiener, Kanki, and Helmreich 1995). Cobley 
and Schulz said communication means sharing or have a relationship with somebody, 
an act of doing something in common (Cobley and Schulz 2013). 
 
Patey (2015) explained that healthcare personnel are told that 90 per cent of making 
a good diagnosis is to take a good medical history of the patient. However, what is not 
taught is how to communicate effectively and safely in the work environment. Another 
missing point is how to be assertive when someone senior to you is making mistakes, 
listening attentively, and being open. She said being rude hinders communication as 
studies have shown that being rude in the work environment reduces cognitive skills 
(Patey 2015). Figure 6 shows effective feedback in communication, while Table 5 













                                           Figure 6: Effective feedback in communication (Flin et al. 2008) 
 
 







Leadership has been defined as a process of social influence that inspires people to 
pursue targeted goals (Quinn and Quinn 2015: 8). Effective leadership is vital for 
maintaining safe performance in the workplace (Hofmann and Morgeson 2004; 
Glendon et al. 2006). Leaders influence main worksite safety behaviours such as 
compliance with rules and procedures (Thompson et al. 1998) and manage serious 
incidents (Flin 1996).  
 
The term ‘safety leadership’ is commonly used in industry which refers to managers 
and supervisors’ leadership behaviours in relative to safety outcomes. It is expected 
that safety leaders should create an atmosphere in which unsafe acts are confronted, 
while safe behaviours are promoted to achieve a workplace free of harm (Step 
Change in Safety 2006). 
 
Flin and Yule (2004) recorded examples of safety leaders as follows: monitoring and 
supporting workers’ safe behaviours; partaking in workforce safety activities; being 
supportive of safety ideas; and emphasising safety over productivity or profit (Flin et 
al. 2004); as safety leaders are meant to create an environment in which unsafe acts 
are questioned, while safe behaviours are promoted to achieve a safe workplace (Flin 
et al. 2004). 
 
Example of leadership failure was Occidental Petroleum (Caledonia) Ltd’s Piper Alpha 
oil and gas production platform, which suffered an explosion on the production deck 
of the platform in 1988. It is believed that the crisis on Piper Alpha could have been 
well managed, but ‘it seems the whole system of command had broken down’. Lord 
Cullen’s official inquiry report revealed that ‘the failure of the offshore installation 
managers (OIM) could not cope with the problems they faced on the night of the 
disaster which clearly demonstrated that conventional selection and training of OIMs 
is no assurance of capability to cope if the manager is not able in the end to take 






2.6.14 Decision Making 
 
Decision making is an important talent especially in high-risk industries especially 
when the individuals involved are working under time pressure and stress. It is a 
procedure of reaching a judgement or selecting a course of action designed at meeting 
certain needs (Flin et al. 2008); as operators are constantly challenged with non-
normal and in some case unexpected situations in which they must efficiently respond 
for them to maintain safe and efficient operations (Thomas 2018). 
  
Nutt and Wilson (2010) noted that decision making is about making choices from 
different alternatives that are often unclear, but in an attempt to choose wisely for the 
interest of the organisational and its stakeholders (Nutt and Wilson 2010). There are 
different types of decision-making techniques (Flin et al. 2008: 41); however, these 
techniques are dependent on situations and circumstances, while some of those are 
relevant to safety critical decisions (Flin et al. 2008). 
 
Patey (2015) twin process theory said there are two forms of decision making. One is 
intuitive decision making, which depends on context. Most mistakes happen with this 
form of decision-making. The second type of decision making is based on analytical 
theory. This mostly occurs when people come across a new challenge. This type takes 
too much time, hard work, and human nature is to return to intuitive decision making 
as quickly as possible (Patey 2015). Figure 7 shows both intrinsic and extrinsic ways 













                                     Figure 7: Intrinsic and Extrinsic decision-making 
 
Thomas (2018) noted that in high-risk industries decision-making is done in a highly 
controlled environment, where a decision is taken in a time-critical way with often quite 




team-based operation, as there are a lot of complexities from information transfer, 
shared mental models and influences surrounding decision-making. There are also 




2.6.15 Traditional decision-making theories 
 
There are basically two types of decision making, the slower and the faster 
(Kahneman 2012: 13). Slower decisions should be taken where those taking the 
decision have a lot of time and all useful information is accessible to execute a 
decision. In a dynamic environment, a decision may be required promptly because of 
time constraint to create options and then evaluate each of those options and choice 
made. In such a situation, decisions are made based on the individual’s knowledge. 
To arrive at the appropriate decision some complex thinking takes place in the mind 




2.6.16 Naturalistic Decision Making (NDM)  
 
Since the mid-1980s, interest has risen by applied psychologists and researchers in 
naturalistic decision making. Its purpose in research is to explain how decision makers 
arrive at decisions under uncertainties, stress and limited information and time 
available at their disposal. It is noted that NDM has been useful in a lot of high-risk 
safety industries such as military, aviation, nuclear power generation and acute 
medicine (Flin et al. 2008: 44). Research conducted on NDM was to find out which 
approaches people used to make decisions and how tough decisions under uncertain 
conditions are arrived at. It revealed that while taking decisions, options and evaluating 
options were not generated. Instead, experience was used to match the situation then 
followed by decision making (Klein 2008). 
 
2.6.17 Model of NDM  
 
In a work environment, there is a continuous cycle of monitoring the situation, 
assessing/checking the state of events and then taking proper actions and re-




(Flin 1996). Figure 8 explains how NDM is applied to a range of operational work 
settings, as the model portrays a two-stage process by carrying out a situation 
assessment and secondly uses a decision method for choosing a course of action 
















                                       Figure 8: Decision Making Model (Flin et al. 2008: 44)  
 
2.6.18 Managing stress 
 
Gray (1998), quoting Hans Selye in his book ‘The Stress of Life’ (1956), gave a 
definition of stress as a condition revealed by a precise condition of biological actions. 
Gray suggests that it was not “nervous tension,” or “discharge of hormones from the 
adrenal glands,” nor “basically the influence of some negative occurrence,” but 
maintained that it was “not an entirely bad event.” Stress, according to Selye (1956), 
is the general response of the body to any request on it for change or adaptation, any 
kind of normal action capable of producing significant stress that cannot cause any 
damaging effects (Gray 1998). 
 
Similarly, the Health and Safety Executive (HSE 2005), defined stress as the adverse 
response people give due to extreme pressure or load they receive (HSE 2005). 
Quoted in Flin et al. (2008), Lazarus and Folkman (1984), defined stress as a type of 




as going beyond limits and equally risking his or her comfort (Flin, O’Connor, and 
Crichton 2008). According to Scott (2018), stress sometimes arises due to the 
seeming gap between the demands of a situation and an individual’s capability to 
manage those challenges (Scott 2018).  It is believed that stress has been associated 
with safety outcomes, such as accident involvement (Cooper and Clarke, 2003). 
Therefore, the ability to diagnose and manage stress in oneself and others is a vital 






















                                   Figure 9: Examples of stress (DFSB 2018: 114) 
 
 
2.6.19 Coping with fatigue 
  
Fatigue has been defined as the condition of being tired which is related to long 
working hours, continued periods of not sleeping, or needing to work at odd hours 
(Flin, O’Connor, and Crichton 2008). Fatigue is a complex condition considered as 
a lack of awareness which can reduce mental and physical actions or alertness and 
often associated by tiredness. Fatigue is described as not one basic event that could 
be easily explained, instead, it is the combination of multiple features linked to 
biological sleep requirements (Nesthus 2009).  
 
According to Foster et al (2015), fatigue is a complicated issue, with physical signs 
such as having low energy or the need to have rest. There is also the cognitive aspect 




experiencing the sensation or feeling of heavy eyelids, lack of concentration, reduced 
energy, nodding heads constantly, grogginess or unsteadiness (Foster et al. 2015; 
Flin et al. 2008). 
 
Stress and fatigue equally have effect on people in a working environment. It is 
believed that 24 hours of non-sleeping has the same effect as one blood containing 
0.1 per cent of alcohol. Other possible causative reasons include extreme workload, 
dealing to mistakes made by oneself, others, and inadequate professional assistance 
and training (Patey 2015). 
 
These seven elements were critically assessed using an online survey to test if the 
three organisations, especially the nuclear sector are in any way using them to 






2.7 Measuring NTS in the Workplace and its Limitations 
 
There are several methods which relate to or contain references to NTS such as 
personality measures, psychometric assessments, structured and unstructured 
interviews, group activities, and work sample tests. These criteria have different 
advantages and disadvantages and purposes. For instance, psychometric 
assessments can be used to measure or determine the cognitive skills which can 
influence the demonstration of NTS such as reasoning, attention and being vigilant 
(RSSB 2016). 
 
Structured interviews and personality measures like situational judgement exercises 
can be used to measure NTS such as co-operation and teamwork, communication, 
carefulness and managing oneself (self-management). See Table 6 on how to 
measure NTS and characteristics to observe (RSSB 2016). 
 

























Organisational learning (OL) is the third pillar used to determine if high-risk industries 
such as the nuclear, aviation and oil and gas are learning organisations which could 
be used to effectively manage workplace safely. The three sectors were engaged in 





Organisational learning is an effective procedure to process, interpret and respond to 
internal and external information of a largely clear nature (Easterby-Smith et al. 
1999); it also helps organisations to change individual knowledge into organisational 
knowledge (Basten and Haamann 2018a). Maybey and Salaman (1995) explained 
that organisational learning is concerned with the expansion of new knowledge or 
understanding as organisations have the potential to influence behaviour; it occurs 
within the wide institutional setting of inter-organisational relationships (Mabey and 
Salaman 1995; Geppert 2000).  
 
Argyris and Schon (1978) said organisational learning refers broadly to an 
organisation’s acquisition of understanding, know-how, techniques and practices of 
any kind and by any means (Argyris and Schön 1978). Cohen and Levinthal (1990), 
quoted in Alonso and Austin (2017) noted that the significance of organisational 
learning is for organisations to exploit external sources of knowledge and positively 
affect internal innovation processes. Despite many academic contributions, numerous 
knowledge gaps concerning OL have been recognised (Hsu and Pereira 2008; 
Lichtenthaler 2009).  
 
Cartwright et al. (2001) noted that organisational learning is a process that requires 
coordinated systems change with mechanisms built in for individuals and groups to 
achieve, build and use organisational memory, structures and culture to develop a 
longer term organisational goal (Cartwright et al. 2001). One important key aspect to 
organisational change as suggested by Argyris (1977) and Senge (1990) is the ability 




recognised as an organisation that is adjusting to environmental change (Argyris 
1977; Senge 1990). 
 
Somehow, OL is equally seen as a development in the sense that people in that 
industry adhere to changes both internal and in the external environments. Errors are 
immediately corrected to sustain the structures or ideas of the organisation. According 
to proponents of change, they believe that change follows mistake detection and being 
inquisitive of fundamental policies and goals as in “generative” or so “double loop-
learning” (Argyris 1977).    
 
OL gives different pattern for systems to cause change by allowing people to interpret  
the economy and society in a different way (Probst and Buchel 2000). The chief 
reasons why organisations should learn is due to increased demand on organisations 
to change; and the fact that change accelerates speedily, therefore, organisations are 
supposed to find their footings in an environment that is becoming more complex. Any 
organisation that refuses to learn, has the potential to be a loser; and learning is the 
only lasting solution to achieving viable advantage (Probst and Buchel 2000; Geus 
1988).  
 
Toft and Reynolds (2006) said organisational learning is a collective, thoughtful and 
saturating procedure that all personnel in the organisations learn to comprehend and 
continuously reinterpret the environment they work in through acquiring experiences 
(Toft and Reynolds 2006). If accidents re-occur due to the same reasons, then it 
could be assumed that organisational learning that took place after an event occurred 
have the possibilities of retaining similar characteristics. If there is better 
understanding of the process of reporting events back and learning from it, chances 
are they could be design procedures and strategies that will help organisational 
learning and reduce great losses (Toft and Reynolds 2006).  
 
However, Tsang (1997) thinks differently. He said organisational learning is better 
described as attempts by individual organisations to tilt towards becoming learning 
organisations by simply encouraging learning in a sensible, methodical and synergistic 
manner that involves all people in the organisation. A learning organisation is the peak 
of organisational learning whereby an organisation has attained the skill to always 





Argyris (1990) recognised that traditional methods to learning are a barrier against 
promoting organisational learning, that failure to have centralised learning gives the 
justification for organisation to learn. Argyris (1990) stated that because environment 
is changing at a fast rate, and the responses required are varied, therefore, 
organisations should not wait for handful of senior managers to recognise what needs 
to be changed in an organisation; by the time they realised the need for change, the 
opportunity would have gone (Argyris 1977, Wilson 1992).  
 
In contrast, organisational learning relates to the connection between the speed, 
repetition and degree of change in the society and the ability to learn. This affords the 
basis to which an organisation desires to move completely away from archaic method 
of learning and relies at the speed and nature that takes place in that environment 
(Bateson 1972, Revans 1982). 
 
Though different authors gave the basis for organisational learning, this is still debated 
in different quarters that it is in no way closer to defining what organisational learning 
is. Conceivably, the most acceptable meaning is that learning is bringing everyone in 
the same organisation to accept change (Stata 1989). Friedlander (1984) stated that 
learning empowers people to determine choosing from different variables or choice in 
whether to change, such an action may not lead in any noticeable changes in attitudes. 
Nevis et al. (1995) said procedure of how organisations learn could be very complex 
and does not happen in a linear progression, somehow it could occur intentionally, 
unintentionally and informal (Friedlander 1984; Nevis et al. 1995).  
 
Drawing upon these statements, it can be said that before organisations and people 
can accept new characters or changes, the first thing that happens is for them to 
“unlearn” former behaviours and procedures which they had acquainted themselves 
with before they can become accustomed to or adopt to change new behaviours 
(Nystrom and Starbuck 1984). Most authors, certainly the sceptical school of 
thoughts view organisational learning as an intricate development that unfolds over a 
period of time, instead they believe it is linked with knowledge acquisition and 
improved performance (Nystrom and Starbuck 1984; Garvin 1993). 
 
Garvin (1993) however gave reasons why organisations refuse to learn. He said 
except there are changes to the way work is planned and completed, obviously there 




hinders organisational existence. Garvin’s  view corroborate with Bateson (1972), 
Argyris and Schon (1978) observations (Garvin 1993).  
 
Debunking all assertions attributed to organisational learning, Vicker (2013) noted that 
organisational learning is contradictory. To him, if organisational learning means 
anything, it is rather on the side of the individuals that function in that organisation. 
Organisational learning is said to be important as it improves safety culture and 
recognises that individuals working in an organisation learn new methods or ways of 
reasoning through varied understanding for a long period of time (Vickers 2013; Kim 
2015).  
 
Pidgeon (1998) holds a divergent view on organisational learning. He said learning is 
paramount to managing organisations safely, that the issue of politics and power is 
conspicuously missing in most academic models of organisational disasters and many 
discussions of safety cultures likewise. Politics and power Pidgeon (1998) pointed out, 
are however serious to determine if a good amount of results of safety values are met, 
and most importantly organisational learning (Pidgeon 1998). 
 
Despite several arguments by different authors on organisational learning, this 
research tends to align with EDF (2017) which clearly incorporates human 
performance, nuclear safety culture and corrective action programme as 
organisational learning. The organisation further stressed that organisational learning 
emphasises minimising the frequency and consequences of human errors achieved 
through training, active use of human error prevention tools and serious supervision, 
performance teaching and the identification and reduction of organisational 
weaknesses through proper investigations into events, incidents, near-misses and 
performance trending of sub-standard situations (EDF 2017). 
 
Nevertheless, Bell and Healey (2006) noted that effective organisational learning 
requires not only innovations and new processes but also their adoption and diffusion 
to other parts of the organisation (Bell and Healey 2006); while Toft and Reynolds 
(2006) maintained that active foresight should be the goal of organisational learning 
process that should combine foresight of the possible causes of disaster, with action 
to remove or reduce the risk of those causes taking place (Toft and Reynolds 2006), 




world; disaster, most often, is expected on multiple occasions (Toft and Reynolds 
2006). 
 
However, Vicker (2013) noted that organisational learning is contradictory. That, if 
organisational learning means anything, it is rather on the side of the individuals that 
functions in that organisation (Vickers 2013). This opinion is supported by Wang and 
Ahmed (2002) that learning commences from individuals (Wang and Ahmed 2002).  
OL is said to be important as it improves safety culture and recognises that individuals 
working in an organisation learn new ways of reasoning through diverse understanding 
for a long period of time (Kim 2015).  
 
Pidgeon (1998) stated that OL is paramount to managing organisations safely, that 
the issue of politics and power is noticeably missing in most academic models of 




2.8.3 Types of Learning 
 
Toft and Reynolds (2006) suggest that two types of learning are most likely to take 
place in an organisation: “passive learning and active learning.” Passive learning 
according to the duo is knowing or having an understanding about something; while 
active learning is understanding something and following it up by taking corrective 
actions to shortcomings that are seen to exist. Irrespective of the type of lesson 
learned after an inquiry into a disaster is published, without putting the lesson learned 
into practice is tantamount to learning nothing. There is no sense in understanding 
how to stop accidents if there are no active moves made to stopping it (Toft and 
Reynolds 2006). 
 
2.8.4 Organisational Learning Theory 
 
According to (Argyris 2012), they are two types of organisational theories which 
organisations should be conversant with to achieve success, vis-a-vis safety practices. 
They are single- and double-loop learning and single-loop and double-loop learning 














                    Figure 10: Single-loop and double-loop learning (Argyris & Schön, 1996: 22). 
 
Single-loop learning: Single-loop learning theory is instrumental learning which 
changes strategies of action or assumptions underlying strategies in ways that leave 
the values of a theory of action unaffected (Argyris 2012). An instance is the 
identification and subsequent correction of a production defect. Engineers change the 
respective product specification to avoid the flaw in the future. Single-loop learning 
compares existing problems and organisational values and norms to develop an 
adequate solution (Argyris 2012). 
 
Double-loop learning: In this case, if defect correction requires adaptations of 
organisational values and norms, then double-loop learning is required. It is a learning 
that results and focuses in value change of theory which is being used both in 
strategies and assumptions (Argyris 2012). This theory refers to two feedback loops 
that connect observed effects with strategies and values served by those strategies. 
Possibly, divergent organisational performance requirements could cause conflicts 
among different people in the organisation. Nonetheless, double-loop learning could 
be executed by persons, when it is obvious that inquiry could lead to change in the 








2.9 Isomorphic Lessons (Cross-System Learning) 
 
2.9.1 Isomorphic Lessons (IL) 
 
Evidence abounds from case study examples which indicate there are links between 
organisational change and accidents (Bell and Healey 2006). If organisations should 
be safe as reasonably practicable, they should learn (change) from their own 
experiences, and where suitable, learn experience from others through isomorphic 
lessons and organisational learning (Toft and Reynolds 2006). Put differently, 
accidents and disasters are unique, which may be the reason why the ‘lesson learned’ 
from such incidents are somehow not implemented in most organisations; as analysis 
of the outcome of events could indicate that the same lessons and recommendations 
keep re-occurring (Symon and Cassell 2012; Kletz 2001; Toft and Reynolds 2006). 
 
However, accidents sometimes seem to have similar characteristics at some point or 
levels of analysis (Toft and Reynolds 2006). This observation when linked to Von 
Bertalanfy’s hypothesis on the nature of systems, provokes questions about how far 
organisational learning can occur through the isomorphic features of an accident (Toft 
and Reynolds 2006). Therefore, isomorphic learning is a form of realistic strategy 
applied to manage accident with regards to organisation and management practice 
(Toft and Reynolds 2006). Moore (2009) noted that lessons could have been learnt 
when there is a corrective measure put in place to prevent future re-occurrence of the 
same event (Trim and Caravelli 2008). 
 
Bowerman (2002) stated that organisations should take initiative to pattern themselves 
after an organisations sometimes during a period of uncertainty, or when achieving 
goals seems to be unclear (Bowerman 2002); as isomorphic is a responsive 
procedure, which comprised of analysis of past understanding to shape a 'hazard 
model' of what is expected to happen in the foreseeable future (Kirkwood 1999). 
 
However, other views are that uncertain situations are the main circumstances that 
stimulate organisations to learn from others (Cyert and March 1964); when 
organisational machineries are not well understood; when it is confusing to achieve 
goals or possibly the environment creating some kinds of uncertainties, then an 
organisation may change pattern to be like other organisations (Cyert and March 




appear not to understand how to deal with some new challenges, and instead search 
for organisations to learn from (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). 
 
Conversely, isomorphic learning as advocated by Toft and Reynolds (2006) is the 
ability of organisations to learn from similar experiences of others. They argue that 
lesson learned from different events or organisation could be applied to another setting 
to manage disasters effectively (Toft and Reynolds 2006).  
 
Toft and Reynolds (2006) suggests that there are at least four separate ways through 
which organisations can learn using isomorphic study: event-based incidents; cross-
organisational incidents; common-mode incidents; and in-house events (Toft and 
Reynolds 2006). Lessons derived from isomorphic learning can generate useful 
‘insight’ with the advantage of hindsight, which provides and increases foresight in 
another organisation. More so, increase in foresight leads to changes in organisational 
safety values leading to where workers can speedily learn from unwanted accidents 
and better the company’s chances of survival (Toft and Reynolds 2006, Kim 2015).  
 
But Trim and Caravelli (2008), referred in Moore (2009), noted that “lessons learnt” 
was a frequent contradiction that organisations constantly used in business continuity 
domains, instead the right word should be “lessons identified”.  Moore (2009) stated 
that a lesson could be said to have been learnt when there is a corrective measure 
put in place to avert future re-occurrence of the same event. This view according to 
him was supported by Toft and Reynolds (2005:66) (Trim and Caravelli 2008). 
 
On other forms of isomorphism, Bowerman (2002) explained that mimetic 
isomorphism is when industries or organisations takes an initiative to pattern (imitate) 
themselves after an organisation sometimes during a situation of uncertainty, or when 
achieving goals seems to be unclear. In such a situation, a company might use 
different approaches to improve their acceptability and reveal they are improving; it is 
a responsive procedure comprised of analysis of past understanding to shape a 
'hazard model' of what is expected to happen in the foreseeable future (Bowerman 
2002; Kirkwood 1999).  
 
Though Krause (2013) and DiMaggio and Powell (1983), explained that IL is a 
compelling development which enforces an organisation in a given population to look 




challenges (Krause 2013, DiMaggio and Powell 1983); still, some organisations 
have a habit of modelling themselves after the same type of organisations they noticed 
to be more successful (DiMaggio and Powell 1983).  
 
Hannan and Freeman (1977) claim that isomorphism can result due to selection of 
non-optimal forms from a population of organisations or possibly because those that 
make decisions in an organisation learn suitable remarks and regulate their conduct 
appropriately (Hannan and Freeman 1989). Three methods were identified in which 
organisational isomorphic transformation can happen, each relating to a common 
background. They are coercive or forced isomorphism which emanates from political 
impact and the problem of legality. The second is mimetic isomorphism, which ensues 
from normal replies to unclear issues; and lastly, the normative or usual isomorphism 
which is related to professionalisation (Hannan and Freeman 1989). 
 
However, isomorphic lesson is understood as sharing information on what went wrong 
irrespective of the location, as it is crucial to stop repeating similar mistakes. 
Somehow, it is believed that what is learned will help to make adequate progress to 
safety. This progress is applicable to designing new and maintaining or upgrading of 
current plants (Christou et al. 2012). The European Parliament and the Council 
believed that when there is exchange of information on past events and accidents, it 
will be of immense importance to avoid similar accidents repeating itself (Christou et 
al. 2012). The European view agrees with the idea this research holds, hence the need 
to find out if organisations are learning from past mistakes. 
 
For organisations to learn, managers have a role to play in isomorphic lessons, which 
is, to increase safety by promoting learning from previous mistakes or experience 
(Gordon 1996). Managers should also provide an environment in which it is safe to 
work, and commitment to safety by senior management who must be seen at strategic 
and policy levels in communication, training, promoting positive safety policy and 
learning from other organisations and experience (Gordon 1996). 
 
Kletz’s (2001) said an organisation can learn from itself and not necessarily from 
others. He cited an instance at Three Mile Island where there were concerns with 
major accident failures, such as cracking of a primary water pipe, while smaller 





Kletz (2001) noted that there is a belief that if significant accidents could be controlled, 
therefore minor accidents could be controlled likewise. On the contrary, he insisted 
that it is not true as minor accidents could become major accidents. Equally, in most 
process industries, a lot of injuries and damage are rather caused by let-downs or 
failures, and failures of whatever source should be given attention (Kletz 2001). 
 
Isomorphism: Case study 
 
Toft and Reynolds (2006) noted that isomorphism had underlying similarity in the failure of systems of 
two seemingly disparate types, a bridge and nuclear power plant (NPP). The West Gate Bridge at 
Melbourne, Australia collapsed after a structural failure. It was later confirmed that the collapse was 
caused by the unsatisfactory nature of a computer program which was used to calculate the size and 
nature of steel required for the bridge’s construction (Toft and Reynolds 2006). 
 
In March 1976, it was revealed that five NPP in the USA were closed due to a seemingly ‘simple 
mathematical error’ identified in a computer program used to design the reactor cooling system (Toft 
and Reynolds 2006). In these two scenarios, there are quite different system, but approximately similar 
problem-defective design software caused to unwanted results (Toft and Reynolds 2006). 
 
Another example of isomorphism was the loss of coolant water at the Crystal River NPP in Florida USA. 
An identical valve to that which malfunctioned at Three Mile Island (TMI) in 1979, stuck open and water-
logged the reactor basement with 190,000 litres of very highly radioactive water (Toft and Reynolds 
2006). In this case the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, which had conducted the inquiry into the TMI 
incident, had permitted the plant operators two exemptions from the recommendations which they 
themselves had suggested. According to some nuclear scientists, those two examples allowed the 
Crystal River incident to develop into an emergency (Toft and Reynolds 2006). 
 
An identical valve to that which stuck open at both TMI and Crystal River malfunctioned again in 
precisely the same way at Davis-Besse in Ohio in 1985. Fortunately, on this occasion an operator 
noticed the drop in pressure and prevented the reactor from entering a dangerous condition. In the 
period between the two incidents, a report was published in Britain on an incident at the Heysham 
nuclear power stations, Lancashire, which discussed mistakes that were almost the same as the 





2.9.2 Isomorphism: Ways Organisations Learn 
 
According to Toft and Reynolds (2006), there are four different ways an organisation 
can learn by using isomorphic study. These are: 
 
2.9.3 Event isomorphism: 
  
This relates to where two different events occur in two entirely diverse ways which 
eventually lead to similar dangerous results. An instance of this was a train accident 
at Clapham Junction, where the driver passed a signal set at danger and occupied a 
track meant for another on-coming train. This is called a ‘signal passed at danger 
(SPAD) occurrence and classified under human error. Another event was when a train 
enters a track and the signal regulatory access did not change to red and equally 
allows other trains to rail on the same track at the same time. This was described as 
‘wrong-sided signal failure’ (WSF) because the signal system was left in danger (Toft 
and Reynold 2006). 
 
2.9.4 Cross-organisational isomorphism:  
 
Cross-organisational isomorphism occurs when an organisation belongs to different 
ownership. The management and staff are recruited by different agencies or people 
but functions as one sector. That is, the organisations could be dissimilar in nature, 
have unrelated company names, settings, but on the other hand can be regarded as 
being identical because each produces the same goods or supplies similar services. 
 
2.9.5 Common-mode isomorphism:  
 
This describes organisations belonging to separate industries, but using almost the 
same or related tools, components and techniques to produce products. This practice 
could lead to having the same kind of challenges should accident occur. An example 
is the use of polyurethane foam in producing aircraft and furniture organisations to 




2.9.6 Self-isomorphism:  
 
This is where an organisation in question is big and has several organisational sub-
units which produce different services. Most of the working units will be exposed to 
internal and external emergencies and therefore facing the same type of failure. (Toft 
and Reynolds 2006). 
 
 
2.9.7 Learning from Past Events - Systems Approach to Isomorphism 
(Benefits of Publishing Accident Reports) 
 
Kletz (2009) suggests that accident reports should be published to enable other 
organisations to learn from such incidents. He gave five reasons why it is beneficial. 
 
a. Moral reason: If people or organisations have information that is capable to 
prevent an accident, then there is need to let others know about it. 
 
b. Pragmatic reason: This relates to telling people/organisations about the 
accidents they have had, as they in turn will tell theirs; if people learn from 
others without giving information in return, then such an organisation that holds 
back information is known as “an information parasite.” This is a term used by 
biologists to describe birds that rely on other species of birds to give warning of 
forthcoming dangers. 
 
c. Economic reason: Many companies spend more on safety plans than other 
competitors, which is regarded as self-imposed tax. If other competitors know 
about the action their rival took after an accident, then they may spend as much 
as their rival has done to prevent that accident happening again. 
 
d. Image loss: If one company has a serious accident, the entire industry suffers 
in loss of public respect, and these may be new legislation by which the whole 
industry is affected. 
 
e. Impact of an accident report: If people or organisations read reports that inform 









This research studied one accident that occurred in each of the three sectors, that is 
nuclear, aviation and the oil and gas sectors, with the hope of determining possible 
causes, relationships and lapses it has on NTS, isomorphic lessons, organisational 
learning and risk characterisation.   
 
The three notable accidents are: Fukushima Daiichi NPP of March 2011 in Japan, the 
Hudson River Landing of a Passenger Plane US 1549 in January 2009 in North 
Carolina, USA and the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill of 2010 in Houston, USA. 
Furthermore, this research likewise discussed low level or near-miss incidents across 
the three sectors. These are: Sellafield Sump Tank Levels Nuclear near miss incident 
of 2019; the Beech-200 King Air registered EC-KNP incident 2012 and EnQuest and 
Odjfell Drilling Sling Failure of 2018. 
 
Analysis of these events were drawn using literature, publications from government 
related agencies, and video recordings aimed at linking possible causes to non-use of 
NTS, isomorphic lessons, organisational learning and risk characterisation to 
managing safely. Findings from these sectors served as lessons, that is, where there 
is no adequate application of NTS, such organisation will be prone to accidents due to 
limited understanding in humans (Flin et al. 2008); organisational learning, isomorphic 
lessons and risk characterisation also becomes important to safety management (Toft 
and Reynolds 2006; Stern and Fineberg 1996). 
 
 
2.10.2 Summary of Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Accident of 2011, Japan 
 
Opinions are still divided on whether the failure of Fukushima Daiichi nuclear facility 
could have been prevented from happening (Khan, A. H., Hasan, and Sarkar 2018). 
People still believe that it was a twin natural disaster that caused the accident, which 
invariably no one could have predicted. However, others argued that lack of 
precautions was the main reason behind the disaster which could have been surely 




The Fukushima Daiichi NPP accident occurred by the Great East Japan Earthquake 
and tsunami. A report by the National Police Agency revealed that 15,884 persons 
were killed and 2,633 persons were still missing, as of March 2014 (Nagasaki 2016). 
The earthquake deactivated off-site power to the plant and caused the automatic 
blackout of the three functioning reactors - Units 1, 2 and 3 (IAEA 2017). The accident 
measured Level 7 on INES (Power Tech 2017). The accident led to complete 
destruction of the local communities and gave rise to conflicts between original 
residents and evacuees. These adversely gave serious physical, health and mental 
impacts on the residents in Fukushima (Nagasaki 2016). 
 
The tsunami waves wrecked most of the safety and power systems, leaving only one 
diesel generator at Unit 6. (Power Tech 2017). This incident caused the damage of 
the cooling reactor cores, which led to the meltdowns of three reactors. The accident 
also caused the discharge of substantial quantity of radioactive materials which 
affected the environment, as hydrogen that exploded at the facility led to further 
destruction of the outside concrete and triggered the evacuation of people occupying 
at 20km zone (Power Tech 2017). The reactor pressure vessels (RPVs) which 
enclose the reactor cores were breached in the units, which caused radioactive 
material to escape from the reactors (IAEA 2015). 
 
However, from the engineering point of view, the direct cause of the accident is the 
submergence of all metal clad switchgears and many power centres (Nagasaki 2016). 
The Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) investigated the sediments carried by 
the tsunami along the Pacific coast of Fukushima region. The study found that 
sediments at the altitude of approximately 4 meter in the north area of Fukushima but 
could not find in the south area of Fukushima Daiichi (Nagasaki 2016). 
 
Technically, in Fukushima there are six units of Boiling Water Reactors (BWRs). These 
reactors are the oldest generation, which are BWR 3 and 4 (Khan et al. 2018). Each 
reactor unit had a reactor pressure vessel, a containment vessel and a reactor 
building. It also had a pool for spent fuels on the top floor of the reactor building. When 
the earthquake occurred, Units 1-3 were still in operation and Units 4-6 were shut 
down for normal inspection. This led reactor Unit 4 to stop, and fuels then moved into 
spent fuel pool. The fuels in the spent fuel pool of Unit 4 had high decay heat. This led 




and emergency diesel generators that supposed to carry out emergency cooling and 
passive cooling system (Khan et al. 2018). 
 
Transmission line towers and other equipment on the plant grounds stopped working 
because of the earthquake which also deactivated Units 1 through 6 from receiving 
external AC power. The Emergency Deiseal Generator (EDG) came up automatically, 
and the Isolated Condenser (IC) in the Unit 1 which is driven by battery became 
operational for core cooling. Though the IC was operated intermittently to avoid too 
rapid temperature change (Khan et al. 2018). Figure 11 shows the areas affected by 



























                               Figure 11: The Great East Japan Earthquake (IAEA 2015) 
 
Apart from technical errors, human errors, apparently due to NTS lapses further 
worsened the accident (IAEA 2017); as the number of staffs at the plant were not 
enough to manage the accident due to the scope that affected several reactor units 
and the long duration that it lasted (NCBI 2014). This research scrutinised various 
publications from different authorities such as International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA) on possible causes relating to the research areas. Table 7 shows possible to 




Table 7: Possible causes of Fukushima Daiichi accident and relationship to NTS lapses, isomorphic lessons, organisational learning and risk characterisation 
 














1 How natural disaster - 
earthquake combined to cause 
continued power failure and 
complete damage of heat sink 
(IAEA 2017; NCBI 2014). 
 
Fukushima accident was caused 
by the Great East Japan 
Earthquake and tsunami 
(Nagasaki 2016). 
No knowledge of situation 
awareness (attention to 
work environment) and 
poor leadership contributed 
to the accident (Flin et al. 
2008). 
No trace of isomorphic lesson.  No trace of 
organisational learning. 
No trace of risk 
characterisation. 
2 Worsened by human failure which 
further impaired operator's 
accident management ability (IAEA 
2017). 
 
In Unit 2, the Reactor Core Isolation 
Cooling system was not stable, and 
the reactor core was not cooled 
suitably, and the Reactor Core 
Isolation Cooling system equally 
stopped functioning (Khan et al. 
2018). 
Lack of knowledge of 
situation and poor 
leadership to manage safely. 
No trace of isomorphic lesson.  No trace of 
organisational learning. 
No trace of risk 
characterisation. 
3 Power plant operators did not have 
enough equipment to monitor vital 
safety components and parameters 
that linked to reactor temperature 
and coolant level (IAEA 2017). 
Poor leadership quality and 
lack of knowledge on 
situation awareness 
worsened the accident.  
No trace of isomorphic lesson.  No trace of 
organisational learning. 





4 The backup generators which was 
planned to start-up after off-site 
power had failed, started to 
provide electricity to pumps 
circulating coolant to the six 
nuclear reactors (IAEA 2011). 
Lack of knowledge on either 
situation awareness, 
communication and or 
leadership worsened the 
accident. 
No trace of isomorphic lesson.  No trace of 
organisational learning. 
No trace of risk 
characterisation. 
5 Disconnection of the energy supply 
and three cooling Fukushima 
reactors leading to the accident 
(WNA 2017). 
No knowledge of situation 
awareness worsened the 
accident.  
No trace of isomorphic lesson.  No trace of 
organisational learning. 
No trace of risk 
characterisation. 
6 Operators and staff on on-site 
emergency response centre did not 
have suitable procedures and 
training required for accident that 
involves extended loss of all on- 
site AC and DC power to manage 
water levels and pressures in 
reactors and containments and 
hydrogen that were generated 
during reactor core degradation 
((NCBI 2014). 
Communication problem at 
Fukushima as the 
organisation had to find 
translators, many calls from 
professionals and members 
of the public to the three 
units, distribute various 
messages and documents 
(IRSN 2011). 
No trace of isomorphic lesson.  No trace of 
organisational learning. 
No trace of risk 
characterisation. 
7 The number of staff at the plant 
were not enough to manage the 
accident due to scope that affected 
several reactor units and long 
duration that it lasted (ibid). 
 
Malfunctioning of nuclear disaster 
robots (Khan et al. 2018). 
Coping with fatigue, 
situation awareness and 
leadership problems. 
No trace of isomorphic lesson.  No trace of 
organisational learning. 





2.10.3 Analysis of Fukushima accident Focusing on NTS and other Pillars 
 
This analyses on Fukushima Daiichi accident did not essentially focused on what past 
literature have done, instead, it focused on how lapses of NTS, isomorphic lessons, 
organisational learning and risk characterisation contributed to the accident. As 
identified in Table 7, there are reasons to believe that knowledge of NTS was not 
adequately utilised to ensure safety was managed at Fukushima NPP (NCBI 2014). 
At the same time, there was no trace of isomorphic lesson, organisational and risk 
characterisation in the materials consulted to ascertain possible causes of the 
accident. This presupposes that none of the four pillars used in this research formed 
part of safety management criteria. 
 
Though it could be argued that perhaps NTS which is virtually a new terminology or 
idea in safety management in high-risk industries, however, could have meant 
something different or rather interpreted differently. Nonetheless, this work was able 
to identify some NTS gaps that perhaps contributed or worsened the Fukushima 
accident. Another possible cause of the accident was lack of preparedness (Khan et 
al. 2018); which is associated to situation awareness and poor leadership (Flin et al. 
2008). 
 
The main reasons behind the tragic consequences in Fukushima Daiichi were the lack 
of communication between the government and TEPCO, and the lack of preparedness 
from both sides (Khan et al. 2018). Also, it was gathered that TEPCO lacked sufficient 
communication capability to report on the progress status of the accident punctually 
and accurately to the appropriate organs and local governments (Nihon Genshiryoku 
Gakkai 2015); while  on safety awareness, TEPCO was confident that no severe 
accident of that magnitude would occur, therefore had insufficient and formal training 
plans, and failed to fully prepare the necessary materials and equipment needed to 
combat any eventuality (Nihon Genshiryoku Gakkai 2015). 
 
Other problems that manifested during the accident and that was visible was confusion 
and want of information among the management and higher authorities. They did not 
have enough information and they could not act promptly and effectively (Khan et al. 




However, not much could be said on isomorphic lesson, organisation learning and risk 
characterisation. It is believed that most of the high-risk industries including the nuclear 
sector have no spirit of learning from past events (isomorphic and organisational 
learning) to manage safely. For instance, it was after the Fukushima accident that an 
international fact finding mission was able to address the issue of learning from past 
mistakes (IAEA 2017); as there was a set of preliminary conclusions and identified 
lessons learned in three broad areas: external hazards, severe accident management 
and emergency preparedness (IAEA 2017). 
 
Mike Weightman, UK chief inspector of Nuclear Installations (IAEA 2017) remarked 
that: 
“It is of fundamental importance for all with responsibility for nuclear safety 
across the world to seek to learn from this unique event,” continuing, “for 
me, to maximize nuclear safety you must work on learning lessons and 
continuously improving throughout time. Therefore, we’ll use our 
opportunity here to come to Japan, gather information to see how the 






2.10. 4 Hudson River Landing 
   
2.10.5 Introduction 
 
Another accident examined was the Hudson River Landing in which all the 150 
passengers, including a child, and 5 crew members on-board survived (NTSB 2010).  
The US Airways Flight 1549 was an Airbus A320. After the flight took-off from New 
York City's LaGuardia airport on January 15, 2009, the flight struck a flock of Canada 
geese less than 5 miles northwest of the airport and eventually lost all engine power 
(NTSB 2010).  
 
Both engines had operated normally until they each ingested at least two Canadian 
geese birds that weighed about 8 pounds each (NTSB 2010). One of the birds was 
ingested into each engine core, causing mechanical damage which prevented the 
engines from being able to supply adequate thrust to sustain flight. The size and 
number of the birds that went into the accident engines exceeded the current bird-
ingestion certification standards by the US Airways (NTSB 2010). Because both 
engines could not operate effectively, it was unable to complete the engine dual failure 
checklist (U.S.NRC 2011). 
 
This study focused on how the mishap was successfully managed which led to no loss 
of lives, and perhaps understanding of NTS, isomorphic lesson, organisational 
learning and risk characterisation to manage safely.  
 
The National Transportation Safety Board 2010 official document on: “Loss of Thrust 
in Both Engines after Encountering a Flock of Birds and Subsequent Ditching on the 
Hudson River, US Airways Flight 1549, Airbus A320-214” was used. Reason for 
focusing on the document was the comprehensive report was conducted by an 
independent federal agency dedicated to promoting aviation, railroad, highway, 
marine, pipeline, and hazardous materials safety (NTSB 2010). Some findings relating 


















1 The probable cause of the accident was 
the ingestion of large birds into the two 
engines that led to an almost total loss 
of thrust in both engines, thereby 
ditching the flight into the Hudson River 
(ATSB 2013).  
Good understanding of 
situation awareness 
(attention to work 
environment) after 
recognising something went 
wrong. 
No trace of isomorphic 
lesson 
No trace of organisational 
learning 
The un-planned use of an 
aircraft that was equipped 
for an extended overwater 
flight, including the 
availability of the forward 
slide/rafts, though it was not 
required to be so equipped. 
2 Each engine ingested at least two 
Canada geese weighing about 8 pounds 
each, which significantly exceeded the 
certification standards, and neither 
engine was able to produce enough 
power to sustain flight after ingesting 
these birds (Ibid). 
Good understanding and 
immediate use of 
communication to inform the 
control room of the hazard. 
No trace of isomorphic 
lesson 
No trace of organisational 
learning. 
No further trace of risk was 
characterised. 
3 De-accelerate of speed according to 
FDR data immediately after the bird 
encounter, both engines’ fan and core 
(N1 and N2, respectively). 
Good and quick decision-
making skills to turn around 
the aircraft for possible 
landing  
No trace of isomorphic 
lesson 
No trace of organisational 
learning. 
No further trace of risk was 
characterised. 
4 Losing thrust in both engines (Ibid). Good knowledge of situation 
awareness. 
No trace of isomorphic 
lesson 
No trace of organisational 
learning. 





5 Unplanned start of generator by first 
officer (Ibid). 
Good knowledge of situation 
awareness 
No trace of isomorphic 
lesson 
No trace of organisational 
learning. 







2.10.6 Analysis of Hudson River Landing Accident Focusing on NTS and other 
Pillars. 
 
This analysis revealed how good use of NTS elements by the captain, first officer and 
crew members culminated in saving the lives of all the occupants in the aircraft. Good 
understanding of situation awareness was brought to the fore which commenced from 
after the aircraft took off and within seconds after ditching the plane on the Hudson 
River. The crewmembers and passengers-initiated evacuation of the airplane. 
According to the flight attendants, the evacuation was relatively orderly and timely 
(NTSB 2010).  
 
There was good understanding on the use of communication, as the captain was 
constantly communicating with Air Traffic Control (ATC) and later to passengers to 
brace for impact (NTSB 2010). According to the NTSB report, it stated that the cockpit 
voice recorder data (CVRD) indicated that communication between the captain and 
first officer were excellent (USNRC 2011). The captain credited his flying prowess to 
the US Airways CRM training for providing him and the first officer the skills and tools 
required to build a team. Both pilots quickly open lines of communication, shared 
common goals, and worked together. The first officer and the captain had specific 
roles, knew what each other was doing, and communicated effectively (NTSB 2010). 
 
Communication was extended to ATM’s and ATCT cab coordinator, as they advised 
the Los Angeles Airport (LGA) departure controller that “runway 4 is also available. 
They contacted the LGA Port Authority to advise that the Port Authority of NY and NJ 
needed to be alerted, that an airplane was going to ditch in the Hudson River, which 
was relayed by a nearby helicopter pilot. Both LGA ATCT and New York TRACON 
personnel immediately contacted the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), the New York Police 
Department (NYPD) and various other search and rescue operations. (NTSB 2010). 
 
Teamwork, which is another element of NTS was vital, as the captain confirmed that 
the crew coordination was “amazingly good” in view of how suddenly the event 
happened, its severity, and the little they had at their disposal. The captain further 
revealed that they had no time to consult all the written guidance or complete the 
appropriate checklist, therefore, they had to work almost intuitively in a very close-knit 





Decision-making was also in use, as flight attendant ‘B’ stated that she improvised 
commands and told “young, able-bodied” passengers to climb over the seats to get 
people away from the water. There was further support from the captain and first officer 
as they helped the flight attendants with the evacuation in the airplane (NTSB 2010); 
captain and the first officer supported a number of passengers that had evacuated the 
airplane with life vests; and obtained more life vests from under the passenger seats 
in the cabin and passed them out to passengers outside of the airplane (NTSB 2010). 
 
Managing stress and coping with fatigue was another crucial NTS element that was 
successfully handled, as the captain, first officer and other crewmembers revealed that 
they always had 7-9 hours sleep before the next flight (NTSB 2010). 
 
Risk was adequately characterised on the US Airways Flight 1549 before take-off. The 
airplane met the structural ditching certification regulations in effect at the time of its 
certification, while the engine met the bird-ingestion certification regulations in effect 
at the time of its certification, as well as an anticipated additional regulation that it was 
not required to meet at that time (NTSB 2010).  
 
Likewise, the decision of the captain to ditch the airplane on the Hudson River rather 
than landing at an airport, provided the highest probability that the accident would be 
survivable (NTSB 2010); and the professionalism of the flight crew members and their 
excellent crew resource management during the accident sequence helped to their 
ability to maintain control of the airplane, configure it to the extent possible under the 
circumstances, and fly an approach that increased the survivability of the impact 
(NTSB 2010).  
 
According an information published by the United States Nuclear Regulation 
Commission (USNRC), there were evidence of strong safety culture traits and 
evidence of positive culture traits that contributed to managing safety in the aviation 
sector (USNRC 2011). The Captain demonstrated high level of leadership safety 
values and commitment to safety in his decisions and behaviours. On safety culture 
traits, even after the captain successfully landed on the Hudson River, he was still 
committed to the safety of others as he twice walked up and down aisle to make sure 




take care of the people on the wings first as those in the rafts were already safe 
(USNRC 2011). 
 
Though human error accounts for 75 per cent of accident, which has always being the 
main threat to flight safety (CASA 2012). However, aviation industries are 
progressively introducing safety management systems (SMS) that surpasses legal 
compliances with rules and regulations, instead, they emphasise on continuous 
improvement by identifying hazards and risk management (ATSB 2008). 
 
From the above analysis, it is evident that almost all the elements of NTS were used 
to successfully manage the Hudson River landing by Captain Chesley Sullenberger 
which saved the lives of all the passengers in the aircraft. However, there was no 
mention of isomorphic lesson and organisational learning which the research had 
expected as part of the pillars used to manage safely, but risk was characterised 









The Deepwater Horizon rig, was owned and operated by offshore-oil-drilling 
company Transocean, but leased by  BP Plc. The rig was situated in the Macondo oil 
prospect in the Mississippi Canyon, a valley in the continental shelf, hence the name, 
Macondo Well blowout. The oil well was located on the seabed 4,993 feet or 1,522 
metres below the surface and extended almost 18,000 feet, or 5,486 metres into the 
rock. On April 20, 2010, there was a surge of natural gas which blasted through 
a concrete core installed by Halliburton, the contractor that was asked to seal the well 
for later use (OSC 2011).  
 
The accident claimed the lives of 11 crew members, while others were seriously 
injured as fire destroyed the entire drilling rig (OSC 2011). The Deepwater Horizon 
spilled over 4 million barrels of crude oil into the Gulf of Mexico. The spill disrupted the 
entire region’s economy and damaged fisheries and caused destruction at the habitats 
(OSC 2011). 
 
The Gulf Oil Disaster and the Future of Offshore Drilling Report to the President by the 
National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling of 
January 2011 was used for the study. The report was considered useful because of 
its national outlook and the impartial judgement it produced and recommendations 
made in a constructive spirit (OSC 2011). The report was scrutinized to determine the 
probable causes of the accident and if there any evidence of lapses on the use of NTS 
(good or bad use) isomorphic lesson, organisational learning and risk characterisation. 










Table 9: Possible causes of Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill accident and relationship to NTS lapses and others 
 
S/No Possible Causes NTS Isomorphic Lesson Organisational Learning Risk Characterisation 
1 The failure to contain hydrocarbon 
pressures in the well (OSC 2011:115). 
Indication of poor situation 
awareness (attention to work 
environment) and leadership 
No trace of isomorphic 
lesson.  
No trace of organisational 
learning. 
Risk was not adequately 
categorised. 
2 Systematic failures (ibid). Indication of poor leadership, 
and communication. 
Transocean failed to 
sufficiently communicate 
to its crew members 
lessons learned from 
similar near-miss on one 
of its rigs in the North 
Sea four months prior to 
the Macondo blowout. 
Transocean failed to 
sufficiently communicate to 
its crew members lessons 
learned from an eerily similar 
near-miss on one of its rigs in 
the North Sea four months 
prior to the Macondo 
blowout. 
Before the Macondo blowout, 
neither the industry nor the 
government adequately 
addressed identified risks. 
3 The accident was caused by several 
individual missteps and oversights by BP, 
Halliburton, and Transocean, as 
government regulators lacked the 
power, necessary resources, and 
technical expertise to prevent Macondo 
Well Blowout (OSC 2011:115). 
Indication of poor leadership, 
situation awareness and lack 
decision-making. 
No trace of isomorphic 
lesson 
No trace of organisational 
learning. 
There were recurring themes 
of missed warning signals, 
failure to share information, 
and a general lack of 
appreciation for the risks 
involved. 
4 Failures of management and 
communication gaps. 
A lack in situation awareness, 
communication and 
leadership. 
No trace of isomorphic 
lesson. 
No trace of organisational 
learning. 
There were several separate 
risk factors, oversights, and 
outright mistakes combined 
to overwhelm the safeguards 
meant to prevent such an 
event from taken occurring. 
5 The process to use only six centralizers 
illuminates the flaws in BP’s 
management and design procedures, as 
well as poor communication between BP 
and Halliburton (Ibid). 
Decision-making and poor 
communication; lack of 
teamwork. 
No trace of isomorphic 
lesson. 
No trace of organisational 
learning 
Risk was not adequately 
categorised based on either 
the use of 15 or 6 centralizers 




6 BP’s team again failed to take time to 
consider whether and to what extent the 
anomalous pressure readings may have 
indicated other problems or increased 
the risk of the upcoming cement job. 
BP’s team appears not to have seriously 
examined why it had to apply over four 
times the 750-psi design pressure to 
convert the float valves (Ibid). 
Situation awareness. No trace of isomorphic 
lesson. 
No trace of organisational 
learning. 
Risk not categorised or 
characterised. 
7 Absent of significant reform in both 
industry practices and government 
policies. The events were rooted in 
systemic failures by industry 
management which also affected the 
contractors in the industry; also, the 
failures of government to provide 
effective regulatory oversight of offshore 
drilling (Ibid).  
No trace of isomorphic lesson. No trace of isomorphic 
lesson. 
No trace of organisational 
learning. 
Risk not categorised or 
characterised. 
8 BP Well Site Leaders did not consult 
anyone on-shore about the anomalous 
data observed during the negative-
pressure test (Ibid).  
No trace of isomorphic lesson. No trace of isomorphic 
lesson. 
No trace of organisational 
learning. 






2.10.9 Analysis of Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill Focusing on NTS Lapses and 
other Pillars 
 
As stated by the committee that investigated the accident, the Macondo blowout was 
as a result of several individual mistakes and oversights by BP, Halliburton, and 
Transocean, as government regulators lacked the authority, the necessary resources, 
and the technical expertise to avert the accident (OSC 2011:115). However, the 
fundamental cause of the accident was a bad safety culture from BP and its 
contractors (Konstantinidou et al. 2012: 20). On the other hand, the situation was 
caused by series of human mistakes through all stages the project lasted, leading up 
to the blowout and subsequent explosion (Smith et al. 2013). 
 
These oversights by those involved are termed to a lack of situation awareness which 
eventually culminated into the accident. Many critical aspects of drilling operations 
were not monitored appropriately and were left to industry to decide without agency 
assessment. For instance, there was no requirement, let alone protocol, for a negative 
pressure test. The inaccurate information was considered a major contributor to the 
Macondo blowout. Nor, were there detailed requirements related to the testing of the 
cement essential for well stability (OSC: 2011). This was an indication of lack of 
situation awareness in safety management. 
 
The accident was also accelerated by lack of internal decision-making process as BP 
personnel did not appear to have insisted that Halliburton complete its foam stability 
tests, let alone report the results to BP for review before ordering primary cementing 
to start the work (OSC 2011). The issue of decision making was further increased 
when it was established whether the failure to use 15 additional centralizers was a 
direct cause of the blowout, as against using six centralizers (centralizers are a cage-
like steel device attached to the casing string being lowered into the drilling hole after 
it had reached a total depth and the drill string withdrawn), which exposed the flaws in 
BP’s management and design procedures (OSC 2011).  
 
Another element of NTS lapses that caused a negative effect on the Macondo Blowout 
was poor communication. There was evidence that BP, Transocean, and Halliburton 
failed to communicate adequately. Information appeared to have been unreasonably 




to share useful information with its contractors, or even internally with members of its 
own team. On the other hand, contractors also did not share significant information 
with BP or with each other. This led to individuals often finding themselves having to 
make serious decisions without a full understanding of the situation in which they were 
being made, or even without recognition that decisions made were critical (OSC 2011; 
Konstantinidou et al. 2012: 20). 
 
Still on communication failure, a lot of BP and Halliburton workers were aware of the 
difficulty of carrying out the primary cementing of the well-bed. But most of the issues 
identified were not communicated (shared) to the rig crew members that conducted 
the negative-pressure test and monitored the well (OSC 2011).  Furthermore, there 
was lack of communication between operators and service providers; and gaps in 
communication that existed between the silos of expertise in the Deepwater oil and 
gas industry (OSC 2011). BP did not put adequate controls in place to make sure that 
key decisions in the months leading up to the blowout were safe or sound from an 
engineering viewpoint (OSC 2011). 
 
Another aspect of this research was organisational learning, as it also formed the focus 
of this finding in the accident examples. There have been evidence to suggest that 
there were lapses on organisational learning as it later emerged that a related incident 
had occurred on a BP owned rig in the Caspian Sea on September 2008 before the 
Deepwater Horizon disaster of 2010. Both cores were likely too weak to withstand the 
pressure because they were composed of a concrete mixture that used nitrogen gas 
to accelerate curing (Pallardy 2010). 
 
Transocean failed to communicate to its crew lessons learned from a similar near-miss 
on one of its rigs in the North Sea four months prior to the blowout. In 2009, gas 
entered the riser on the rig while the crew was dislodging a well with seawater during 
a completion operation (OSC 2011), and it is believed that the basic facts of both 
incidents are the same. Had the rig crew been conversant of the prior event and trained 
on its lessons, events at Macondo might have occurred differently (OSC 2011: 124). 
 
BP lacked learning culture. In 2000, BP’s Grangemouth Complex in Scotland suffered 
three possible life-threatening accidents. A power distribution failure led to the 
emergency shutdown of the oil refinery due to a rupture of a main steam pipe; and a 




Subsequent investigations revealed several weaknesses in the safety management 
systems on-site over a period which had led to the series of events that caused the 
power distribution failure (OSC 2011). 
 
Still on failures of organisational learning, BP’s refineries had problems at the North 
Sea platforms in 2003, as a gas line ruptured on BP Forties Alpha and methane 
flooded on the platform. BP admitted breaking its rule as it allowed pipes to corrode 
on the Forties Alpha. Eventually, BP paid a sum of $290,000 as a fine (OSC 2011).  
 
Another failure on organisational learning was the BP’s Texas City refinery explosion. 
According to the report examined, this was a deficient on safety culture. In 2005, a 
blast at the refinery, the third largest refinery in the United States, killed 15 people and 
injured more than 170. It was established that BP Group did not steadily review its 
refinery operations and corporate governance worldwide with the aim to implement 
needed changes identified in the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) report and BP’s 
Task Force report, despite what the group chief executive had told staff in one of the 
2000 edition of BP’s in-house magazine that the organisation would learn lessons from 
Grangemouth and other incidents (OSC 2011). 
 
The Safety Board’s report on Texas city stated that while most attention was focused 
on the injury rate, the overall safety culture and process safety management program 
of BP had serious gaps. And despite many previous fatalities at the Texas city refinery 
that recorded 23 deaths in past 30 years prior to the 2005 disaster, and many 
hazardous material releases, BP did not take active steps to curtail the growing risks 
of  a disastrous event (OSC 2011); a lack of organisational learning culture. 
 
Grouping all NTS, organisational learning and risk characterisation lapses, the report 
pointed out that BP Texas city lacked a reporting and learning culture. Reporting 
negative news was not allowed, and often managers did not efficiently investigate 
incidents or take suitable corrective action (OSC 2011). The report went further to 
reveal that BP Group and Texas city managers provided weak leadership and 
oversight (situation awareness). And the management did not implement adequate 
safety oversight, provide needed human and economic resources, or consistently 
model adherence to safety rules and procedures. On risk classification, the 
organisation did not effectively assess the safety effects of major organisational, 




With a long history of failure on organisational learning, the Baker panel (OSC 2011) 
faulted BP for failing to learn the lessons of Grangemouth by allowing them in the 
events that caused the Texas city refinery explosion. BP did not use any opportunity 
to make and sustain company-wide changes that would have led safer workplaces for 
its employees and contractors (OSC 2011). 
 
Again, one year after the Texas city refinery accident occurred, BP had another 
significant accident known as the Prudhoe Bay pipeline leak in 2006, as 212,252 
gallons of oil spilled into the tundra environment (OSC 2011); regarded as the worst 
spill ever recorded on the North Slope. The leak went unnoticed for as long as five 
days. During analysis, it was revealed that the pipes were found to have been poorly 
maintained and inspected. BP paid more than $20 million in fines and restitution (OSC 
2011). 
 
On risk characterisation, which is also one of the pillars of this research, the report 
noted that none of BP’s or even the decisions made by other companies seem to have 
been subjected to a full and systematic risk-analysis, either by peer-review or 
management of change process (OSC 2011). Evidence however revealed that the BP 
team members and personnel from the other two companies responsible for most of 
the decisions had not conducted any form of formal analysis to evaluate the relative 
riskiness of available alternatives (OSC 2011); and in the years before the Macondo 
blowout occurred, neither BP nor government adequately addressed most of the risks 
within the rig (OSC 2011). 
 
This was due to the fact that regulatory oversight alone was not sufficient to ensure 
adequate safety, as the oil and gas industry will need to take its own independent 
steps to increase safety throughout the industry, including self-policing mechanisms 
that complement governmental enforcement (OSC 2011). The accident under review 
was similarly triggered because several separate risk factors. However, most of the 
mistakes and oversights at Macondo Well were traced back to a primary failure of 
management (OSC 2011).  
 
Better management by all the three key players would certainly have prevented the 




risks they faced, properly evaluate, communicate, and address them. A blowout in 
deep-water was not a statistical inevitability (OSC 2011).  
  
It has been argued in different quarters that if properly managed, the presence of risk 
does not mean that accidents must happen. According to Magne Ognedal (2011):  
 
“Risk must be managed at every level and in every company involved in 
this business. In this way, risk in the petroleum sector can be kept at a 
level society is willing to accept. And we can reduce the probability that 
major accidents will hit us again.”  (OSC 2011: 219). 
 
Subsequent analyses on the accident indicated that BP did not have consistent and 
reliable risk-management processes, thus, has not been able to meet its avowed 
commitment to safety. BP’s safety lapses have been enduring (OSC 2011). The three 
companies did not sufficiently identify or address risks of an accident, not in the well 
design, cementing, or temporary abandonment procedures (OSC 2011); and 
underscoring the complexity of the organisational problem challenging BP, the report 
singled out for blame BP’s general approach to accident analysis. BP’s investigation 
system had not introduced effective root cause analysis procedures to identify 
systemic causal factors (OSC 2011). 
 
 
2.10.10 Conclusion on the Three Accidents 
 
It is evident that NTS incorporates a wide range of skills which are critical to sustaining 
safe performance in high-risk industries. Fukushima Daiichi and Deepwater Horizon 
accidents have revealed that knowledge of NTS had the potential of saving lives (Flin 
et al, 2008), as lapses of NTS led to several disaster. More so, some high-risk 
industries reviewed did not apply organisational learning, isomorphic lesson, while risk 
was not adequately characterised to manage safely as indicated in Deepwater Horizon 
risk characterisation (OSC 2011).  
 
However, some of the NTS elements were interchangeably used to mean different 
things in various organisations. For instance, oversight could have been used to mean 
situation awareness, which was constantly used in Macondo Well Blowout (OSC 




making, leadership were referred to as such, while managing stress and coping with 
fatigue were referred to as stress in general terms. 
  
In the three accident examples reviewed, it was only Hudson River Landing that the 
pilot and the captain and by extension crew members constantly used virtually all the 
NTS elements to successfully land the aircraft safely on the Hudson River without no 
life lost (NTSB 2010). See evidence on Table 8. Whereas in Fukushima Daiichi 
accident and the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill, both organisations lacked the use of 
NTS elements to successfully manage risk.  
 
On organisational learning, isomorphic lessons and risk characterisation were not 
regarded as such in the three organisations, especially in the oil and gas sector. In 
Deepwater Horizon oil spill, it was clear that the oil and gas sector, especially BP never 
considered to learn from past incidents (OSC 2011). Deficiency in learning culture also 
affected the nuclear sector (TMI) did not learn from a similar accident (Trigilio 2006); 
while in the airline industry is well aware that the industry as a whole suffers if the 
public lacks trust in the safety of any one company (0SC 2011). 
 
Therefore, it is worth mentioning that even the most naturally risky industry can be 
made much safer, if staff are given the right incentives and disciplined systems, 
sustained by dedicated leadership and active training to manage safely (OSC 2011); 
as NTS are vehicles by which technical skills and knowledge can be applied and 











A basic understanding in recent safety management is that accidents are avoidable 
through effective feedback control, and through mechanisms by which information 
about accidents and near misses is employed as a basis to increase the level of safety. 
This research has discussed examples of notable accidents in nuclear, aviation and 
oil and gas. Conversely, this section is focused on low-level or near-miss incidents to 
establish similarities or differences that triggered both notable and low-level incidents 
in the three sectors. Findings helped to determine if lessons could be learned and 
transferred to the nuclear sector in the UK. 
 
The three low-level of incidents discussed are: Sellafield Sump Tank Levels Nuclear 
near miss incident of 2019; the Beech-200 King Air registered EC-KNP incident 2012 
and EnQuest and Odjfell Drilling Sling Failure of 2018. 
 
 




Sellafield nuclear site was licensed under the Nuclear Installations Act 1965. It is 
owned by the Nuclear Decommissioning Authority. The organisation is responsible for 
cleaning-up the country’s (UK) highest nuclear risks and hazards to safeguarding 
nuclear fuel, materials and waste (Gov. UK 2020). Sellafield is located in West 
Cumbria and regarded as one of the most complex and hazardous nuclear sites in the 
world (Sellafield Ltd 2019). 
 
The probable cause of the sump tank level incident according to Sellafield Ltd was 
because of the detection of liquid levels in a concrete sump tank in the legacy ponds 
area of the Sellafield site. The primary cause of the loss in levels of the liquor was 
because of a maintenance work on the tank (Sellafield Ltd 2019). 
 
However, ONR noted that in 2019, Sellafield Ltd reported it had sign of a loss of 




facility. The indication of a leak was based on the irregular frequency of water top-ups 
required to maintain water level within the sump of the RST (ONR 2020). Table 10 
shows the possible causes of Sump tank near miss incident and inadequacies of the 
four pillars used in this research. 
 
Table 10: Possible causes of Sump Tank near miss incident and lapses on the four pillars 
 









1 Loss in levels 




work on the 
tank (Sellafield 
Ltd 2019). 





No trace of 
isomorphic 
lessons. 
No trace of 
organisational 
learning. 
No trace of risk 
characterisation. 








(ONR 2020).  





No trace of 
isomorphic 
lessons. 
No trace of 
organisational 
learning. 
No trace of risk 
characterisation. 





level within the 
sump of the 
RST (ONR 
2020). 





No trace of 
isomorphic 
lessons. 
No trace of 
organisational 
learning. 
No trace of risk 
characterisation. 
  4 Historic leak 
paths to 
ground from 
small cracks in 
the structure of 
the sump. 
Lack of situation 
awareness and 
communication. 
No trace of 
isomorphic 
lessons. 
No trace of 
organisational 
learning. 





2.11.4 Analysis of the Sump Tank Level Near Miss at Sellafield Limited 
 
From what has been reported by Sellafield Ltd and ONR, there is evidence to believe 
that there were lapses of NTS, isomorphic lessons, organisational learning and risk 




reported it had sign of a loss of radioactively polluted water which started from the 
Redundant Settling Tank (RST) facility. The loss of the liquor occurred continuously, 
but investigation established that the movement of the liquor was not through 
engineered route; as near miss incidents has been occurring in the organisation, 
regarded as historic paths, with small cracks in the structure of the sump (ONR 2020). 
 
After the incident, an engineering team was put together to assess the tank and 
investigate the primary cause of the liquid reduction. This supports the fact that there 
were NTS lapses in the organisation. Sellafield Ltd stated that: “As a precaution we 
have increased the local monitoring and detection systems around the tank. There is 
no risk to the public or the workforce. The relevant regulators have been notified.” As 
a near miss, the organisation rated the event at Level 1 according to INES (Sellafield 
Ltd 2019). The active failure that led to the near miss was workers lacked NTS skills 
(Situation awareness) to monitor the movement of liquors. 
  
 




The aircraft, known as the Beech-200 King Air registered EC-KNP incident of 10 May 
2012 is managed by Air Taxi et Charter International at Paris le Bourget (93) Airport. 
The aircraft developed landing gear extension problem. During the landing roll, the 
nose landing gear malformed (collapsed). The aircraft collapsed on the runway. The 
damage that was observed was on the lower forward section of the aircraft and the 
propellers on both engines (BEA 2014). 
 
The plane had just gone through a maintenance operation, though did not include the 
nose landing gear which had just been carried earlier by the Blois Aéro Services 
maintenance. The aircraft took off from Blois aerodrome and headed to Paris Le 
Bourget airport. During landing roll, the initial Instrument Landing System (ILS 27) gear 
was extended, the crew heard an uncommon noise and observed that the red landing 
gear indicator light was on (indicating that landing gears are not locked down), while 
the green down-and-locked light were still off (indicating that the three wheels are not 





The controller stated that the nose landing gear was extended. In that situation, the 
crew did a go-around and withdrew the landing gear. Because the red landing gear 
indicator light was still on, the pilot used the emergency landing gear extension 
procedure but found the same signs as during the first attempt. The crew continued to 
runway 21, took advantage of the headwind and to avoid blocking the main runway 27 
should there be a problem. The nose landing gear collapsed during the landing 
process. The plane eventually stopped on the runway. The damage that occurred on 
aeroplane was observed on the lower forward section, and the propellers on both 
engines. Table 11 shows lapses of the four pillars used in this research as possible 
causes of Beach-200 King Air incident. 
 
Table 11: Possible causes of Beach-200 King Air serious incident and lapses on the four cardinal pillars 
 
                                        Lapses of the four cardinal pillars leading to the near miss 






1 When the 
kinematics was 
inspected, the 
nose landing gear 
revealed a 
malfunction of the 
actuator (BEA 
2014). 
Lack of situation 
awareness. 
No trace of 
isomorphic 
lessons. 
No trace of 
organisational 
learning. 
No trace of risk 
characterisation. 
   2 No information 
given that 
lubrication was 
added as part of 
the work done in 
the section of the 







No trace of 
isomorphic 
lessons. 
No trace of 
organisational 
learning. 
No trace of risk 
characterisation. 
  3 There was no 
internal clearance 







No trace of 
isomorphic 
lessons. 
No trace of 
organisational 
learning. 
No trace of risk 
characterisation. 
  4 There was a 




the lubrication.  
Lack of situation 
awareness. 
No trace of 
isomorphic 
lessons. 
No trace of 
organisational 
learning. 
No trace of risk 
characterisation. 
  5 There was 
incorrect 




Lack of situation 
awareness. 




temperature of the 
actuator when in 
operation that led 






 Use of "FAA PMA" 




Lack of situation 
awareness. 
   
 
 
2.11.7 Analysis of the Beach-200 King Air 
 
The analysis of the incident revealed that maintenance work was not properly 
coordinated. There was evidence of leadership failures, lack of situation awareness, 
communication and teamwork. This suggests that operators did not have a 
comprehensive understanding of NTS to carry out work effectively to manage safety. 
The report equally noted that there was no internal clearance included in the file.  
 
Lack of communication existed during the maintenance work, as the lubrication of the 
actuator related to the maintenance check which supposed to be on internal clearance 
was not stated on the technical intervention sheet delivered by the workshop. There 
was no indication concerning lubrication included in work carried out on the work 
section files for preceding maintenance operations.  
 
Possibly, provision of such relevant information could have averted the incident. Also, 
there was evidence of cutting corners during the maintenance operation. Information 
from Hawker Beechcraft Corporation (HBC) maintenance manual informed that only 
original HBC parts must be used. This was a clear indication of lack of situation 
awareness, as the maintenance team would have known the repercussion of using 
inferior materials for such work. 
 
Inspecting the actuator revealed that the stripping of the threads on the threaded 
sleeve made it difficult for it to drive the actuator rod. Before stripping, the threads of 
the sleeve had started to wear due to abrasion (friction) between the threads on the 




extension and retraction stages. Another point to consider is the clearance between 
the threads on the threaded rod and the threads of the sleeve was measured at 0.6 
mm (about 0.025 in); while the actuator rod was not mentioned by the manufacturer 
but matched to an FAA-approved replacement part ("FAA PMA" part). There was 
presence of grease throughout the actuator. 
 
On the other hand, HBC had no statistics on the number of actuators rejected after a 
check of the internal clearance (situation awareness). HBC maintained that the 
possible contributory factors to actuator failure are unsuitable lubrication due to 
mixture of greases that can potentially reduce the effectiveness of the lubrication. 
There was also incorrect alignment of the actuator (rod) during assembly, which raised 
the temperature of the actuator during operation which led to the wear on the threads 
and reduced the lubricating performance of the grease. 
 
Therefore, it is believed that the use of NTS and other pillars to manage risk and 
equally train staff is bound to reduce accidents, as workers will know and understand 
how and when to apply NTS elements in workplace activities. 
 
 




EnQuest is a production and development oil company. It has operations in the UK 
North Sea and Malaysia. The organisation was formed in conjunction with the UK 
North Sea assets of Petrofac and Lundin Petroleum (EnQuest 2020). According to the 
Institute of Occupational Health and Safety (IOSH), the North Sea operator exposed 
their staff to what was described as “serious risk” when a sling used to lift a riser (a 
large-diameter pipe which connects the subsea BOP stack to a floating surface rig that 
carries mud to the surface  failed and fell on the section around 1.5 metre on to the 
platform. It was observed that no one was injured during the incident. Actions were 
taken and learnings identified to prevent future re-occurrence (IOSH 2020). Table 12 
indicating inadequate use of the four pillars to manage EnQuest and Odjfell drilling 





Table 12: Possible causes of EnQuest and Odjfell drilling sling serious incident and lapses on the four 
cardinal pillars 
 









1 EnQuest did not 
ensure that the 
contractor, 
Odjfell Drilling's 








No trace of 
isomorphic 
lessons. 
No trace of 
organisational 
learning. 
No trace of risk 
characterisation. 




Lack of situation 
awareness and 
leadership. 
No trace of 
isomorphic 
lessons. 
No trace of 
organisational 
learning. 
No trace of risk 
characterisation. 
  3 The Magnus 
sling failure 
incident is one of 
the several 
EnQuest have 
had in 2018. 





No trace of 
isomorphic 
lessons. 
No trace of 
organisational 
learning. 




2.11.10 Analysis of the EnQuest and Odjfell Drilling Sling Failure 
 
The near-miss incident of a piece of an equipment that weighed more than two-and-
a-half tonnes could have turned catastrophic had the riser (equipment) not fell about 
5 feet and landed just 2ft feet away from one member of the deck crew and 15 feet of 
the other member of the same deck crew on a North Sea platform (IOSH 2020). The 
incident occurred on the Magnus installation 100 miles (160km) north east of Shetland. 
 
The polypropylene sling is used to lift the flange riser section that weighed about 2.6 
tonnes. A notice claimed that EnQuest failed to certify that Odjfell drilling lifting plans 
had no effective measures in place. This is an indication that the organisation lacked 
knowledge of NTS, especially on the use of situation awareness by workers. 
 
Other possible lapses were worker’s failure to effectively communicate and the use of 
teamwork when work was on going. This was indicated when the Health and Safety 




two workers of the deck crew would not have been exposed to grave risk to their safety 
when the polypropylene sling failed (IOSH 2020). 
 
Despite no one was injured, the organisation stated that they have taken the learnings 
identified to prevent re-occurrence. The Magnus incident is said to be one of the near 
misses of several incidents the organisation had in 2018 which involved lifting 
incidents. Equally, the incident has been regarded as a reflection in a change of culture 
in the offshore in terms of low morale of workers and casting question marks over 
adherence to procedures, which the organisation believes are recurring around the 
fear of employment and the pressures of the job. 
 
The near-miss incident shows how no knowledge of NTS, isomorphic lesson, 
organisational learning and risk characterisation could lead to accidents or near-
misses in high-risk industries.  
 
 
2.11.11 Conclusion on the three incidents 
 
The three near-miss incidents which are Sellafield sump tank level; the Beach 200 
King Air registered EC-KNP; and the EnQuest and Odjfell drilling sling failure on 
Magnus platform discussed in this section have indicated that safety could be 
achieved where technical skills of workers is complemented with NTS, and by 
extension the use of isomorphic lessons, organisational learning and risk 
characterisation to manage safely.  
 
 
2.12 Regulation of the UK Nuclear Sector 
 
In the nuclear sector, each country tends to regulate its sector as it suits them, 
whereas, in the aviation and the oil and gas sectors, there is international guidance 
that guides the sector. While the Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR) regulates or 
control nuclear sites in the United Kingdom, the legal responsibility for safeguarding 
the nuclear sector rests with the duty-holder. It is the responsibility of the government 
to establish nuclear policy through a legislative regulatory framework (ONR 2016). 
Similarly, the IAEA promotes and supports the establishment of inclusive regulatory 






In the UK nuclear sector, the UK government has no hand to set regulatory standards 
or even make regulatory decisions. These matters are the duty of ONR. What the UK 
does is to operate a goal-setting regime instead of being more prescriptive. Standards-
based regimes applied in some other countries. This means that ONR gives wide 
regulatory requirements, and it is for licensees (operators) to decide and defend how 
best to achieve them (ONR 2016).  
 
It is expected that this method allows an operator to be creative and realise the 
required high levels of nuclear safety by implementing practices that meet its 
circumstances. It equally contributes to continuous improvement and the 
implementation of appropriate good practices. There are 36 conditions attached by 
ONR to each nuclear site licence within which the licensees are expected to operate 
within those licence conditions. These conditions were put before the operators of 
nuclear industry to make and implement appropriate arrangements for compliance 
with the licence condition and some more prescriptive requirements (ONR 2016). See 
licence conditions on Table 13. To this end, IAEA (2019), noted that countries 
introducing or expanding nuclear power for the first time can benefit from the 
knowledge of those that are far ahead in nuclear power programmes to devise a 
regulatory framework (IAEA 2019). 
 
Policing the entire process, ONR’s evidence-based judgement is that the nuclear 
operators’ arrangements for the management of nuclear safety meet the high-quality 
standards anticipated of the nuclear industry in both the UK and globally. There is a 
combination of ONR’s assessment and inspection functions that allows ONR to judge 
whether nuclear operators are functioning with risks reduced to as low as reasonably 
practicable (ONR 2016). 
 
To ensure an acceptable level of safety is achieved, a substantial body of information 
is naturally considered by ONR, for example: safety cases; reports on the licensees’ 
periodic reviews of safety; annual reviews of safety at each site, and information from 
start-up meetings at the end of each reactor life span; insights and intelligence gained 
from the nuclear operators’ senior management and internal regulator; results of on-




regulatory compliance teams; findings from investigations of incidents and events;  
and the yearly demonstration of emergency exercises at each site (ONR 2016). 
 
Ensuring general safety  
 
In addition to nuclear safety, ONR is also authorised to regulate non-nuclear, or 
conventional, health and safety on nuclear approved sites. The purpose of regulation 
is to make sure that risks to employees and the public are reduced to so far as is 
reasonably practicable, including fire safety (ONR 2016). Table 13 shows ONR license 
categories of nuclear sectors in the UK. 
 









2.13 Conclusion of Chapter 2 
 
In conclusion, chapter two has identified the following points as significant to the 
direction of this research, which has critically appraised key areas of controversy and 
disagreement in the literature. For instance, as claimed in different quarters that NTS 
is widely used by high-risk industries to manage safety, literature revealed that there 
is still need for the nuclear sector to imbibe the skills for safety management. 
 
NTS: High-risk industries require a skilled operator, but more importantly, there is a 
need to ensure cognitive, interpersonal, and personal coping skills alongside technical 
competences if full safety is to be achieved. The seven elements of NTS, therefore 
have proved in literature sources to be highly valued (Flin et al. 2008). 
 
Isomorphic lesson: Isomorphism represents hidden opportunity for comparative 
learning between different systems with underlying similarities. The challenge here is 
the inability of organisations to demonstrate effective learning. In most cases, lessons 
may be identified, but not always learned. 
 
Organisational learning: Organisational learning is a fundamental requirement for 
continuous improvement: however, organisational culture can profoundly affect the 
degree to which organisations are open and able to learn. 
 
Risk characterisation: Risk characterisation reflects three key requirements for 
effective risk assessments and the correct risk appetite. Characterisation includes 
effective discourse with the right range of stakeholders and meticulous attention to 












Research methodology is a broad style to carry out research topics (Silverman 2015). 
While methods represent the approach used to ensure the research is properly carried 
out in detail (Mason 2002). Data was gathered from sample population within the 
nuclear, aviation and the oil and gas sectors in the UK. Different or more independent 
sources of data-collection methods within a specific study was used to ensure that the 
data collected are accurate (Saunders et al. 2009).  
 
 
3.2 Research Design 
 
The conceptual structure with which this study is conducted is known as research 
design (Kurmar 2005). This was planned to meet the aim and objectives of this study. 
Several methods are used to gather research data, however, this research used mixed 




 3.2.1 Quantitative data  
 
This research used quantitative data approach to gather respondents view 
(questionnaires), which were analysed using statistical method. Quantitative data is 
mostly used as a substitute for data collection to complement findings. Technique, 
using either questionnaire, or data analysis procedure using graphs or statistics which 
produces or uses numerical data to analyses information gathered (Saunders et al. 
2009).  
 
3.2.2 Qualitative data 
 
Equally, this research used qualitative data in form of interviews as another method of 
data collection, or data analysis process like categorising data without the use of 
numbers. Qualitative data can also refer to data other than words such as pictures and 




information. However, this research used focus groups as substitute to participant 
observation. Its emphasis is based on determining meanings people attach to actions 
(Saunders et al. 2009). Table 14 shows the difference between quantitative and 
qualitative data. 
 
Table 14: Distinction between qualitative and quantitative data (Saunders et al. 2009) 
 
 
3.2.3 Mixed methods approach 
 
Basically, this is a general term when qualitative and quantitative data collection 
techniques and analysis measures or procedures are used in a research design, which 
is the case in this research. It could be at the same time (parallel), or one after the 
other (sequential or successive), and they are not combined. Although, mixed method 
uses both approaches, however, quantitative data are quantitatively analysed, and 
qualitative data are qualitatively analysed (Saunders et al. 2009). 
  
While mixed-model research is the combination of both quantitative and qualitative 
data collection methods, using the same analysis processes and combining 
quantitative and qualitative methods at other stages of the research. This means that 
quantitative data can be converted into narrative or discussion which can be analysed 
qualitatively. Likewise, quantitative data, can be converted into numerical codes or 
numbers for it to be analysed statistically (Saunders et al. 2009). 
 
Tashakkori and Teddlie (2003) noted that multiple methods are valuable as they give 
better opportunities for the researcher to answer research questions and allow to 
better evaluate the extent to which the research findings can be relied upon, and 
inferences or extrapolations made from them. Interviews could be employed, as they 




questionnaire to collect data. This will boost researchers’ confidence that most 
important issues were addressed (Tashakkori and Teddlie 2003). Therefore, this 
research employed mixed method approaches that is, quantitative and qualitative 
methods to harness possible means and gather enough information and critically 
evaluate how safety is manged across the three sectors using the four pillars. 
 
3.2.4 Initial Pilot Study 
 
An initial pilot study was carried out (Silverman 2015), targeted at Coventry University 
students and lecturers. It was carried out as part of the research design to test 
participants understanding of the questionnaire and areas that would requires 
changes before it is launched using Bristol Online Survey (BOS). As a result, hard 
copies of the questionnaire were printed and handed to selected students in the 
related industry being researched, which are in oil and gas, HSE, aviation and disaster 
management departments. Furthermore, some of the lecturers in those related 
departments were served with the same sets of questionnaires. Results received were 
not analysed but were used as a guide to fine-tune the survey online and 
questionnaires. The pilot study engaged a total of 25 students and lecturers as a 
reasonable sample size for a test. 
 
3.2.5 Research objectives 
 
The objective of the research was to undertake a critical evaluation of the UK nuclear 
industry safety practices, focusing on the use of NTS from an online survey on non-
technical skills, isomorphic lessons, organisational learning, and risk characterisations 
in aviation and oil and gas.  
 
This research has three objectives. 
(i) To critically evaluate and benchmark non-technical skills and their values in 
achieving workplace safety in the UK nuclear power industries. 
(ii) To investigate the extent to which isomorphic lessons, organisational learning 
and risk characterisations derived from approaches used in safety-critical 
industries such as aviation and oil and gas informed and/or added value to the 




(iii) To design and create a holistic framework (with key processes, principles, 
terms, and toolkits) to support isomorphic lesson opportunities, optimise and 
benchmark NTS capabilities, risk characterisations, and organisation learning 
in the nuclear industry within the UK. 
 
 
3.3 Data Collection 
 
Primary data were used to seek respondents’ views on the use of non-technical skills 
(NTS), isomorphic lessons, organisational learning and risk characterisation in the 
nuclear, aviation and the oil and gas sectors; as primary data provide first-hand 
information to the researcher. Secondary data were used as a complementary method 
(Kumar 2011).  
 
Data were gathered using a wide range of methods (survey tools) such as online 
questionnaires, interviews, focus groups, accident/incident examples and industry 
regulatory data. The first online survey focused on the four key pillars used to assess 
this research, which are: NTS, isomorphic lessons, organisational learning and risk 
characterisation. The second survey was necessitated due to the emergence of Covid-
19 pandemic. Therefore, it was designed to gauge the impact Covid-19 pandemic will 
have on the four pillars, either positively or negatively in the workplace. The third line 
of inquiry used in this research was interviews, as 15 industry experts were 
interviewed, five from each sector.  
 
On secondary data, industry regulatory documents were scrutinised to produce 
lexicons on language used in each sector as it relates to the four pillars. Additionally, 
notable past accidents/incidents events were examined across the three sectors to 
determine if causes of accidents and or incidents have any lapses of NTS, isomorphic 
lessons, organisational learning and risk characterisation. Then, focus groups were 
used to test the validity of the online results and if some of the toolkits produced will 
be of any significance to the three sectors. Each of these components has been 
explained in detail and their relevance to the research.  
 
The online survey used in this research combined both descriptive quantitative and 
qualitative questions for data gathering. The questions had direct link to the research 




substantial group of people or population in a reasonable way (Saunders et al. 2009); 
using a questionnaire administered to a sample population and later standardized for 
easy assessment (Saunders et al. 2009). See appendix 2 for questionnaire sample. 
 
 
3.3.1 Use of Questionnaires 
 
This research observed the needed protocols, sought participants consent to collect 
data using questionnaires which are used in survey research as the primary data 
collection method. It is equally referred to as a survey tool (Leavy 2017); as the use 
of a questionnaire to collect information in the workplace is very common (Flin, 
O’Connor, and Crichton 2008). Data collection or sample from a particular population 
uses questionnaire or interviews as part of the survey tools (Robison 2005). 
Therefore, this research designed a questionnaire and employed an online survey 
method (BOS) to recruit 232 respondents that examined the use of NTS, isomorphic 
lesson, organisational learning and risk characterisation and its applicability to risk 
reduction in workplace.  
 
The research population (Kumar 2011) are safety experts from nuclear, aviation and 
the oil and gas sectors. The research involved the use of representative sample 
survey, as questionnaire was randomly sent to a combination of staff and key 
stakeholders in the related industries (Walliman 2011). 
 
In all, the questionnaires were designed and shared to: 
 
1. Nuclear Power Plant: Safety managers/officers; safety trainers; operators; 
risk managers. 
2. Aviation sector: Pilots; Air Safety Controllers; safety managers/officers; safety 
trainers and risk managers. 
3. Oil and Gas: Safety managers/officers; safety trainers; operators, drillers and 
risk managers. 
 
3.3.2 Advantages of using a questionnaire 
 
• They are economical and efficient way to gather information from respondents. 
• No known risk. 




• It saves time and financial resources.  
• The use of questionnaire is reasonably convenient.  
• Because there is no face-to-face interaction, it offers anonymity (online).  
• Information is not biased or subjective. 
• It gives accurate information to the researcher (Flin et al. 2008; Kumar 2011). 
 
 
3.3.3 Disadvantages of using a questionnaire 
 
• Application of questionnaire is restricted to a study population or group. 
• Questionnaire cannot be used on groups that is uninformed (uneducated), very 
young, old or handicapped respondents. 
• Response rate using questionnaire is usually low therefore affecting the sample 
size. 
• There is bias in selecting questionnaires especially online version of it. 
• There is difficulty in given clarifications as different respondents have different 
understanding of questions which will affect the quality of feedback (Kumar 
2011). 
• Mostly requires technology such as computer, internet and software for 
analysis. 
 
3.3.4 Bristol Online Surveys (BOS) 
 
To ensure data was collected across the three sectors using the four pillars, Bristol 
Online Surveys (BOS) was used to recruit 232 respondents. It is a Coventry University 
online survey tool designed for education and research to gather responses from 
participants. The survey tool is monitored by the researcher, who can decide how long 
the survey will last. Online surveys are easy to use, cost-effective, support 
collaboration and safeguards survey data. 
 
To recruit responses using BOS, the candidate (researcher) had to send 
questionnaires to respondents using an email addresses obtained or provided by 
respondents. However, this research largely used LinkedIn to recruit responses from 
participants. Although an online method used to recruit participants directly, completed 
questionnaires are sent directly to BOS for analyses. Further explanation is provided 







This research focused on structured and unstructured interviewing and gathered 
respondents’ views on issues that were helpful to solving research questions. The 
research equally sought participants consent before conducting interviews and they 
have right to withdraw from the interview at any given time. The research used 
predetermined questions to interview 15 safety experts (5 expert each) in the nuclear, 
aviation and oil and gas sectors. The interview was designed to ascertain if NTS are 
a strong feature of an organisation’s practice and its entire contribution to staff training. 
Other research instruments used are organisational learning, isomorphic lessons and 
risk characterisation which helped to put together valid and reliable data appropriate 
to the research question(s) and set objectives (Saunders et al. 2009).  
 
A total of six questions were asked to participants, at the typical length of an interview 
lasted for 45 minutes. Interviews were conducted via face-to-face interaction, and data 
was stored on a digital tape-recorder. 
 
Interviewing is a frequently used method by researchers to collect information from 
people or respondents. Information is collected in the form of interaction with others 
(Kumar 2011). It is a focused and planned discussion between two or more people 
(Saunders, Lewis, and Thornhill 2009).  
 
However, interviews could be any discussion or interaction between person-to-person, 
either face-to-face or otherwise, and involving two or more individuals with a definite 
objective in mind (Kumar 2011). The procedure of asking questions to respondents 
could either be flexible, where both the interviewer and interviewee are at liberty to 
think about and frame questions as they come to mind on issues under investigation, 
or where questions are not flexible, and has to be strictly followed as planned (Kumar 
2011).  
 
According to Monette et al. (1986: 156), an interview comprises an interviewer asking 
questions to respondents or sample population and recording their feedback or 
answers (Wilgus 2007, cited Monette et al. 1986); while interviews are rather more 
suitable for inquiries that need probing to obtain satisfactory data or information 
(Walliman 2011). Kumar (2011), noted that interviews are classified into different 




3.4.1 Structured interviews 
 
This research used a pre-arranged set of questions to interview managers, and 
systematically follow the order of questions as stated in the interview plan (Kumar 
2011). Additionally, this research also used face-to-face and questions via email to 
gather information (Kumar 2011; Walliman 2011) across the three sectors. 
 
3.4.2 Unstructured interviews 
 
This type of interview is informal in nature. In most cases, it is used to discover in-
depth understanding on a wide area in which the researcher is interested. This 
research adopted this method as it had questions and a clear idea of what was needed 
(Saunders et al. 2009). Unstructured interviews are common in both quantitative and 
qualitative research. The variance however is how data obtained from them in reply to 
the questions are used. Quantitative research develops feedback categorisations from 
responses that are then coded and quantified or counted. But in qualitative research 
feedback are used as descriptors, often written exactly the way it is said, and can be 
integrated with further arguments or opinions and the logic involved. (Kumar 2011); 
but there are no closed format questions (Walliman 2011). 
 
3.4.3 Advantages of using interviews 
 
Using interviews is good for compound or complex circumstances, as it gives detailed 
description of an event or situation (Luton 2010). The most conducive method of 
learning situations that are complicated areas, as the interviewer has the time to plan 
before interviewing respondents on sensitive issues. It is a useful way to collect in-
depth information or data. An interviewer can ask follow-up questions and gauge 
contacts received from observation of non-verbal responses (Kumar 2011). In a case 
where questions are not understood, it can be re-explained or reiterated for clarity 
purposes. Similarly, interviewing has broader application. Unlike a questionnaire, an 
interview can be applied to different population, be it the literate or illiterate, children, 






3.4.4 Disadvantages of interviews  
 
On the other hand, using interviews is said to be time and money consuming (Kumar 
2011). This is particularly so as possible respondents could not be concentrated in 
one location. Though, if there is a place, office or organisation where possible 
respondents are gathered, then using interviewing in that situation will not be 
considered as expensive (Kumar 2011). The quality of information or data received 
from respondents is dependent on the quality of discussion and the interviewer. 
Because discussion during interview is sometimes private, the quality of feedbacks 
received from having separate interviews may differ. There is also the possibility of 
researchers being bias in framing questions and different interpretations could always 
be applied. (Kumar 2011). 
 
Wilgus (2007) noted that some challenges can affect an interviewee (person 
interviewed) which could include, failure to comprehend questions, memory lapses, 
embarrassment, or making information due to the presence of others. Also, an 
incompetent interviewer may book the wrong person, misjudge a query, give 
incomplete and salient information, transcribe data incorrectly or completely 
misconstrue the interviewee. An unguided interviewer could purposely make some 
remarks that are unacceptable, deliberately omit or retell questions incorrectly, or even 
interview another respondent. Sometimes, respondents could offer erroneous 
information not relevant to the information needed. A lot of variables can combine to 







3.5 Data Analysis 
 
3.5.1 The use of (SPSS) 
 
Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) software was used to analyse data 
collected online. Descriptive statistics were generated, and chi-square tests used to 
analyse categorical responses, while Kruskal-Wallis (KW) nonparametric one-way 
ANOVA tests were used to analyse ordinal responses and test if responses from the 
three different sectors had any statistically significant difference. Nonparametric 
statistics, for example the Kruskal Wallis test, are appropriate for data which are 
ordinal, such as the responses to the online questionnaire. In these tests, the null 
hypothesis was that there were no differences between the responses from the three 
industry sectors. The threshold for statistical significance was taken as p = 0.05, i.e. 
the null hypothesis was rejected when p < 0.05. 
 
 
3.6 Examining of Past Accidents 
 
Three past accidents and three past incidents (Zainal 2007) in nuclear, aviation and 
oil and gas were examined in this research. The aim was focused on if knowledge or 
lack of knowledge of NTS, isomorphic lessons, organisational learning and risk 
characterisation contributed in managing safely or wrongly in the events that were 
examined.  
 
Examining of past accidents/incidents can be considered a strong research method 
particularly when a full, in-depth investigation is conducted (Gülseçen and Kubat 
2006). With case study methods, a researcher can go away from the quantitative 
numerical results and understand the behavioural conditions through other 
perspectives. By including both quantitative and qualitative data, case studies (past 
accidents) help to explain both the process and outcomes of an occurrence through 
broad observation, reconstruction and analysis of the cases under investigation 
(Zainal 2007). 
 
However, Yin (1994) noted there are three categories of examining past accidents, 
which are exploratory, descriptive and explanatory (Yin 1994). The advantage of using 
case studies (past accidents) as a research method is primarily the examination of the 




and qualitative analyses of the data (Yin 1994). Another reason for case studies (of 
past accidents) is that they help to discover or describe the data in real life 
environment, but also help to explain the difficulties of real-life circumstances which 
may not be captured through survey research (Zainal 2007).  
 
However, despite the advantages accredited to case studies (past accidents), they 
have criticisms. They are three types of argument against case studies (past 
accidents) research (Yin (1994). Case studies (past accidents) are often accused of 
lack of rigour, investigators being sloppy and has allowed misleading evidence or 
biased views to affect the direction of findings and conclusions (Yin 1994). Case 
studies (past accidents) also provide little basis for scientific generalisation as they 
use a small number of subjects (Yin 1994). They also produce a large amount of 
documentation or large amount of data over a period; and it depends on a single case 




3.7 Secondary Data Method 
 
There are two methods of secondary data (Johnston 2014) used as line of inquiries 
in this research. The first was the industry regulatory data of past accidents/incidents 
across the three sectors (see Section 2.10). The second one was past accident 
records that occurred in the nuclear sector. It was collected to determine which aspect 
of human factor led to accidents causation in the nuclear sector from 1998 to 2018. 
The first set of data was collected from 1998-2010 (Sovacool 2010), while 
complementary data was obtained from 2011-2018. See Section 4.7 for HFACS 
analysis.   
 
 
3.7.1 Industry Regulatory Data 
 
Use of regulatory data was another research method used to look at documents from 
the regulators point of view between nuclear, aviation and oil and gas. Documents 
were explored to determine if NTS, isomorphic lessons, organisation learning, and risk 





Some of the regulators documents used are from the Office for Nuclear Regulation 
(ONR), which is the safety regulator for the nuclear industry in the United Kingdom; 
the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA), which is the statutory authority that oversees and 
regulates civil aviation in the UK; and the Oil and Gas Authority (OGA), whose role is 
to regulate, influence and promote the UK oil and gas industry, with the purpose of 
achieving the industry statutory principal objective of maximising the economic 




3.7.2 Human Factor Classification System (HFACS Analysis) 
 
3.8.3 The Coding Process 
 
Publicly available nuclear sector accident reports from 1998 to 2018 were used. The 
accident data were inputed into Microsoft Excel and later imported into the SPSS 
software for coding. It was coded with 1 and 0 as being present and absent (accident) 
respectively for different years, as shown in Appendix 6. After the coding, it was then 
analysed. All human factor components (levels) of the HFACS framework were loaded 
into separate columns, according to their hierarchy in the framework.  
 
Data were analysed for different active and latent causal factors that prompted the 
accidents using information from their incident descriptions. To codify the results using 
the HFACS taxonomy, the HFACS event description worksheet was used to 
understand the various events in each accident that could aid in determining each 
human factor that played a role in accident causation. 
 
The accident data was analysed using descriptive statistics in SPSS and crosstabs 
analysis selected. Chi-square tests and correlation options were selected as the 
statistical tools displayed in the results and only the significant relationships with p < 
0.05 were selected for analysis. See Appendix 6 for Chi-square test. See result on 
Trend analysis on Figure 28 (Section 4.7.2). 
 
Subsequently, a bivariate correlation test was carried out with the years selected that 
served as independent variables and the human factors selected as the dependent 
variables. Two levels of significance were chosen for the hypothesis test on human 




after the analysis is significant as it is < 0.05 and 0.01. All significant human factor 
relationships were symbolised with one and two stars, where one star is significance 
at < 0.05- and two-stars meaning significance at 0.01. Positive values indicated a 
progressive or linear relationship between two human factors, while the negative 
values indicated the strength of inverse relationships also between two human factors. 
See appendix 6 for Pearson’s Correlation.  
 
Pearson’s chi-square test was used to indicate the effect each level of HFACS had on 
the lower level (Siu, Phillips, and Leung 2004). It was adopted by this research to 
gauge the level of independence of various human factor levels on each other in the 
HFACS framework (Agresti and Kateri 2013). A chi-square p < 0.05 justifies that 
there is significant relationship between two human factor levels (Restrepo, 
Simonoff, and Zimmerman 2009).  
 
 
3.8 Focus Groups 
 
Focus groups (Silverman 2015) were used to test the validity of the online results 
gathered. This research invited 15 experts (5 from each sector) and were asked to 
examine if online survey findings from different sectors truly represent industry 
practice, and proffer solutions where necessary.  
 
All focus groups were conducted via MS Teams with the assistant of one of the 
supervisory team who introduced the concept to the participants. Permission was 
asked and granted for the recording of the sections which typically lasted 45 – 60 
minutes in length. The focus group interaction was conducted in two days for the 




3.9 Research Approaches 
 
Research approaches depend on what has been stipulated at the beginning of the 
research, especially as they relate to what kind of design approach is used for the 
research project. This implies if the research will use the deductive approach, which 




examine the hypothesis; or either the inductive approach, that is expected to collect 
data and develop theory using data analysis (Saunders et al. 2009). 
 
 
3.9.1 Deductive approach 
 
This research adopted deductive approach to gather and analyse results. Deduction 
approach is using a scientific method of carrying out research. This involves 
developing a theory which is subjected to continuous or rigorous test. Based on that, 
it is believed to be a leading research method in the field of natural sciences, where 
laws exist as the basis of interpretation, allowing the expectation of phenomena, 
predicting their occurrence and therefore permitting them to be controlled (Collis and 
Hussey 2003).  
 
Robson (2002) listed five successive steps in which deductive research can progress.  
 
These are:  
• Deducing a premise (a testable plan about the relationship between two or 
more ideas or variables) from the theory. 
• Expressing the hypothesis (theory) in operational or functioning terms (this 
means indicating precisely how the ideas or variables will be measured), which 
recommend a link between two definite variables. 
• Testing the operational hypothesis (will involve one or more of the strategies). 
• Examining the exact result of the investigation (it will also tend to confirm the 
theory or show the need for its change).  
• If necessary, the theory will be modified from what is obtained from the findings 
(Robson 2002).  
 
 
3.9.2 Inductive approach 
 
Also, this research largely used inductive approach method of data gathering and 
analysis. Reason being that it helped to gain meaning respondents attached to events. 
However, to have a wider scope and view from participants, the research combined 
deductive and inductive methods to gather data. Inductive approach is targeted at 
getting a feeling of what is happening, enabling the researcher to understand or have 




need to make sense of the interview, data collection and analysis. Result findings from 
the analysis would then be formulated into a theory. Table 15 shows the distinction 
between deductive and inductive approaches in research. 
 
In summation, a deductive approach to research is associated with scientific 
investigation. It tries to study what others have done, in terms of existing theories, and 
then tests hypotheses that emerges from those theories. 
 
Whereas, inductive approach is a systematic procedure for analysing qualitative data 
whereby the analysis is likely to be guided by specific evaluation objectives and 
concerned with the generation of new theory developing from a data. 
 




3.9.3 Research Population 
 
The population researched (Lee Abbott and McKinney 2012) were safety experts 
from nuclear, aviation and oil and gas sectors within the UK. Some of the nuclear 
respondents (safety managers, operators and safety trainers) were recruited from the 
World Nuclear Association Symposium held in London in 2018, while LinkedIn was 
mostly used to recruit respondents from the aviation (Pilots, crew members, air traffic 
controllers, safety managers and operators). In the oil and gas sectors, safety 




received the questionnaire answered the same set of questions in the same 
predetermined order (Saunders, Lewis, and Thornhill 2009). 
 
The population for this research was 232 respondents (Saunders et al. 2009). Which 
means the people the research is interested in, as size sample is meant to be the 
population (Leavy 2017). Though in sampling, the word ‘population’ is not used in its 
usual or normal sense, as the full set of respondents may not essentially be people 
(Levy 2017). It also means the whole set of entities or objects that the decision or 
action is concerned with (Easterby-Smith, Araujo, and Burgoyne 1999).  
 
 
3.9.4 Sampling Method and Size 
 
Sampling methods provide an array of approaches which allows a researcher to 
condense or reduce the quantity of data needed to be collected, by considering only 
data or information from a sub-group instead of all possible cases (Saunders et al. 
2009). Therefore, this research shared questionnaires to safety experts across the 
three sectors. The sample size gathered across the three sectors are nuclear (n=124, 
54%); aviation (n=59, 25%) and oil and (n=49, 21%). Figure 12 indicates an example 



















3.9.5 Need to sample  
 
In some research, there is the possibility of collecting data from an overall population 
to a controllable size. Still, it should not be assumed that a census would necessarily 
offer useful information instead of collecting figures from a sample that signifies the 
whole population. Sampling method provides a valid substitute to a census when it is 
difficult to investigate the whole population. Budget constraint is another issue that 
could prevent surveying the whole population; in addition to that is time constraints to 
gather all the data and analyse it on time (Saunders et al. 2009).  
 
The four main types of probability sample methods are sample random, systematic, 
cluster and stratified sampling methods (Levy 2017 and Sunders et al. 2009).  
 
This research used random sampling method and mixed design methods to recruit 
respondents in answering the research questions. Reason being that the research 
population was not grouped in a particular location.  Qualitative research depends on 
probability sampling methods which involve using any strategy that relies on collecting 
samples in a way that each element in the population has either known or non-zero 
chance of being selected. Each person or element in the population possibly had a 
chance of inclusion in the sample and can be determined statistically with a number 
above zero for every person or element (Leavy 2017).  
 
3.9.6 Assessing validity  
 
Focus group was used to test for validity in this research. Further explanation for this 
is on section 4.9. Bryman (2012) said assessing validity is whether an indicator that is 
designed to measure a concept, really measured the concept or what it was intended 
for (Bryman 2012). Content validity is about the extent to which the measurement 
questions contained in the questionnaire can provide adequate coverage of the 
research questions. Decision of what is ‘adequate coverage’ can be made in several 
ways. One is by careful definition of the research through the literature review and, 
where suitable, past discussion with other people. Another method is using a group of 
individuals to measure if each measurement or research question in the questionnaire 
is ‘important’, ‘useful but not essential’, or ‘not necessary’ (Bryman 2012). The 





While predictive validity is concerned with the ability of the questions to make correct 
predictions or forecast. For instance, if a researcher is using the measurement 
questions within the questionnaire to forecast customers’ future buying behaviours, 
then using a test of such nature will be the degree to which they predict customers’ 
buying attitude. To assess criterion-related validity, the researcher will be comparing 
the data from the questionnaire with that stated in the standard in some way. 
Sometimes, this is assumed using statistical analysis such as correlation (Bryman 
2012). This research did not consider it useful to predictive validity. 
 
Construct validity is the degree to which measurement questions gauge the presence 
of constructs being intended to measure. Construct validity is used when referring to 
constructs such as attitude scales, aptitude and personality tests (Bryman 2012). 
 
3.9.7 Testing for reliability  
 
Reliability is concerned with consistency of measures (Bryman 2012). For a 
questionnaire to be valid, there must be reliability, which is not satisfactory on its own. 
Respondents may misconstrue a question in the questionnaire in one way, when it 
means something else (Saunders et al. 2009). This exactly happened in one of the 
questionnaires on isomorphic lessons which many participants did not initially 
understood until an explanation was given. 
 
Saunders et al. (2009), noted that reliability is about the strength or robustness of the 
questionnaires and if it will produce constant findings at different times and different 
conditions, using different samples, especially using different interviewer-administered 
questionnaire with different interviewers. Three basic methods to assess reliability, 
and comparing the figures collected with other figures from different sources. The 
interpretation for each of these is carried out after data must have been collected, 




3.10 Research Philosophy 
 
Research philosophy relates to the development of knowledge and the nature of that 
knowledge (Saunders et al. 2009). As a result, the purpose of this research is geared 




the three sectors carried out in this research, thereby developing new knowledge. 
Though some research questions have been asked in this research and answers 
sought, however, the reality is that a research question rarely falls precisely into only 
one philosophical domain as indicated and suggested in the ‘onion’ in Figure 13 
(Saunders et al. 2009), and hence, there is need to look at other research 
philosophies. 
 
There are two major ways of thinking about research philosophy, these are: ontology 
and epistemology, as each contains vital differences that will influence the way in 
which researchers think about research process, and how it enhances understanding 
of the way in which people approach the study of a particular field of activity (Saunders 
et al. 2009). 
 
 
3.10.1 Pragmatism  
 
The pragmatist argues that the most significant determinant of epistemology, ontology 
and axiology a researcher adopt is the research question, as one may be more 
appropriate than the other to answer. Likewise, if the research question does not 
suggest explicitly that either a positivist or interpretivist philosophy is accepted, this 
confirms the pragmatist’s view that it is possible to work with variations in 
epistemology, ontology and axiology (Saunders et al. 2009). 
 
Tashakkori and Teddlie (1998) stated that it is important for the researcher in a specific 
study to think of the philosophy adopted as a range rather than opposite positions. 
They noted that at some points, the ‘knower and the known’ must interact, while one 
may easily stand apart from what one is studying (Tashakkori, Teddlie, and Teddlie 
1998). 
 
They said that pragmatism is naturally appealing, mainly because it avoids the 
researcher from engaging in what is seen as rather pointless debates about such 
concepts as to what is truth and reality. In their view, a researcher should in what 
he/she is interested in and of value to the researcher; study in the different ways in 
which it deems appropriate, as result will be used to bring about positive 




result, this research concentrated on those ideas that are regarded to be interested in 





This branch of knowledge is concerned with the nature of reality, as it raises questions 
of assumptions researchers have about the way the world functions and the 





They are two aspects of ontology, which are objectivism and subjectivism. Objectivism 
reveals the position that social beings exist in reality to external social actors 
concerned with their existence. For instance, the way people are managed in an 
organisation. Therefore, one may argue that management is an objective entity 





Subjectivism contends that social phenomena are fashioned from the perceptions and 
consequent actions of the social actors concerned with their existence. This is a 
constant process in that through the process of social interaction, social phenomena 
are in a constant state of adjustment (Saunders et al. 2009). Remenyi et al. (1998:35) 
said this is often associated with the term social constructionism. Social 
constructionism views reality as being socially created (Remenyi et al. 1995:35). This 
research took a subjective approach because participants view and reasoning during 




This is the second way of thinking about research philosophy as it concerns to what 
constitutes acceptable knowledge in a field of study. This research would rather 
believe that the data collected are far less open to bias does not agree that it is 




epistemological philosophy to conduct the research. Figure 13 shows research 
philosophy used in this research. 
 
                           Figure 13: Research philosophy (Saunders et. al. 2009)  
Some materials have been removed from this thesis due to Third Party Copyright. Pages 
where material has been removed are clearly marked in the electronic version. The 





3.10.6 Comparison of Four Research Philosophies 
 
Table 16 further illustrates the comparison that exist between four research 
philosophies in management of research. 
 
Table 16: Four philosophy areas 
  
Positivism Realism Interpretivism Pragmatism
Ontology: The
researcher’s view of 
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of what is being
researched, cannot
be separated and so
will be subjective.






























3.11 Ethical Issues on Data Collection 
 
Ethical measures were considered in carrying out the research work; as participant 
informed consent was sought, and further explanation given to the sample population 
as to why the research was carried out. Respondents were treated with courteousness 
(Walliman 2004). However, irrespective of the data collection method used, there 
were still lots of ethical principles that were adhered to. Harm was not caused, or 
participants’ privacy intruded upon. Also, participants had the right not to participate in 
the research even if they had agreed to do so. They reserved the right to withdraw. 
 
The research guaranteed confidentiality and anonymity of respondents, as it is 
important to gain access to organisations and individuals. And since such promises 
have been given, it is paramount to mention that they were maintained (Saunders et 
al. 2009). 
 
Coventry University utilises an online ethics applications system. It is a requirement 
for any research to be approved prior to data collection. One of the requirements for 
primary data collection is to use approved Participant Informed Consent (PIC) and 
Participant Information Leaflets (PIL). Additionally, requirements can include 
completion of a risk assessment form. All primary data collection requires the 
researcher to provide details on survey questions, interview questions and focus 
groups activities in advance. For the further clarification on the approval system for 






3.12 Conceptual Framework 
 
The conceptual framework of this research provided a theoretical overview of the 
research and order within the research process. According to Weaver-Hart (1988) 
conceptual framework is defined as a structure for organising and supporting ideas; a 
mechanism for systematically arranging abstractions; sometimes revolutionary or 
original, and usually rigid. Miles and Huberman (1984) stated that conceptual 
framework is a researcher’s territory being investigated. The definition accommodates 
purpose (boundaries), with flexibility (evolution) and coherence of the research which 
is plan, analysis and conclusion (Trafford and Leshem 2008; quoted Miles and 









3.12.1 Explaining the framework 
 
The conceptual framework in this research comprises three levels of investigations. 
Level 1 is both academic (theory) and industry (practice) contributions derived from 
the three industries examined in this research, namely: nuclear, aviation and oil and 
gas. Level 2 is the outputs derived from the four pillars are: NTS, isomorphic lessons, 
organisational learning and risk characterisation. These in turn are used to produce 
some toolkits for both academic and industry applications. Level 3 focused on line of 




Academic toolkits are represented as A1 - Lexicons, which is a comparison of 
terminology used in different sectors, which invariably could mean the same thing in 
another sector. A2 – Benchmarking data, these are findings derived from the online 
survey on how each sector uses the four pillars to manage safely in various sectors. 
(Provide information that meets the needs of managers and planners in an 
unpredictable environment; offer possible solutions gathered from best practices in 
either aviation or oil and gas; provide a means of improving competence through 
learning both within and outside organisations and between organisations). The third 
is A3. This includes 3 accidents and 3 incidents examples. A3 is used to indicate that 
where there are lapses on NTS, isomorphic lessons, organisational learning and risks 
characterisation, accidents are bound to happen in such sectors. Evidence of these 
have been shown on the accidents and incidents examples. 
 
The contributions for industries (practical) comprise B1 – Training/Reflection logs in 
different sectors to enrich workers understanding on the four pillars used in this 
research. B2 – List of publications of different articles relating to the three sectors on 
the four pillars. The list served as reference points to industries on different types of 
publications that supports industry learning. And B3 – Archiving of incidents near-
misses. This again served as reference point to industries on the type of low incidents 








Level 2 focused on the four pillars used to investigate the three sectors. The four pillars 
have been defined by different authors. For instance, NTS has been defined by Flin et 
al. (2008) as the cognitive, social and personal skills which complements technical 
skills in job performance (Flin et al. 2008). While isomorphic lesson is the faculty to 
learn from similar experience of others or oneself (Toft and Reynolds 2005). Argyris 
and Schön (1978) explained that organisational learning refers broadly to an 
organisation’s acquisition of understanding, know-how, techniques and practices of 
any kind and by any means (Argyris and Schön 1978). Risk characterisation is 
geared towards a decision-driven activity, aimed at informing choices and targeted at 
problem solving (Stern and Fineberg 1996:1). 
 
Also, the level contains sub-topic which represent the toolkits for both academic and 
industry contributions. As discussed on level 1, the ‘As’ represents the contribution for 




Level 3 are six layers of authentication or line of inquiry used to justify the framework. 
Research methodology adopted relates to justification of these layers of both primary 
and secondary data collection. Overall, there are six methods of data gathering in the 
entire research work. These are: online research survey (used to test if the three 
sectors use the four pillars to manage safely) (See section 4 for result analysis); 
accidents and incidents examples which can be a mode of failures that triggers 
accidents. (See Table 14 examples). There also 15 interviews to substantiate if 
industries are conversant with the four pillars and apply them to day-to-day safety 
management.  
 
Another line of investigation is the industry regulatory data. This helped to understand 
if various industry regulators are familiar with (lexicons) languages on the four pillars 
and what they are called. Another online survey carried out was to investigate the 
impact of Covid-19 pandemic on workers performance due to changing nature of risk 
across the three sectors. (See Section 4.8 for explanation on result findings and 
analysis); and finally, a focus group discussion. This is to underpin the views and body 




Therefore, these six lines of inquiry were the amalgam used to justify the merit of areas 






RESULT ANALYSIS & DISCUSSION 
 
4.1 Introduction to Result Analysis 
 
Data should first be collected and prepared before they are analysed (Sapsford and 
Jupp 2006); as data are a raw form of information, and until they have been sieved 
and analysed they convey very little meaning. To make data useful, they have to be 
processed and then turned into information (Saunders, Lewis, and Thornhill 2009). 
Data analysis involves reducing information gathered during the survey and presenting 
them in a clear and understandable form either in tables, pie and bar charts (Bryman 
2012). With quantitative analysis techniques such as charts, graphs and statistics, it 
allows and makes it possible to explore, present, describe and examine relationships 
and trends within data collected (Saunders, Lewis, and Thornhill 2009).  
 
There are four result analysis in this thesis. These are: Two online result analysis; 
interview result analysis and accident data result analysis (secondary data). Each of 
these analyses were discussed as separate topics but combined in this chapter. 
Secondary and primary data were two notable methods used for data collection in this 
research (Kumar 2011). 
 
 
4.2 Online Result Analysis 
 
Bristol Online Survey (BOS) was used to gather respondents’ views from nuclear, 
aviation and the oil and gas sectors. The survey was then hosted on May 23, 2018. 
Finally, 232 respondents were received from industry experts which achieved a 
response rate of 77.33% out of 300 respondents that were initially targeted.  
 
 
4.2.1 Analysis using SPSS 
 
Results were analysed using SPSS to determine to what extent organisations use 
NTS, organisational learning, isomorphic lessons and risk characterisation in training, 
exercise and managing safely; and if workers have encountered the four pillars within 
their working environment in the UK. Table 17 shows breakdown of responses 




Breakdown of questionnaire fielded and received during the research 
 
          Questionnaire                                         Total 
         Table 17: Breakdown of responses received 
 
1 Online respondents received 234 
2 Valid questionnaire 232 
3 Invalid (undefined response).    2 
4 Number of questionnaires analysed 232 
 
 
In all, 17 questions were fielded to respondents across the three sectors. The 
questions asked focused on participants experience and position; general questions; 
practice and closing questions. (See Appendix 2 for the online questionnaire). 
 
4.3. Addressing research questions 
 
Questions were asked to address the following research areas which are in tandem 
with research objectives: 
   
RQ1: To what extent does the nuclear, aviation and the oil and gas sectors use NTS, 
isomorphic lessons, organisational learning and risk characterisation in training and 
managing safety in the UK? 
 
RQ2: To what extent could lessons learned from other organisations, such as aviation 
and oil and gas, help shape the UK nuclear industry’s safety? 
 
 
4.4 Presentation of Result Findings 
 
The analysis from the online survey produced findings and are summarised as follows: 
 
Q1: Currently work in the following industry 
 
The origin of respondents was nuclear (n=124, 54%); aviation (n=59, 25%); and oil 
and gas (n=49, 21%). The pie chart in Figure 15 indicates how participants responded 












I work in the following industry




Q2: What position do you hold within your company? 
 
Table 18 is a crosstab of Q1 and Q2, which illustrates how each sector responded. 
 
Table 18: Position respondents hold in various sectors 
 
    Senior 
Manager 
Manager Supervisor Operator Technical Non-
technical 
Others Total 
Nuclear Count 45 23 4 1 32 4 15 124  
[%] of 
Total 
36 19 3 1 26 3 12 100 
Aviation Count 11 12 3 18 5 1 9 59  
[%] of 
Total 
19 20 5 31 9 2 15 100 
Oil & Gas Count 7 10 9 2 10 0 11 49  
[%] of 
Total 
14 20 18 4 20 0 22 100 
Total Count 63 45 16 21 47 5 35 232 
  [%] of 
Total 








Q3: Total years of service 
 





                        Figure 16: Years of service between the three sectors 










1-5 years 6-9 years 10 years & above
Years of service





Q4a: Have you encountered any of the following (NTS) within your working 
environment? 
 




                Figure 17: Sectors response on if they have encountered NTS 
 
 













Formally Informally Not at all
Encountered NTS?




Q4b: (Isomorphic lessons) 
 
Details of how the three sectors responded is shown in Figure 18. 
 
 













Formally Informally Not at all
Encountered Isomorphic lessons?




Q4c (Organisational learning) 
 




         





















Formally Informally Not at all
Encountered Organisational learning?




Q4d (Risk characterisation) 
 




















Formally Informally Not at all
Encountered risk characterisation?




Sample of Columns of Raw Data Responses from Questions 4 and 5  
 
This snippet of the data (Table 19) file shows the 3-level ordinal responses to the four 
parts of Question 4 and the 10-level ordinal responses to the four parts of Question 5. 
These questions have been compared between industry sectors using Kruskal Wallis 
tests. Categorical variables with a small number of levels are often compared using 
chi-square tests and those with a larger number of levels using correlation.   
 











Q5: Using a scale of 1-10, rate the following on their ability to promote a stronger 
safety culture specifically within your organisation.  
 
Detailed of how each responded is indicated in Table 20 – 23. 
 
 
Table 20: Response on the use of NTS to promote stronger safety culture  
 
  Count (Rating)   
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Total 
Nuclear 2 0 1 8 8 6 14 35 12 32 118 
[%] 2 0 1 7 7 5 12 30 10 27 100 
Aviation 0 0 3 1 2 2 7 9 9 26 58 
[%] 0 0 5 2 3 3 10 16 16 45 100 
Oil & Gas 1 1 2 0 3 8 3 13 3 11 45 
[%] 2 2 4 0 7 18 7 29 7 24 100 
Total 3 1 6 9 13 16 23 57 24 69 221 




Table 21: Response on the use of isomorphic lessons to promote stronger safety culture 
 
  Count (Rating)   
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Total 
Nuclear 1 0 3 1 9 7 12 15 28 36 112 
[%] 1 0 3 1 8 6 11 14 25 32 100 
Aviation 2 0 0 1 2 2 4 16 8 18 53 
[%] 4 0 0 2 4 4 8 30 15 34 100 
Oil & Gas 1 2 1 1 2 2 5 11 10 8 43 
[%] 2 5 2 2 5 5 12 26 23 19 100 
Total 4 2 4 3 13 11 21 42 46 62 208 






Table 22: Response on the use of organisational learning to promote safety culture 
 
  Count (Rating)   
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Total 
Nuclear 1 0 1 2 3 8 14 24 25 42 120 
[%] 1 0 1 2 3 7 12 20 21 35 100 
Aviation 0 1 1 0 1 3 7 20 10 16 59 
[%] 0 2 2 0 2 5 12 34 17 27 100 
Oil & Gas 1 1 1 0 2 2 6 14 8 9 44 
[%] 2 2 2 0 5 5 14 32 18 21 100 
Total 2 2 3 2 6 13 27 58 43 67 223 




Table 23: Response on the use of risk characterisation to promote safety culture 
 
  Count (Rating)   
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Total 
Nuclear 1 1 3 2 6 3 12 23 22 45 118 
[%] 1 1 3 2 5 3 10 20 19 38 100 
Aviation 2 0 0 1 0 4 5 11 12 21 57 
[%] 4 0 0 2 0 7 9 19 21 37 100 
Oil & Gas 3 0 1 0 0 2 4 14 7 13 44 
[%] 7 0 2 0 0 5 9 32 16 30 100 
Total 6 1 4 3 7 9 21 48 41 79 219 










Q6: My organisation incorporates NTS effectively into training, exercises and 
safety practices 
 
Each sector responded to the question as indicated in Figure 21. 
 
 
         


















Q7: What type of NTS training have you received in your organisation? 
 
Detailed of how each sector responded is indicated on Table 24. 
 
Table 24: Indicating NTS training received by workers in workplace  
  
Training Types  






No training provided 
[%] 
 Nuclear Aviation Oil & 
gas 
Nuclear Aviation Oil & 
gas 
Nuclear Aviation Oil & 
gas 
1. Situation 
Awareness   
     47     93   54        27    7   30     26      0     15 
2. Decision making      44      81   43        31    15    34      24      3    23 
3. Communication      56      88   55        29    10    23      15              2    21 
4. Teamwork      53      90   50        30     5    35      17       5    15 
5. Leadership      61      85   55        20    12    23      19       3    21 
6. Managing stress     41      54   40        31    27    23      28     19    36 




Q8: On a scale of 1-10 (1=lowest, 10 = highest) how effective is your organisation 
in terms of the following:  
 
 
Details show how sectors responded to the question on Table 25 – 30  
 
Table 25: Anticipating critical incidents 
 
  Anticipating critical incidents (including near miss events)   
 Count 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Total 
Nuclear 2 3 2 1 9 13 18 31 22 20 121 
[%] 1.7 2.5 1.7 0.8 7.4 10.7 14.9 25.6 18.2 16.5 100 
Aviation 0 1 2 0 5 5 11 13 9 13 59 
[%] 0 1.7 3.4 0 8.5 8.5 18.6 22 15.3 22 100 
Oil & Gas 0 1 3 3 4 2 3 15 5 7 48 
[%] 0 2.1 6.3 6.3 8.3 4.2 8 31.3 10.4 14.6 100 
Total 2 5 7 4 18 20 37 59 36 40 228 
[%] 1 2.2 3.1 1.8 7.9 8.8 16.2 25.9 15.8 17.5 100 
 
 
Table 26: Assessing critical incidents  
 
  Assessing critical incidents (including near miss events)   
 Count 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Total 
Nuclear 2 1 0 4 5 12 13 22 32 30 121 
[%] 1.7 0.8 0 3.3 4.1 9.9 10.7 18.2 26.4 24.8 100 
Aviation 1 0 1 1 1 3 12       11 14 14 58 
[%] 1.7 0 1.7 1.7 1.7 5.2 20.7 19.0 24.1 24.1 100 
Oil & Gas 0 0 3 0 3 5 4 13 10 10 48 
[%] 0 0 6.3 0 6.3 10.4 8.3 27.1 20.8 20.8 100 
Total    3 1 4 5 9 20 29 46 56 54 227 






Table 27: Preparing for critical incidents 
  Preparing for critical incidents (including near miss events)   
 Count 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Total 
Nuclear 2 1 3 4 3        9     21 25 28 25 121 
[%] 1.7 0.8 2.5 3.3 2.5 7.4 17.4 20.7 23.1 20.7 100 
Aviation 0 0 0 5 2 4 11 12 12 12 59 
[%] 0 0 0 8.6 3.4 6.9 19.0 20.7 20.7 20.7 100 
Oil & Gas 0 1 1 2 3 6 8 12 7 8 48 
[%] 0 2.1 2.1 4.2 6.3 12.5 16.7 25.0 14.6 16.7 100 
Total 2 2 4 11 8 19 40 49 47 45 227 
[%] 0.9 0.9 1.8 4.8 3.5 8.4 17.6 21.6 20.7 19.8 100 
 
 
Table 28: Responding to critical incidents 
  Responding to critical incidents (including near miss events)   
 Count 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Total 
Nuclear 1 1 1 4 5 4 12 21 32 40 121 
[%] 0.8 0.8 0.8 3.3 4.1 3.3 9.9 17.4 26.4 33.1 100 
Aviation 0 1 2 0 2 6 10 11 14 13 59 
[%] 0 1.7 3.4 0 3.4 10.2 16.9 18.6 23.7 22.0 100 
Oil & Gas 0 1 1 0 1 1 9 11 12 12 48 
[%] 0 2.1 2.1 0 2.1 2.1 18.8 22.9 25.0 25.0 100 
Total 1 3 4 4 8 11 31 43 58 65 228 





Table 29: Recovering from critical incidents 
 
  Recovering from critical incidents (including near miss events)   
 Count 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Total 
Nuclear 3 0 3 4 6 9 14 22 34 25 121 
[%] 2.5 0 2.5 3.3 5.0 7.5 11.7 18.3 28.3 20.8 100 
Aviation 0 0 3 2 2 5 11 16 10 10 59 
[%] 0 0 5.1 3.4 3.4 8.5 18.6 27.1 16.9 16.9 100 
Oil & Gas 2 0 1 0 2 4 9 15 7 8 48 
[%] 4.2 0 2.1 0 4.2 8.3 18.8 31.3 14.6 16.7 100 
Total     5 0 7 6 10 18 34 53 51 43 228 
[%] 2.2 0 3.1 2.6 4.4 7.9 15.0 23.3 22.5 18.9 100 
 
 
Table 30: Review and learning from critical incidents 
 
  Review and learning from critical incidents (including near miss events)   
 Count 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Total 
Nuclear 1 3 3 3 4 10 17 18 28 34 121 
[%] 0.8 2.5 2.5 2.5 3.3 8.3 14.0 14.9 23.1 28.1 100 
Aviation 1 0 1 2 4 3 7 15 12 14 59 
[%] 1.7 0 1.7 3.4 6.8 5.1 11.9 25.4 20.3 23.7 100 
Oil & Gas 1 1 2 2 1 7 8 8 7 11 48 
[%] 2.1 2.1 4.2 4.2 2.1 14.6 16.7 16.7 14.6 22.9 100 
Total 3 4 6 7 9 20 32 59 47      59 228 





Q9: NTS are strong feature of my organisation’s practice 
 
Detail for Nuclear, Aviation and Oil and gas on if NTS are strong features of individual 
organisation’s practice is indicated on Figure 22. 
 
 












Strongly agree Agree Neither agree
nor disagree
Disagree Strongly disagree
NTS are strong feature




Q10: Isomorphic lessons is a strong feature of my organisation’s practice 
 

















Strongly agree Agree Neither agree
nor disagree
Disagree Strongly disagree
Isomorphic lessons as a strong feature




Q11: Organisational learning is a strong feature of my organisation’s practice 
 












Strongly agree Agree Neither agree
nor disagree
Disagree Strongly disagree
Organisational learning is a strong feature




Q12: Risk deliberations and analysis are strong feature of my organisation’s 
practice  
 















Strongly agree Agree Neither agree
nor disagree
Disagree Strongly disagree
Risk deliberation is a strong feature




Q13: Lessons learned from other high-risk sectors (e.g. aviation, nuclear and oil 
and gas) can help inform risk-based decisions in my organisation. 
 




























Strongly agree Agree Neither agree
nor disagree
Disagree Strongly disagree
Lessons learned from other industries




Q14: A combined framework, with benchmarking and a toolkit (between 
aviation, oil and gas and nuclear) would be useful for cross industry 
learning on similar underlying risks 
 
Details on sectors response is indicated on Figure 27. 
 
 
        





















Q15: On a scale of 1-10, rate the following options as essential contributions to 
incidents 
 
Details of how each sector responded is indicated in Table 31. 
 
Table 31: Indicating essential contributions to incidents 
 
                                                                  Human Factors (Rating) 
Count 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 




2 1 3 11 22 61 




0 0 2 17 22 57 




2 8 0 14 31 41            
                                                                                                    Mechanical Factors 
Count 
          
Nuclear [%] 1 2 4 5 20 11 20 20 6 12 
Aviation [%] 0 5 5 5 10 12 22 20 7 14 
Oil & Gas [%] 0 0 6 6 10 8 25 29 12 4            
                                                                                                     Environmental Factors 
Count 
          
Nuclear [%] 1 1 2 2 13 9 23 21 7 21 
Aviation [%] 0 0 0 5 5 5 17 41 10 17 
Oil & Gas [%] 0 2 6 14 10 16 12 25 8 6            
 
                                                                 Natural Factors 
    
Count 
          
Nuclear [%] 12 23 16 12 15 7 7 0 3 6 
Aviation [%] 7 24 12 14 22 3 3 9 3 3 








Q16: Which human analysis framework will be most suitable for the 
management of safety in your industry in the UK (For senior managers 
only) 
 
Details of how each sector responded is indicated in Table 32 
 
 













Count 59 22 0 43 124 
Nuclear [%] 48 18 0 35 100 
Count 0 35 2 22 59 
Aviation [%] 0 59 3 37 100 
Count [%] 5 28 2 14 49 
Oil & Gas [%] 10 57 4 29 100 
Count 64 85 4 79 232 
Total [%] 28 37 2 34 100 






Sample of columns data used for Chi-square contingency tables 
 
This snippet of the data (Table 33) file shows the industry sector indicated in the 
column headed Q1 (for Question 1) and another categorical response for Question 16 
(in Q16). These have been compared using a chi-square test. 
 











Q17: What additional measures do you think should be put in place to reduce accidents in your industry? 
 
Respondents were asked to give more information that could assist in managing safely in their sectors.  
Some of the responses are tabulated below: 
 
Table 34: Sectors response (comments) from online questionnaire 
Nuclear Aviation Oil & Gas 
The sector should keep learning from ONR and 
WANO. 
 
Better integration of learning for experience with risk 
assessment processes. 
Creation of security awareness at all 
levels of the organisation.  
Some performance practiced offshore in the 
UK sector in 1984/5 were inadequate. 
A proper review and learning session should be put in 
place. 
 
Better cross organisation/company interaction on 
learning from experience. 
 
Safety drills, training and retraining of staff 
on safety aspects 
Additional training in human factors above the bare 
minimum requirement. 
In-depth training along the career-path. A culture where everyone feels they can act 
without reproach is vital.  
Adherence to IAEA safety standards and enhanced 
ONR regulations. 
Training in the form of organisational 
dialogues about the factors that can 
improve or distract from good safety 
culture. 
 
A culture of zero accidents as a goal should be 
implemented and monitored. 
 
The need to have an assertive attitude in everything. 
Training and knowledge-sharing. A move away from regulatory testing and 
towards competency-based training and 
assessment. The testing required by 





Applying formal training into practice through 
workshops and more 'hands-on' experience. 
 
Behavioural assessment and learning. 
Improving laws and regulations guiding 
safety in aviation. 
Address the working environment of 'over 
stretch' - doing more with less.  Short term it 
is fine. 
Better cross organisation/ company interaction on 
learning from experience. 
  
Proper safety awareness, transparency in 
reporting accidents and near misses as 
well as putting adequate measures in 
place to avoid accident re-occurrence. 
Bow Tie process for managing risk. 
Better fatigue management systems. 
  
Constant review of near misses.   
Enforcement and compliance of safety 
rules by staffs. 
Change management culture. Don't 
promote selfish ambitious people, but 
caring, team workers. 
Better induction and training for new entrants into 
nuclear site construction. 
Staff should receive adequate training to 
manage their work effectively. 
Clear focus on safety governance from 
management level down. 
Better integration of learning for experience with risk 
assessment processes. 
 
Constant education, training, using the right tool for 
the job, drills and up-to-date re-certifications.  
Workers in the aviation sector (pilots) are 
trained in crew resource management 
before they start flying. Therefore, is a 
common feature in aviation. 
Constant education, training, using the right 
tool for the job, drills and up-to-date re-
certifications. 
Corrective action programme, routine performance 
monitoring, identification of gaps and programme of 
continuous improvement of all key processes and 
celebrating success. 
Training staff on non-technical skills and 
organisational learning is important. 
IOSH Training and certification. 
Training session especially for fresh graduates 
employed in the nuclear industry. 
Training is important in aviation and 
should be extend to other sectors. 
Continuous learning and improvement. 
Implementation of true just culture. 
Shorter working hours.  
 
Make sure that senior staff do not intimidate staff into 
performing unsafe work, taking time to do jobs safely. 
Workers should be trained regularly to 
reduce human in organisations 
Correct returns targeted at prioritising risk 
factors 
Innovation and implementation of new technologies 
could reduce the incident of accidents due to ageing 
infrastructure. 
Safety culture, education, training and 
retraining. 
Replacing human with robots, would reduce 
number of accidents. 
Innovation that removes the human element. Allow the 
engineering, physics and machinery to control the 
system, rather than relying on human to make active 
decision. 
Management need a greater 
understanding of the risks on commercial 
operating pressures place on the safe 
operation of aircraft. 
Limitation of excessive subcontractors. 
Enhance safety culture. 
 
More automation. Listen to the operators, people with 




Change management culture. Don’t promote selfish 
ambitious people, but caring, team workers. 
conclusions and knee jerk reactions in the 
name of safety. 
Formal training on nuclear safety culture and risk 
management, backed by nuclear knowledge 
management. 
Good communication with all staff; 
effective fatigue management. 
Development and retention of experience at 
senior supervisory levels. 
Increase the understanding how a new safety 
measure can impact existing safety measures. Learn 
more from other industries. 
Better fatigue management systems. Workers should undergo trainings to be able 
to operate machines and work effectively. 
Managers in the fields of safety should have technical 
backgrounds to better understand accidents. 
Better safety culture and training We have not had any major exploration in 
our company; however, training and practice 
is vital. 
More training and better leadership. 
 
Safety leadership training for senior managers; cross-
industry learning; ensuring time is made available.  
Developing evidence and competency-
based training. 
Cross industry learning. Effective reporting 
and communications. Effective training 
which is not determined solely by budgets. 
Lessons learn globally in form of videos should be 
shared. 
Training, learning from experience, peer 
review, detailed hazard identification and 
risk assessment. 
Review of Reporting of Injuries, Diseases 
and Dangerous Occurrences Regulations 
(RIDDOR) to include near misses-although 
through anonymous recording. 
Executive and leader observation and coaching in the 
workplace. 
 
More training and reviews of past incidents no matter 
what industry it happened. 
Considered risk assessment rather than 
by note or checklist. Effective LFE 
addressing root causes at all event 
levels. Periodic safety reviews and don’t 
assume that everything is okay. 
The biggest gains would be from culture 
change leading to a thorough awareness of 
Human Performance (HuP) tools and 
habitual application.  
Close supervision of employees and frequent internal 
and external safety risk assessment. 
 
Stronger leadership. 
Training, more consideration of human factors. 
 
Reduce workload; increase enough funding for safety 
and improve safety culture. 
Less reliance on "off the shelf" safety 
management systems and more 
promoting safety culture. 
Education that is practical, relevant and 
engages those at the coal face. Not some 
college professor full of buzz words and who 
has no actual experience and just spouts 
theory. 
Training, motivation for best practices and staff 
inclusion in policy formulation. 
 






4.4.1 Result of Kruskal Wallis test and Mean Scores 
 
A summary of Kruskal Wallis (KW) tests (Table 35) of the ordinal responses collected 
from the questionnaire is presented in this section. The table contains mean scores 
rather than mean ranks of each ordinal scale. Mean values are given for each industry 
sector and H is the Kruskal Wallis test statistic. P is the probability that the null 
hypothesis (no difference between industry sectors) is true. Means are given in 
preference to medians since the latter may not adequately identify where industry 
sectors differed. When the P-value of the KW test is <0.05 reject the null hypothesis 
is rejected and it is concluded that the responses differ between industry sectors.  
 
Differences in mean scores indicate the differences between sectors. For example, on 
the use of NTS, the means are nuclear (1.28), aviation (1.03) and oil and gas (1.53). 
This scale is scored 1 = formally used, 2 = informally used, 3 = not used at all. Thus, 
aviation uses NTS most formally, followed by nuclear, then oil and gas.  
 
The test result of Kruskal Wallis is indicated on Table 35. 
 
 
Table 35: Indicating Kruskal Wallis test and mean scores across the three sectors 
 Mean Kruskal Wallis 
  Scale Nuclear Aviation 
Oil and 
Gas H P 
Q2: What position do you 
hold within your company? 
1-n 3.19 3.56 3.86 4.841 0.089 
Length of Service 1-n 2.55 2.56 2.35 3.166 0.205 
Non-technical Skills 1-3 1.28 1.03 1.53 25.072 <0.001 
Isomorphic learning 1-3 1.55 1.47 1.70 4.253 0.119 
Organisational learning 1-3 1.27 1.18 1.24 1.239 0.538 
Risk characterisation 1-3 1.28 1.09 1.26 7.249 0.027 
Non-technical skills 1-10 7.79 8.45 7.42 8.275 0.016 
Isomorphic learning 1-10 8.19 8.23 7.60 2.930 0.231 
Organisational learning 1-10 8.42 8.25 7.82 3.583 0.167 




Q6: My organisation 
incorporates NON-
TECHNICAL SKILLS 
effectively into training, 
exercises, and safety 
practices. 
1-5 2.09 1.53 2.27 21.359 <0.001 
Situation Awareness 
(knowing your environment) 
1-3 1.78 1.07 1.61 36.666 <0.001 
Decision Making 1-3 1.80 1.22 1.81 25.694 <0.001 
Communications 1-3 1.58 1.14 1.66 20.234 <0.001 
Teamwork 1-3 1.64 1.15 1.65 23.810 <0.001 
Leadership 1-3 1.59 1.19 1.66 13.764 0.001 
Managing Stress 1-3 1.87 1.64 1.96 4.242 0.120 
Coping with Fatigue 1-3 2.20 1.44 1.96 32.188 <0.001 
Anticipating critical incidents 
(including near miss events) 
1-10 7.55 7.71 7.21 1.421 0.492 
Assessing critical incidents 
(including near miss events) 
1-10 8.03 8.09 7.83 0.652 0.722 
Preparing for critical 
incidents (including near 
miss events) 
1-10 7.83 7.84 7.48 1.787 0.409 
Responding to critical 
incidents (including near 
miss events) 
1-10 8.36 7.93 8.23 3.708 0.157 
Recovering from critical 
incidents (including near 
miss events) 
1-10 7.85 7.66 7.60 2.055 0.358 
Review and learning from 
critical incidents (including 
near miss events) 
1-10 7.96 7.92 7.44 2.266 0.322 
Q9: Non-technical skills are 
a strong feature of my 
organisation’s practice. 
1-5 2.09 1.73 2.16 8.132 0.017 
Q10: Isomorphic learning is 
a strong feature of my 
organisation’s practice. 
1-5 2.43 2.15 2.27 5.280 0.071 
Q11 Organisational learning 
is a strong feature of my 
organisation’s practice. 




Q12: Risk deliberation and 
risk analysis are a strong 
feature of my organisation’s 
practice. 
1-5 1.86 1.68 1.84 1.432 0.489 
Q13: Lessons learned from 
other high-risk sectors (e.g. 
aviation, nuclear, oil and 
gas) can help inform risk-
based decisions in my 
organisation. 
1-5 1.60 1.37 1.78 6.624 0.036 
Q14: A combined 
framework, with 
benchmarking and a toolkit 
(between aviation, oil and 
gas, and nuclear) would be 
useful for cross industry 
learning on similar 
underlying risks. 
1-5 1.73 1.83 1.73 0.853 0.653 
Human factors 1-10 9.28 9.24 8.69 6.469 0.039 
Mechanical factors 1-10 6.74 6.81 6.94 0.560 0.756 
Environmental factors 
(working environment) 
1-10 7.44 7.81 6.45 12.613 0.002 
Acts of God (Natural 
factor/mystery) 
1-10 4.00 4.31 3.57 4.304 0.116 
 
 
The rational for conducting the Kruskal-Wallis (KW) nonparametric one-way ANOVA 
tests were used to analyse ordinal responses and test if responses from the three 
different sectors had any statistically significant difference. Nonparametric statistics, 
for example the Kruskal Wallis test, are appropriate for data which are ordinal, such 











This discussion is based on the results generated and analysed in this research. 
These are the online questionnaires which were completed by 232 respondents, 
carried out in parallel with other research (secondary data and interviews).  
 
4.5.2 Discussion of the Main Findings 
 
The research focused on the four pillars (NTS, isomorphic lessons, organisational 
learning and risk characterisation) and produced information generated between the 
three sectors. As observed, the nuclear sector generated the highest number of 
responses from the online survey, followed by the aviation and oil and gas sectors. 
 
Respondents were requested to state the position they occupy within their respective 
organisations. The question was important to this research since it helped to determine 
the respondents’ status (portfolio) in their various organisations. For instance, greater 
seniority or longer length of service might imply that respondents’ views could be better 
relied upon. Of the respondents, the nuclear sector had the highest proportion of 
senior managers, followed by the aviation and the oil and gas sectors. This further 
indicates that senior managers in the nuclear sector were willing to participate in the 
online survey, possibly because there were more confident of answering the questions 
compared to the other sectors. 
 
Respondents indicated the length of service from a choice of sector categories. The 
proportion of respondents who had worked in their sector for 10 years or more was 
highest in the aviation sector, followed by the nuclear sector. The oil and gas sector 
had the highest proportion of respondents with 1-5 years and with 6-9 years of 
experience. See Figure 16 (Q3). 
 
Crucial to this research is the use of the four pillars, which are NTS, isomorphic 
lessons, organisational learning and risk characterisation within the working 
environment to manage safety. Each segment of the questionnaire tests a different 
set of ideas and knowledge. Therefore, respondents were requested to indicate if they 
had used any of the four pillars in training and managing safety in the UK, and to 




is expected to draw out possible lessons for the UK nuclear sector. Most importantly, 
the question addressed research question one. RQ1: To what extent does the nuclear 
sector use the four pillars in training and managing safety in the UK? 
 
Sectors’ knowledge on Figure 17 (Q4a) was tested on the use of NTS within the 
working environment, either formally, informally or not at all. This is significant since 
NTS contributes considerably to the management of everyday human error; and poor 
non-technical performance permits error to compromise the safety of a process. In the 
aviation sector, the result is consistent with an expert’s view during an interview this 
research conducted, that the use of NTS is made compulsory during flight training 
exercises. The result in aviation also supports the work of Flin et al. (2008) and 
Thomas (2018), that NTS in aviation cannot be compromised. However, results from 
the nuclear and oil and gas sectors were different on the informal use of NTS in the 
workplace. This implies that the oil and gas sector tend to rely on an informal training 
approach instead of a formal training strategy which should be regarded as more 
official form of training in organisations.  
 
The differences in the use of NTS in the nuclear sector were further emphasised by a 
participant during an interview session this research conducted. He remarked that in 
the nuclear sector, NTS is not termed as such, but described as soft skills. 
Furthermore, during a focus group discussion conducted in this research, a nuclear 
expert said that during his 40 years of service in the nuclear industry, he had never 
heard the terminology NTS. According to him, NTS is mostly used in aviation rather 
than in the nuclear sector. This means the terminology or lexicon used is different 
between the three sectors, which invariably may have affected respondents’ 
understanding of the question especially in the nuclear and oil and gas sectors. This, 
in turn, may have been the reason why the nuclear and the oil and gas sectors had 
lower numbers of respondents compared to the aviation sector. 
 
The question on Figure 18 (Q4b) tried to identify whether workers had encountered 
isomorphic lessons in the working environment. Responses were similar between the 
three sectors, it indicates that all three sectors were not using isomorphic lessons 
formally in the work environment, which could be the reason the same type of 
accidents keep reoccurring in some industries, supporting the work of Toft and 




0.119) between sectors on how participants responded to the question. The result also 
confirms what participants said during the focus group discussion. Participants 
independently said that isomorphic lesson had not been formally encountered in the 
working environment. A participant in the aviation sector noted that the industry was 
not aware of the term isomorphism. This view was also stated across nuclear and oil 
and gas sectors by some participants. However, the question could have been scored 
low probably because respondents either did not understand the question, or because 
the word isomorphism was not understood despite providing a definition of terms for 
participants taking part in the online survey. 
 
Another research question was on organisational learning on Figure 19 (Q4c). 
Participants across the three sectors were asked if it was used within the working 
environment either formally, informally, or not at all. Though the three sectors recorded 
a high mean level of response signifying that workers had received formal training on 
organisational learning, however, Kruskal Wallis test confirmed that there was no 
significant difference (p = 0.538) between the three sectors.  The result contrast with 
literature that states that most organisations have not fully utilised their learning 
abilities (Trigilio 2006). In the same vein, organisations struggle to apply practical 
methods because they lack concrete remedies (Basten and Haamann 2018). 
 
The statement from Basten and Haamann (2018) also agrees with information 
gathered from the interview conducted by this research that organisational learning 
across the three sectors was not adequately used. For instance, during the interview, 
a participant from the nuclear sector said there had not been any organised disciplined 
process of learning, either internally from companies or between companies. (See 
Appendix 3). Furthermore, during the focus group discussion conducted by this 
research, a respondent in the oil and gas sector stated that organisational learning is 
difficult because no organisation would like to publish its mistakes or accident reports 
for the public to see. This, he said, was a terrible set-back for organisations, since 
learning is not taking place even across sectors. 
 
Risk characterisation was another research pillar used to gauge whether it had been 
encountered by workers in the three sectors. Respondents from the three sectors 
shows they had encountered risk characterisation on a formal basis to manage and 




followed by the nuclear sector. Results from this question may not be directly 
comparable because the three sectors do not perform the same function. As a matter 
of fact, worker’s experience will differ sector-to-sector. How work is performed, and 
risk characterised or calibrated will also not be the same. A nuclear expert during the 
focus groups discussion noted that human factor tools such as: Nuclear ‘jewelry’ (key 
outcomes), pre and post job review, and independent review were constantly used to 
ensure tasks were assessed properly. 
 
From a cultural perspective, respondents were asked to assess the ability of NTS, 
isomorphic lessons, organisational learning and risk characterisation to promote a 
stronger safety culture within organisations. (See Table 20 – Table 23). Questions on 
a 10- point scale measured respondents’ view. The importance of these questions is 
that they indicate how organisations place priority on the use of the four pillars to 
achieve safety culture. The data revealed that the aviation sector had the highest 
response on a 10-point scale, while the nuclear and oil and gas sectors rated NTS on 
8-point scale. 
 
However, the online data did not agree with the experts’ view that NTS covers a wide 
array of skills that are important to maintaining safe performance in the work 
environment (Thomas 2018). Nonetheless, despite the result that respondents from 
the aviation sector had formally encountered NTS, it could not be said that NTS was 
used by workers to promote a stronger safety culture. On the other hand, the result 
also implies that neither nuclear nor oil and gas sectors have formally made use of 
NTS to promote a stronger safety culture in the work environment.  
 
Isomorphic lessons were also rated on their ability to promote a strong safety culture. 
Both aviation and the nuclear sectors highly rated the use of isomorphic lessons on a 
10-point scale, though the aviation had the highest mean. The oil and gas sector rated 
isomorphic lesson on a 9-point scale. The result indicated that the three sectors were 
not using isomorphic lessons and their ability to promote a stronger safety culture in 
their various organisations. This is the same as in the use of organisational learning, 
indicating that organisational learning is not used to promote a stronger safety culture. 
KW test revealed that there was no significant difference (p > 0.05) between the three 
sectors in using isomorphic lessons to promote a stronger safety culture. These 




discussions that both isomorphic lessons and organisational learning were not fully 
utilised to manage safety. Participants also said that efforts are being made to train 
workers on how to use both pillars to manage effectively in the working environment. 
 
Additionally, to promote safety culture using risk characterisation, the result from the 
three sectors did not demonstrate a high use of risk characterisation and did not 
corroborate what sector experts said during an interview session conducted in this 
research to authenticate the online result. Notwithstanding, in the nuclear sector, a 
safety expert said risk characterisation in the industry was highly evolved. The industry 
carries out both deterministic and probabilistic safety analysis that is extremely 
detailed. It looks at accident scenarios including the most remote and ensures that 
designs and operators are robust. 
 
In the aviation sector, a pilot noted that there are more layers of control put in place, 
that more risks are controlled but less opportunities to identify what went wrong. In the 
oil and gas sector, a drill operator said risk is mitigated against using relevant control 
measures, and if the risk is not As Low as Reasonably Practicable (ALARP), the job 
would not be carried out. The fact remains that risk is characterised across the three 
sectors, but individual sectors determine how it is characterised due to the nature of 
risks and jobs performed in those individual sectors. KW test revealed there was no 
significant difference (p = 0.600) between the three sectors. 
 
This research asked a 5-point (strongly agree, agree, neither agree nor disagree, 
disagree and strongly disagree) ordinal questions to respondents. The question was 
to determine whether organisations incorporated NTS effectively into training, 
exercises and safety practices. The result from across the three sectors revealed that 
the aviation sector incorporates NTS effectively into training, exercises and safety 
practices with more responses in the strongly agree category, compared to the nuclear 
and oil and gas sectors. The result from the aviation sector agrees with the views from 
industry players that NTS is used in aviation for training purposes (Thomas 2018). In 
confirmation of the result, KW test indicated significant differences (p < 0.01) between 
the three sectors. On strongly agree, the aviation sector had the highest and 
considered the best, followed by the nuclear sector as the second best and then oil 
and gas as the third. The result also agrees with the work of Flin et al. (2008), that 




making sure that people receive suitable NTS to cope with the risks and demands of 
the job. 
 
Throughout the text p=0.05 has been used as a threshold for significance, i.e. p< 0.05 
is considered statistically significant. This indicates strong evidence against the null 
hypothesis since there is less than a 5 per cent chance that the null hypothesis is true. 
When the null hypothesis is rejected, the alternative hypothesis (typically that the three 
industry sectors differ) is accepted. Where a result is marginal (0.05<P<0.10) a 
comment has normally been provided on the direction of differences. 
 
 
Table 24, (Q7) summarises responses on the type of NTS training that operators had 
received in their various organisations. NTS is comprised of seven forms of elements 
which were all tested. These categories of elements are discussed below. 
 
4.5.3 Categories of NTS 
 
Situation awareness (SA) training 
 
Situation awareness (SA), known as awareness and understanding of the working 
environment, was highlighted by participants as one of the NTS elements they had 
received training in. The result suggests that more staff received formal training in the 
aviation sector on SA to prevent or mitigate accidents while flying, compared to oil and 
gas and nuclear sectors. The aviation result is supported by literature that crew 
members are required to have temporal awareness, anticipating future events based 
on information of both the past and the present. It is important that people monitor their 
surroundings so that likely problems can be corrected before they get worse (Flin et 
al. 2008). However, the way participants in the nuclear and oil and gas sectors 
responded to this question could have been influenced by nomenclature. The 
statement reflects the views that some of the participants, especially in the nuclear 
sector, stated during the focus group discussion and interviews conducted in this 
research that situation awareness is known as observation, which in the aviation 
sector is known as SA. As stated above, this question could have been misconstrued 
by participants in nuclear and oil and gas sectors and which influenced the response 







Decision making is critical in any workplace. Workers in the three sectors were asked 
in the online survey if they had received training on decision-making in their workplace. 
The result revealed that formal training of workers on decision-making was more likely 
in the aviation sector which is believed to be essential in its working environment 
especially when flying an aircraft. This was followed by nuclear and oil and gas sectors. 
However, the result from the nuclear sector is in contrast with the view of nuclear 
experts who believe that operators in the sector are vested with much authority and 
know the expectation when challenged with unanticipated or undefined conditions, 
and therefore strive to place the plant in a safe condition (INPO 2012). Decision-
making could have been high in aviation because any delay responding to challenges 
could become catastrophic for operators. It is also understandable of the need to take 
decisions quickly when working with smaller groups, than in larger groups. Hence, it 
is possible and expected to take decisions faster in the aviation sector, than in the 





Communication which means exchanging of information either verbal or non-verbal 
between workers in a team is another vital element of NTS. Respondents were 
requested to state if training on communication had been provided in the workplace. 
The result shows that among the three sectors, communication was highest in the 
aviation sector on formal strategy, compared to nuclear and oil and gas sectors which 
recorded lower score. However, the data did not mean that nuclear and oil and gas 
sectors were not using communication effectively. Given the nature of work in the 
aviation sector, communication is sine-qua-non which could be the reason the sector 
had the highest mean response (Thomas 2018).  
 
However, most of the accidents that have occurred in high-risk industries are always 
traceable to communication lapses. The data from nuclear and oil and gas sectors is 
supported by literature on why accidents that have occurred between the two sectors 
are always catastrophic in nature, since communication was not adequately used to 
manage safety (NEI 2017; Cullen 1990). Nonetheless, regardless of how each sector 




due to communication lapses (Hutchinson 2000). What is paramount is the ability to 
effectively utilise the knowledge acquired through quality training. This will determine 





Teamwork involves coordinating activities within a team, support for others and 
establishing a shared understanding. It is particularly relevant since it reduces error 
and maintains safety in the work environment. The three sectors responded that they 
had received training on teamwork in the workplace. The result indicates that the 
aviation sector received more formal training. This was followed by the nuclear and 
then the oil and gas sectors which recorded high responses on informal training 
approaches. The data from the oil and gas sector is supported by literature that 
teamwork was lacking in the sector which led to three contractors - Haliburton, BP and 
Transocean making grievous errors which led to the Macondo Well Blowout (OSC 
2011). However, the result on teamwork could have been less comparable because 
respondents are from three different sectors, meaning that work patterns and roles of 





Leadership is defined as guiding others. It is also aimed at providing direction and 
instruction. Leadership helps to understand and consider the roles and needs of other 
team members. Respondents were asked if training had been provided to workers in 
the workplace. The result implies that the aviation sector provided training to staff 
using formal methods, compared to nuclear and oil and gas sectors (in that order) that 
relied mostly on informal methods. The result from the oil and gas sector supports 
experts’ views from the literature that leadership in the oil and gas sector was not fully 
utilised, which contributed to accidents such as Piper Alpha and the Macondo Well 
Blowout (Flin et al. 2008: 142; OSC 2011). On the other hand, the result is expected 
to be different across the three sectors because of differences in work operations 









Managing stress is the ability to understand if a worker is overstretched with workloads 
in a work environment. Providing feedback on whether training had been provided 
across the three sectors, the result suggests that the aviation sector had the highest 
response, followed by nuclear and oil and gas sectors. However, based on focus group 
discussion, managing stress is still a challenge facing high-risk industries in the UK; 
has also been linked to safety outcomes in industries (Cooper and Clarke 2003; 
quoted in Flin et al., 2008). Among the seven elements tested in this section, KW test 




Coping with fatigue 
 
Fatigue is synonymous or related to drowsiness, sleepiness and tiredness. Coping 
with fatigue was the last NTS element on which respondents were asked whether 
training was provided in the workplace. The result from the online survey suggests 
that the aviation sector train workers on coping with fatigue using formal approaches, 
compared to the oil and gas and the nuclear sectors. The result from the nuclear sector 
agrees with the work of Grishanin (2010) which noted that the nuclear sector is yet to 
introduce a formal training strategy to train workers on coping with fatigue (Grishanin 
2010). KW test revealed that there was significant difference (p < 0.01) between the 
sectors. The aviation sector had the highest of respondents, followed by the oil and 
gas sector and the lowest was the nuclear sector. Responses to the question may 
have been high in the aviation sector because the sector knows the implication of not 
having long hours of sleep before flying an aircraft. Accidents in aviation could occur 
within split seconds and chances of saving the situation are slim, compared to nuclear 
and oil and gas sectors which could take a longer time to cascade into a serious event. 
 
 
4.5.4 Continuation on Additional Research Findings 
 
This research used 10-point scale (1=lowest, 10 = highest) to determine how effective 
the three sectors were in terms of the following: anticipating, assessing, preparing, 
responding, recovery, reviewing and learning from critical incidents in their 




can affect managing safety. The result equally showed how effectively each sector 
uses the six elements in the workplace. Generally, the three sectors responded to the 
question on a scale of 10 to emphasises the importance of reviewing and learning 
from critical incidents. The reason could have been to avoid the same type of incident 
repeating itself and which could eventually escalate to major accidents (Trim and 
Caravelli 2008). Toft and Reynolds (2006) believe that the crucial aspect of accident 
reviewing (investigation) of events is the feedback stage which helps organisations 
learn from past mistakes. 
 
The question whether all the four pillars are a strong feature of an organisation’s 
practice  as summarised on Figure 22, 23, 24 and 25; (Q9 - Q12) is different from what 
has been asked and discussed earlier. While previous research had focused on NTS 
as strong skills in the aviation sector, in contrast, this result demonstrates that none of 
the three sectors has made NTS a strong feature of its organisation’s practice. 
However, NTS is considered to be widely used to manage safety in the aviation sector 
(Flin et al. 2008). 
 
On whether isomorphic lesson is a strong feature of the three sectors’ practice, this 
result confirms what participants across the three sectors independently remarked 
during the focus group discussion conducted in this research. They separately said 
that isomorphic lesson was not a strong feature of their organisation’s practice, 
something each of the sectors said they had started to investigate. The result is also 
not surprising since participants stated that isomorphic lessons had never been used 
in various organisations. The result agrees with KW test which revealed that there was 
no significant difference (p = 0.071) between the three sectors. 
   
Further to examining the use of the four pillars and their ability to manage safety, the 
three sectors were asked if organisational learning was a strong feature of their 
organisation’s practice. The data suggests that organisational learning is not practiced 
across the three sectors as it ought to be. This is further supported by a respondent’s 
view in the nuclear sector during an interview session conducted by this research. He 
noted that organisational learning will evolve over time, as the sector continues to learn 
how to make the industry as safe as possible. In the aviation sector, a pilot said there 
is not necessarily as good a spirit of learning as one would like to think. In the oil and 




in the oil and gas sector. According to the participant, the sector is always learning 
and has different learning strategies.   
 
The last pillar that was examined was whether risk deliberation and analysis are a 
strong feature of an organisation’s practice. The result showed that risk deliberation 
and analysis are not a strong feature of organisational practice across the three 
sectors. However, during a focus group discussion, an expert in the nuclear sector 
disclosed that risk is carefully assessed as ALARP before tasks are carried out. In the 
aviation sector, a captain said risk is characterised both formally and informally and 
threats are identified through error management. In the oil and gas sector, a driller 
said risk is characterised according to people, assets, environment and community. 
Despite explanations provided by each sector, it appears the reasons did not explain 
whether risk characterisation is a strong feature of organisation’s practice. Kruskal 
Wallis test revealed that there was no significant difference (p = 0.156) how the sectors 
responded to the questions.  
 
The research sought to know if lessons learned from other high-risk industries can 
help inform risk-based decisions in various organisations. The result indicated that all 
three sectors agreed that learning lessons from other sectors is needed for safety 
management. This response agrees with what participants said separately during the 
focus group discussion. The sectors agreed that the combined framework will help 
high-risk industries manage safely. It will support cross-industry learning, 
collaboration, and add value to industry performance. Most participants from the 
aviation sector noted that the concept of producing toolkits will provide a lot of benefits 
across industries. The oil and gas sector also said producing some toolkits is vital to 
helping high-risk industries learn lessons from each other. 
 
On Table 31 (Q15), which is on a scale of 1-10, the three sectors were asked to rate 
the following: Human, mechanical, environmental and natural factors as essential 
contributions to incidents. The result revealed that each sector identified those factors 
they believe will contribute to accidents. This recognised that there is need for each 
sector to devise a means of tackling the identified causes of accident in their domain 
with the hope of finding solutions, except to natural factors.  
 
Furthermore, this discussion also focused on which human analysis framework will be 




question was intended for senior managers to respond to. The reason being that 
senior managers, when compared to junior staff, have a better understanding of 
analytical tools that are suitable for managing safety. Senior managers can also take 
crucial decisions if there is a need in the workplace without solely relying on the 
management. However, the results revealed that each sector tends to align itself with 
those human analysis frameworks that are relevant and known to them. The nuclear 
sector believed that Nuclear Safety Reliability Analysis Method (NSRAM) is needed. 
The aviation and oil and gas sectors believed that Human Factors Classification 
System (HFACS) will address human factor challenges.  
 
Apart from using ordinal and likert-type questions to elicit respondents’ opinions in the 
questionnaire, the research also used qualitative (statement box) responses. 
Respondents were provided a space to state if they had additional information or 
measures to reduce accidents in various organisations.  
 
A respondent from the nuclear sector stated that: “The sector should keep learning 
from the Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR) and World Association for Nuclear 
Operators (WANO). There should be a better integration of learning to build workers 
experience and further training in human factors above the bare minimum 
requirement.” Another respondent said there should be formal training of staff through 
workshops and more 'hands-on' experience. 
 
In the aviation sector, a respondent stated that: “There should be in-depth training 
along career-path, improving laws and regulations on guiding safety in aviation.” 
Another participant said that: “There should be proper safety awareness, transparency 
in reporting of accidents and near misses. Put adequate measures in place to avoid 
accident re-occurrence and less reliance on "off the shelf" safety management 
systems and promoting safety culture. Safety problems would not be managed by 
attending only to technology or focusing on technical skills of workers.”  
 
A respondent from the oil and gas sector stated that: “There should be a move away 
from regulatory testing to towards competency-based training and assessment. 
Testing required by regulation is out-dated and has not evolved with technology.” 
Another participant from the sector said: “Management should pay adequate attention 




jerk’ reactions in the name of safety.  There should be a limitation of excessive use of 
sub-contractors as this should be targeted at reducing accidents.” 
 
On the whole analysis, the result outcome which generated 232 responses has 
addressed some of the pertinent issues that are related to the research questions. For 
example, the result indicates that the UK nuclear sector is not adequately utilising NTS 
and its elements, isomorphic lessons, organisational learning or risk characterisation 
to formally train workers for safety management. Therefore, it is of critical importance 
that some of these lapses are addressed in future studies, and possibly contextualise 
the research to the nuclear industry in the UK. Doing so will produce direct findings 










Another aspect of data gathering for this research was the use of interviews (Kumar 
2011); which was planned (Saunders, Lewis, and Thornhill 2009). The interview 
targeted five personnel with industry specific health and safety expertise (managers, 
operators and supervisors) in the nuclear and the oil and gas sectors. While the 
aviation sector focused on pilots, air traffic controllers, health and safety managers 
and trainers. Predetermined, identical questions were asked to the interviewees. (See 
Appendix 4 for interview questions and responses). Some of the interviews were 
conducted face-to-face and recorded with a midget (tape recorder), while some 
questions were conducted or administered online.  
 
The purpose of the interview is to determine if the three sectors use NTS, isomorphic 
lesson, organisational learning and risk characterisation with the hope of reducing 
accidents and contributing to staff training. Overall, the interview was a helpful tool 
used to put together a valid and reliable data collection which was used to address the 
research questions (Saunders et al. 2009). 
 
 
4.6.2 The Analysis 
 
Interviews were conducted sector by sector: nuclear, aviation, and oil and gas. A total 
of six (6) questions were asked to five experts across the three sectors. The recorded 
interviews were translated and data analysed using content analysis (Vaismoradi, 
Turunen, and Bondas 2013), which is one of the common forms of qualitative 
research analysis used to filter and sort findings. Content analysis equally helped to 
describe the features of the document’s content by examining what is being said 





4.6.3 Qualitative findings 
 
4.6.4 Nuclear Sector (5 participants) 
 
Interview for the nuclear sector was conducted during the World Nuclear Association 
Symposium 2018, held in London. Five nuclear experts which cut across safety 
managers, operators and supervisors and health and safety practitioners were 
interviewed. The transcribed interviews were coded, which was planned to sieve out 
unrelated comments. Questions asked and responses received from interviewees 
were as follows: 
 
 





Five participants were interviewed separately on this question. One expert responded 
on the use of NTS in managing safely in workplace, that: 
 
“NTS is different from country to country. For instance, in Russia, the skills are 
used during the standardised process of teaching and examining the operational 
personnel in simulations and in some emergency situations on what to do and 
how to react.” 
Continuing: 
 
“Stress management, communication, leadership, situation awareness is not part 
of it, it is a semi-technical skill. Also, there are new digital method of trainings 
including the use of virtual reality simulators which is widely used in Russia. The 
real challenge is training new-comer countries as there is no tradition of operating 





On the same question, another participant responded that: 
 
“I think that both the World Association of Nuclear Operators (WANO) and the International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA) holds huge emphasis on developing the best practices and guidelines for safety 
culture and they both have excellent details on safety culture.  
 
Q2: Which aspect of NTS element does the nuclear industry provide effective 




Not all the managers interviewed were able to provide answer to this question. Though 
a manager noted that: 
 “A few of them are used, but not recognised as NTS.”   
 
Q3: Is there spirit of learning in nuclear and how is it regarded, i.e. individual 
learning, organisational learning or just normal learning strategy? Can lesson 




Out of the five experts interviewed on the question above, three provided answers to 
the question. One of them stated that: 
 
“There are two different levels to the question. Learning is different for project and 
operational teams. On operational side, the industry has an excellent and well-
developed set of systems for operational learning both internally, in terms of 
lesson learned, reviews and shared lesson learned through the WANO. 
 
“On the project side, I think there has not been any organised disciplined process 






Second respondent explained that: 
 
“Is a mixture of both normal and organisational learning strategy. The idea of 
nuclear safety culture started few years ago. This thing will involve over a period 
as we learn how to make our industries safer. 
 
“Organisational learning now exists in the nuclear sector. The IAEA reviewed the 
entire safety culture after the Fukushima accident, what effect it had from design 
and to learn from that disaster and thereafter issued design extension conditions. 
They realised that after the accident, the reactors were shut down and three hours 
later the entire place was flooded and there was no cooling anymore.” 
 




The first nuclear expert interviewed on this question stated that: 
 
“Risk characterisation in the nuclear industry is highly evolved. The nuclear 
industry does both deterministic and probabilistic safety analysis that is extremely 
detailed that look at accident scenarios including the most remote and ensure that 
the designer operators are robust. 
 
“In the core of nuclear industry, I think risk is well looked out for and we know that 
there hasn’t been any modern nuclear power plant with containment, there hasn’t 
been any escape of radiation from containment even from the world accident 
because of that kind of safety analyses with risk. But on project risk, there has 





Second response on the same question revealed that: 
 
“Risk characterisation is addressed by looking at risk component of safety related and non-
safety. Depending on their performance, we then assess risk. Risk is categorised according 
to safety rules and the impact they have. So, risk category will be created accordingly and 
then put safety system in place.” 
 
Q5: What are the major factors that causes accident in high-risk industries and 




Five experts interviewed responded to the question, each having a divergent view on 
causes of accidents in the nuclear sector. They stated that: 
 
“Organisational culture, human factor, equipment factor and environmental factor. 
All the four are all possible causes of accident.” 
 
“However, it is important humans are trained properly. There are a lot of 
automated systems which protects the equipment from human error. So, I believe 
that the proper 3 plus gen design and the automated system are significant 
foundation to operate nuclear power plants. Is much better to have trained 
personnel.” 
 
Another expert stated that: 
 
“If you look at the accidents that has attracted public attention, each had their own 
circumstances. If you read the review on TMI, operators’ errors are identified on 
TMI, Chernobyl. But when you look at Fukushima for example, there are sets of 
circumstances where there was natural disaster and a design issue on those 





The third respondent stated that: 
 
“TMI was lack of personnel training on (NTS). On Chernobyl accident, human was 
responsible. While Fukushima was a natural disaster, but operators still lacked the 
skills needed to manage the accident.” 
 
Q6: Does the UK legislation influence in any direct or indirect way the 
requirement for the nuclear industry to develop NTS/CRM capabilities or 




An interviewee noted that: 
 
“There is a common regulation and the IAEA has a common regulation considered 
as a global standard. Nevertheless, there are countries that have stricter 
regulatory standard. Also, when building a nuclear power plant in a new location, 
there is need to consider the local regulatory standard. 
 
“There is need for a global regulatory which is not in place, instead what is 
obtainable is country by country with different approach. IAEA sets a minimum 
bar, different countries with different approaches and standards. There is no 
unified approach.” 
 
Second respondent noted that: 
 
“The nuclear sector has technical standards set by the ICPRC. It is adopted by the 
IAEA which has multiple levels of guidance and some of them is mandatory and 
some optional. These standards are guided and then imported to international 
regulatory system. So, each regulator adopt each international standard and they 
are very detailed and significant.” 
 
 
Third respondent (manager) noted that: 
 
“IAEA sets regulation but every country that has a nuclear reactor will have 




4.6.5 Interview Discussion in Nuclear 
 
Based on the experts interviewed in the nuclear sector, the use of NTS in managing 
safely is not regarded as NTS but known as semi-technical skills.  Interviewees noted 
that countries operate differently from each other. Some interviewees stated that both 
the World Association of Nuclear Operators (WANO) and the International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA) said developing the best practices and guidelines for safety 
culture is needed. 
 
Another aspect of the interview was to identify in which aspect of NTS does the nuclear 
industry provide effective training, education and awareness (TEA). Experts 
interviewed were not able to provide specific answers to this question. However, the 
real challenge facing the sector is training newcomer countries on NTS, as there is no 
tradition of operating a nuclear power plant in terms of teaching and examining the 
sectors and individuals on the use of NTS in workplace.  
 
NTS is not a common expression or language used in the nuclear sector, as in the 
aviation sector. Though communication and leadership mean the same thing. During 
the interview, experts revealed that situation awareness is not known as such in the 
sector. But it was revealed that the nuclear sector has the spirit of learning as culture. 
Though experts interviewed believed that learning as it is, is a mixture of both 
individual and organisational learning strategy. Those interviewed in the sector noted 
that the idea of nuclear safety culture started few years ago and will evolve over a 
period to learn how to make the industry safer. 
 
Interviewees stated that risk characterisation in the nuclear sector has evolved. They 
noted that both deterministic and probabilistic safety analysis are extremely detailed, 
looks at accident scenarios including the most remote and ensure that the designer 
operators are robust. More so, risk characterisation is addressed by looking at risk 
component and those tasks that are non-risky. Depending on their performance, risk 
is then assessed and categorised in accordance to safety rules and the impact they 
have.  
 
On accident causation in the nuclear sector, the interview established that there are 
lots of reasons why accident occur. Those interviewed in the nuclear sector said 




factors. Though before the Fukushima disaster, there is 3 plus nuclear design which 
has a lot of safety systems. The machines operate when there are no personnel driving 
them and are independent of the action of the personnel during emergency. Though it 
is important to note that operators are trained properly. 
 
On if the UK legislation influences the industry to develop NTS/CRM capabilities or 
training in their workforce? Industry experts explained that a common regulation exist 
and IAEA considered it as a global standard. Nevertheless, there are countries that 
have stricter regulatory standards. Also, when building a nuclear power plant in a new 
location, there is need to consider the local regulatory standard. IAEA sets a minimum 
bar, but different countries have different approaches and standards, because there 
is no unified approach. Therefore, is obvious that there are no regulations that 
stipulates nuclear sector to train staff on NTS, which is commonplace in aviation. 
 
Therefore, this research suggests that the following should be incorporated as plans 
to move the nuclear sector forward and ensure that safety is robustly entrenched. 
These are:  
 
A. Both WANO and IAEA should inculcate in their training manual NTS elements, 
just as the aviation sector has made it compulsory for pilots to undergo training 
on NTS. 
B. Both individual and organisational learning culture should be made compulsory 





4.6.6 Aviation Sector Interview Analysis 
 
Interviews were conducted via face-to-face, telephone and emails sent online. 
Transcribed interviews only considered information that addressed what the interview 
intends to achieve.  
 
The questions asked and responses received were as follows: 
 
 





Five pilots were interviewed on this question and responses were however similar to 
each other. The pilots noted that:  
 
“I have come across CRM in managing safely in my sector. I believe CRM is 
beneficial for all technical sectors including the nuclear sector. This is because 
CRM creates a harmony in a working environment which raises awareness and 
accountability for all personnel to identify risk and manage workloads. In so doing, 
one can identify resources and deploy them to the right areas or critical points of 
work in order to maintain high standards in dangerous work environment.” 
 
“NTS is used in commercial aviation all the time and can be applied to any 
industry.” 
 
Q2: Which aspect of NTS element does the aviation industry provide effective 
training, education and awareness (TEA) on? 
 
A pilot noted that:  
 
“I would say all of them. But if I had to prioritise as a pilot, it would be situational 
awareness and decision making. Situational awareness is because all parties 
involved, including the captains, first officer and cabin personnel need to be aware 
or have at the very least travelled mentally to the destination before the aircraft 
even gets there.  
 
“Decision Making is because in almost all situation, the result of every flight is not 
based on flying alone but a sum of decisions made. By clearly identifying 




and decide again to adjust or carry on. Another key point is that people can get 
tunneled vision, including the best/skilled pilots. Thus, when making decision it is 
right for the decision to be clear and concise to all personnel and challenged if it 




“TEA actually tries to cover all the elements.  Communication, managing stress 
and fatigue, teamwork and leadership are most important in that order. Quite often 
leadership and decision making come out top of most people’s list.” 
 
Third and fourth pilot interviewed said: 
 
“Basically, the aviation industry prides itself in providing constant trainings to 
pilots, crew members and other ancillary staffs in the industry. For instance, 
situation awareness, decision making, teamwork, leadership, managing stress and 
coping with fatigue are common features and areas of the industry. They ensure 
operators of aircrafts and its crew members are acquainted with those elements. 
 
“It is worth to note that the aviation industry is more on fatigue management, but 
communication ranking the highest, while decision-making is embedded in 
communication. Though it is critical to take on-board all available information 
needed to take a decision.” 
 
Q3: Is there spirit of learning in aviation and how is it regarded, i.e. individual 
learning, organisational learning or just normal learning strategy? Can lesson 
learned be applied to other high-risk industries? 
 
Pilots interviewed noted that: 
 
“A recent incident is the MAX 8,9 air accident this highlights the risk. This is then 
sent out as publication to all MAX 8,9 operators (after the investigation). It has 
become apparent what the issue was. Nonetheless, it will now be included in 
training and all pilots and operators will train their personnel.”  
Another pilot noted that: 
 
“There isn’t necessarily a good spirit of learning as you would like to think.  What 
seems to have happened now is that the ‘rump’ of the business, those who do 
more ‘thinking’ have sort of caught up and are now applying rules to cement their 




“There is spirit and aspiration to learn in the industry. The industry embraces skills 
and there is lesson appetite. Lesson learned from NIMROD plane disaster is an 
example. In the aviation sector, there is opportunity of proper learning, 
organisational learning and individual learning that is highly motivated. Lesson 
learned can be transferred to other sectors because the importance of learning is 
great.” 
 
Q4: How is risk characterised in the aviation sector? 
 
First pilot stated that: 
 
“Risk is characterised as moderate, intermediate and severe because of the drive 
for high safety standards. There is a strong correlation between safety, cost and 
public attitude to flying. This will impact on profit but also the general sentiments to 
air travel. The response is always above the standard of severe in order to 
maintain public trust, and revenue for operators, manufacturers and airlines. 
Therefore, nobody wants to jeopardise the trust they have worked hard to develop 




“There is an interface between pilots and Approved Training Organisations (ATO) 
in terms of risk characterisation. Information affects risk control. Though the more 
layers put in places, the more risk are controlled and less opportunities to identify 






Q5: What are the major factors that causes accident in high-risk industries and 
any reason for that? 
 
All the pilots interviewed stated that: 
“All of the above factors, particularly human factor.”  
 
 
Q6: Does the UK legislation influence in any direct or indirect way the 
requirement for the aviation industry to develop NTS/CRM capabilities or 
training in their workforce? 
 
Experts noted that: 
 
“In aviation the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) make stipulations in regulation for a 
minimum requirement. However, airline and operators implement higher standards 





4.6.7 Interview Discussion in Aviation  
 
The aviation sector has been a proactive organisation in mitigating accidents, errors 
and near misses using NTS (Skybrary 2010), as some of the pilots interviewed stated 
they have come across CRM in managing safely in their sector. Remark interviewees 
made about NTS is that it creates harmony in a working environment, raises 
awareness and accountability for all personnel to identify risk and successfully 
manage workloads. In so doing, it is hoped that one can identify resources and deploy 
them to the right areas or critical points of work to maintain high standards in a 
dangerous work environment. 
 
NTS tries to cover all the seven elements recognised by literature. However, experts 
interviewed maintained that situation awareness, communication, managing stress 
and fatigue, teamwork and leadership are most important elements constantly used. 
Quite often, leadership and decision making are rated high by some pilots. 
 
Those interviewed in the aviation sector stated that the aviation industry provides 
effective training in all the elements to staff. Priority is given to situational awareness 
and decision making. Reason being that captains, first officers and cabin personnel 
need to be aware of where the flight is travelling to, either it is a potential water 
environment, high terrain or adverse weather prone areas. It is expected for operators 
to know this and understand how to manage the aircraft. 
 
On decision-making, interviewees in the aviation sector noted that it is important in 
almost all situations, as the purpose of every flight is not just based on flying, but the 
sum of decisions made to fly safely. This clearly identifies decision-making as 
important as it can be analysed to prove whether the right course of action was taken, 
or further adjustments were needed. Another key point is that people can get 
‘tunnelled’ vision, including the best skilled pilots. Thus, the sector believes that when 
taking a decision, it is expected for what is communicated to be clear and concise to 
all personnel. Personnel should also be polite and assertive to challenge any decision 
that is believed to be unsatisfactory. 
 
However, the aviation industry prides itself in providing constant training to pilots, crew 
members and other ancillary staffs in the industry. Training covers all the seven NTS 




acquainted with. However, interviewees revealed that the aviation industry is also 
focusing attention on fatigue management, while communication ranks the highest, as 
decision-making is also entrenched in communication. It is critical to take on-board all 
available information needed to take a decision. 
 
Spirit of learning in aviation is another area those interviewed in the sector gave further 
insight on. Learning could be focused on individual, organisational learning or just 
normal learning strategy. Surprisingly, some pilots revealed that there isn’t necessarily 
a good spirit of learning as one would like to think. What seems to have happened is 
that the ‘rump’ of the business, those who do more ‘thinking’ are now applying rules to 
rather than promote progress and effective safe flying. Still, interview respondents 
believe that lessons the aviation has learned could be applied to other high-risk 
industries. 
 
The few experts interviewed in the aviation sector remarked that there is spirit and 
aspiration to learn in the industry, as it embraces skills and have learning appetite. 
Those interviewed said there is opportunity for proper learning that will cut across both 
individuals and the entire organisation. 
 
Safety experts that were interviewed in the aviation sector noted that risk 
characterisation is taken seriously. According to the pilots, risk is characterised as 
moderate, intermediate and severe because of the drive for high safety standards. 
They believe there is a strong relationship between safety, cost and public attitude 
towards flying, as it will impact on profit and general sentiments to air travel in order to 
maintain public trust, revenue for operators, manufacturers and airlines. Nobody, the 
pilots said would want to jeopardise the trust they have worked hard to earn as far as 
public relations is concerned.  
 
Additionally, there is an interface between pilots and Approved Training Organisations 
(ATO) on risk characterisation as information affects risk control. Though the more 
layers or barriers put in places, the more risks are controlled and less opportunities to 
identify what went wrong.  
 
Major factors that causes accident in high-risk industries interviewees identified are 




they believe are contributed to human failures in understanding what to do at any 
critical time. 
 
On if government legislation of the sector has direct or indirect influence to develop 
NTS/CRM capabilities or training in their workforce, pilots responded that the CAA 
make stipulations in regulation for a minimum requirement. However, airline and 
operators implement higher standards which will be submitted to the CAA for approval 
before they are implemented. 
 
Those interviewed in the aviation sector showed that NTS are prerequisite skills 
needed to manage safety in high-risk industries (Flin et al., 2008). On the other hand, 
there is need for the aviation sector to strive to be a learning organisation, as accident 






4.6.8 Oil and Gas Sector Interview Analysis 
 
The same sets of questions that were applied to five experts in the nuclear and 
aviation, were also repeated in the oil and gas sector, and same method of analysis 
applied. The questions and responses from the oil and gas experts interviewed are as 
follows:  
 





A respondent noted that: 
 
“If by non-technical you mean the softer skills set, then yes. And it is quite common in the oil 
and gas sector. Now there are lot of trainings to educate the workforce in the areas of human 
factors and major accident hazard recognition. I am not familiar with crew resource 
management, but all installations ensure that appropriate skill sets are available in 
installations, e.g. fire and emergency teams. These initiatives are transferrable to any 
industry.” 
 
Another respondent stated that: 
 
“Yes. Non-technical skills and soft skills was a part of my annual trainings. I 
believe the same is applicable to all industries, including the nuclear.” 
 
The third expert interviewed said that: 
 
“I have come across the term NTS as a trainer in health and safety, oil and gas 
environment.” 
 
Whereas, respondents four and five remarked that they don’t have a suitable answer 







Q2: Which aspect of NTS element does the oil and gas industry provide effective 




An interviewee stated that: 
 
“All of these are covered, and all have equal importance. You should also be aware of the 
offshore Minimum Industry Safety Training (MIST) course that was introduced to the North 
Sea in 2009 and is specifically used in the UK Continental Shelf (UKCS) to provide all workers 
travelling offshore with basic safety awareness in order to reduce the risk of accidents and 
injury. It is carried out using CBT.” 
 
Another expert interviewed said that: 
 
“Communication and team-work skills are both interrelated. Improved 
communication skills helped the sector to openly share observations with peers 
and clients. Team-work skills improved the quality of our job.” 
 
Other respondents said that: 
 
“Virtually in all the elements relating to work operation. Also, there is teamwork 
and communication improvement in the sector. There is International Well Control 
Forum (IWCF-SA) certification that drillers must pass. This is to acquaint them on 
situation awareness (SA) before they become a driller to be able to identify kits. 
 
“There is also a minimum training that is provided to all oil rig workers, which is 
complete Basic Offshore Safety Induction and Emergency Training (BOSIET). It is 
a survival course, with a certificate that is valid for four years and approved by the 




Q3: Is there spirit of learning in oil and gas and how is it regarded, i.e. individual 
learning, organisational learning or just normal learning strategy? Can lesson 




A respondent said that: 
 
“Learning is either formal or informal, and Offshore Petroleum Industry Training 
Organisations (OPITO) set the standard, through Step Change in safety or 
bespoke company training. They organise training particularly in emergency 
response trainings. 
 
“One company adopts a 70/20/10 approach. 70% is on the job training. The 
problem is ensuring one have a robust programme that maps out how this is 
achieved and how success is measured. No good telling someone to learn the job 
if there is no structure.  
 
“While 20% is what the individual can do by joining a governing body such as 
IOSH and attend their meetings. Watch relevant webinars. Join groups/networks 
in their company and/or outside and keep up with current knowledge/events; and 
then 10% is formal training. This can be applied across all industries.” 
 
Other two respondents stated respectively that: 
 
“In oil and gas, we are always learning. We have different learning strategies. 
Individual learning is part of our day-to-day work. Organisational learning are 
planned annually based on the vision of the company. We also focused on training 
our peers. These are knowledge sharing with a group of colleagues within a 
discipline which are not having any job-codes or budget. This model can be 
applied to all other industries.” 
 
“There is spirit of learning in oil and gas sector. Accident statistics from 1992-
2012, especially after the Piper Alpha accident indicates that accident rate has 
reduced drastically. At that time, offshore and onshore drilling was vertical, now 
there is directional drilling. However, there is room for improvement. On the other 
hand, there is the problem of contractor management where 60-80% of worker are 





Q4: How is risk characterised in the oil and gas sector? 
 
Respondents interviewed noted that: 
 
“Hazards present risks that need to be mitigated against using relevant control 
measures. If the risk is not ALARP then the job doesn’t start. We could get very 
technical here using terms such as QRA, HAZOP, HAZID, LOPA and others. All 
relevant to high hazard industries.” 
 
“There are golden rules on safety which tried to mitigate risk throughout all the 
premises. We had office rules (fire drills, safety rules like tripping hazards) and on-
site rules (working at height, plants with H2S). Also, we have personal risks 
(depression, health monitoring). One core issue within oil and gas business is zero 
LTI throughout any project. Other risk assessments were related to environment 
which was core to all projects. Clients have had very strict environmental 
requirements like emissions from valves, sewage treatment, energy efficiency.” 
 
“Risk is characterised in the oil and gas sector according to people, assets, 
environment and community.” 
 
Q5: What are the major factors that causes accident in high-risk industries and 
any reason for that? 
 
Respondents said that: 
 
“Accident is caused by several factors in the oil and gas sector. These include 
people, workplace, and management (interaction of human factor). However, it will 
depend from industry to industry and site-to-site. Though accident statistics which 
has happened overtime shows that human error seems to be the major cause. But 
the underlying factor is organisational factor, which leads to management failure. 
 
“Human factors are there because we are all bad judges of our own risk and we all 
make mistakes, while mechanical, environmental and natural factors sometimes 





Q6: Does the UK legislation influence in any direct or indirect way the 
requirement for the oil and gas industry to develop NTS/CRM capabilities or 
training in their workforce? 
 
Respondents interviewed said that: 
 
“In a broad sense yes, but never the specifics and legislation is goal setting. 
Though there is influence. The UK safety case regulation-HASWA 1974, has more 








4.6.9 Interview Discussion in Oil and Gas 
 
From the interviews conducted, it revealed that the oil and gas sector make use of 
some of the skills to manage safely, but they are not largely known as NTS. They are 
rather regarded as soft skills such as communication and teamwork. Those 
interviewed in the oil and gas sector are of the opinion that there are a lot of 
educational programmes for the workforce in the areas of human factors. Safety 
experts said during the interview that they are not too familiar with CRM as it is known 
in the aviation industry, but in all installations, they are appropriate skill sets that are 
available. These initiatives the sector believe are transferrable to any industry. 
 
Respondents said the oil and gas sector provides effective training, education and 
awareness (TEA) and that all the seven elements of NTS have equal importance. 
However, interviewees could not point out those NTS elements that are connected to 
the industry. Instead, they noted that there is an offshore Minimum Industry Safety 
Training (MIST) course that was introduced in the North Sea in 2009. It is specifically 
used in the UK Continental Shelf (UKCS) to provide all workers travelling offshore with 
basic safety awareness with the hope of reducing risk of accidents and injury.  
 
Communication and team-work skills are used in the industry, experts said. They said 
that communication and teamwork are interrelated, as improved communication skills 
help operators to openly share their observations with colleagues. On team-work skills, 
the oil and gas experts interviewed said they help to improve the quality of the job 
done. Oil and gas have introduced International Well Control Forum (IWCF-SA) 
certification that drillers must pass. This is planned to acquaint staff with situation 
awareness (SA) and be able to help drillers identify various things that happens within 
their environment, oil and gas experts said at the interview. 
 
There is also a minimum training course that is provided to all oil rig workers. This is 
known as complete Basic Offshore Safety Induction and Emergency Training 
(BOSIET). It is a survival course, with an awarding certificate that is valid for four years 
and approved by the Offshore Petroleum Industry Training Organisation (OPITO). 
 
Learning in the oil and gas sector is either formal or informal; and OPITO sets the 




organise training particularly in emergency response. Also, the sector adopts what is 
described as 70/20/10 approach of learning. The 70% is on the job training. The 
problem though is ensuring there is a robust programme that maps out how it is 
achieved and how success is measured. It was also noted that it is not good informing 
workers to learn the job if there is no structure put in place to support learning. 
 
The 20% is what the individual can do by joining professional bodies such as IOSH 
and attending meetings, watch relevant webinars, join groups/networks and keep up 
with current knowledge/events. The remaining 10% is formal training and can be 
applied across all industries. 
 
However, experts interviewed in the sector said learning is never ending, as there are 
different learning strategies. Individual learning is part of the day-to-day work, and 
organisational learning is planned annually based on the vision of the company. The 
interviewees said the workforce within the sector is also focused on training 
colleagues, which they believe is knowledge sharing with group or colleagues.  
 
The oil and gas experts interviewed noted that the aftermath of Piper Alpha brought a 
lot of changes in the sector and increased the spirit of learning. Accident statistics from 
1992-2012 in the oil and gas sector indicate that accident rate reduced drastically. An 
expert interviewed said offshore and onshore drilling has changed from vertical to 
directional drilling. Though there is problem of contractor management, where 60-80% 
of workers are contractors which is a challenge the sector had to contend with.  
 
Risk characterisation is another pillar to which those interviewed said attention is 
given, as hazards present risks that must be mitigated against using relevant control 
measures. Experts interviewed noted that if risk is not as low as reasonably practicable 
(ALARP) then the job won’t be done. There are other methods such as quantitative 
risk assessment (QRA), hazard and operation (HAZOP), hazard identification 
(HAZID), and layer of protection analysis (LOPA). All are relevant to high-risk 
industries to managing safely. 
 
From the interview analysis, the oil and gas sector have golden rules on safety which 
tried to lessen risk throughout all the premises. Representatives from the sector 
interviewed said there are office rules (fire drills, safety rules like tripping hazards) and 




monitoring). One core problem within oil and gas business is zero lost time injury (LTI) 
throughout any project. Other risk assessments were related to environment which 
was core to all projects. The experts interviewed said clients have had very strict 
environmental requirements like emissions from valves, sewage treatment, and 
energy efficiency. 
 
Another aspect of the interview questions was to rate the highest accident causation 
in the sector. The interviewees believed that accidents are caused by several factors. 
These include people, workplace, and management (interactions of human factors). 
However, those interviewed in the sector said that it varies from industry to industry 
and site-to-site. Accident statistics point to the fact that human error seems to be the 
major cause of accidents in high-risk industries.  
 
Legislation in the sector is reliant upon the UK safety case regulation, which is the 
Health and Safety at Work Act 1974 (HASAWA). The act has more than 300 
regulations that covers the oil and gas sector in the UK. Legislation in the sector is to 
ensure workers operate in a safe and organised environment. 
 
The five experts interviewed in the oil and gas sector said the sector operate with 
relevant skills such as communication and teamwork in workplace activities. However, 
some accidents that have occurred in the oil and gas proved otherwise. For instance, 
the Piper Alpha and Macondo well blowout were connected to lapses in NTS. 
Therefore, there is need for the sector to take the spirit of learning culture seriously 
and ensure that workers are trained with those prerequisite skills needed to carry out 










Secondary data (Johnston 2014) was collected to determine which aspect of human 
factor led to accidents causation in the nuclear sector from 1998 to 2018. The first set 
of data was collected from 1998-2010 (Sovacool 2010), while complementary data 
was obtained from 2011-2018 (Laka n.d). Information collated from the accidents 
were coded in Microsoft Excel spreadsheet for analysis.  
 
Five sets of analysis were carried out, namely - HFACS; trend analysis; causal factor 
analysis, using Microsoft Excel. Pearson’s correlation and chi-square test were 
analysed using SPSS. (See Appendix 6 for Pearson correlation analysis and Chi-
square test). The result revealed that most of the accidents that occurred in the nuclear 
sector were triggered by human error (Downer 2010; Reason 1990).  
 
The findings also showed how related factors within a sector triggered accidents if not 
properly managed, together with technical and organisational factors (Lees 2012). 
Different causes of accidents have proved Heinrich et al. (1980) right, as accidents 
are not expected to be credited to a single reason, or in most cases to a single person 
(Heinrich et al.1980; cited in Shappell and Wiegmann 2000).   
 
Skalle et al. (2014) noted that technical errors and organisational factors are causes 
of accidents in recent times; while  Norazahar et al. (2014) stated that disasters are 
somehow caused by more than one causal factor regardless of what is been focused 
on. Deacon et al. (2013) said that human error, which is a major causal factor to 




4.7.1 HFACS Analyses  
 
On HFACS analysis, it is possible for unsafe supervision on Figure 28 to create the 
condition for planned inappropriate operation, which equally triggered physical mental 
limitation. Crew Resource Management, personal readiness, physical environment 




problems increased and caused an effect that triggered negative on physical 
environment.   
 
Physical environment led to perceptual errors and technological environment led to 
exceptional error. On the other hand, physical mental limitation, crew resource 
management and personal readiness triggered errors. CRM and personal readiness 
caused perceptual errors which eventually led to accidents. HFACS suggests that if 
staff, especially those at safety ends are not properly trained and supervised, there is 
the tendency that errors committed as a result of planned inappropriate operations 
and failure to correct problems is capable to trigger accident in high-risk industries, 
including nuclear power plant. See Figure 28 on the interconnectedness of HFACS 
analysis and why accident could readily occur when one of the environments is 






























4.7.2 Causal Factors of Nuclear Accidents 
 
Figure 28 shows HFACS analysis for nuclear accident from 1998 – 2018. It revealed 
accident causal factor graph. 
 
 
                                       Figure 29: Causal factors of nuclear accidents from 1998 – 2018 
 
 
The result indicated that inadequate supervision (83%) was the major human causal 
factor of accidents in the nuclear sector from 1998 to 2018, followed by technological 
environment and supervisory violations (70%), decision error (66%), failure to correct 
problems (55%) and skill-based error  (53%).  This is an indication that most accidents 
in the nuclear sector were adversely influenced by flaws in non-technical skills such 
as leadership (supervisory violations), teamwork (skill-based error), situational 












































decision-making (decision error). As a result, there is need to train operators on NTS 
use to managing safely. Figure 30 indicates trend analysis of nuclear accident. 
 
4.7.3 Trend Analysis 
 
 
                                               Figure 30: Trend analysis from 1998 - 2018 
 
The trend line in the trend analysis shows that nuclear accidents are reducing on the 
average compared to previous years. However, in the last 10 years, there has been 
little improvement in the number of nuclear accidents as the number of nuclear 
accidents increased from 2 in 2010 to 5 in 2011. The R2 value denotes the accuracy 
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The emergence of the coronavirus 2019 (Covid-19) pandemic in the UK in February 
2020 (Holmes 2020) proved an opportunity for additional research on: “The Impact of 
Covid-19 on Nuclear, Aviation and Oil and Gas Safety in the UK.” Because the 
dynamics of risks may have changed in most UK industries, there is urgent need to 
find which aspect of government proposed changes (policy) would be affected mostly 
on the four pillars (NTS, isomorphic lessons, organisational learning and risk 
characterisation) of this research across the three sectors.  
 
For instance, under the current circumstances managing stress (under the NTS 
category) may have changed. Additionally, other pillars such as risk characterisation 
in the work environment arising from coronavirus may have altered communications 
and decision-making dynamics around risk, affecting workers performance during the 
post covid-19 period. 
 
This preliminary result presented a survey of 53 respondents and offers some cursory 
data on how Covid-19 may have affected the researched areas. Therefore, it is 
recognised that further research is required on Covid-19 if precision and a fuller 
understanding of the coronavirus impacts are to be fully understood and properly 
gauged. It will be interesting to see what level of organisational learning will arise from 
the coronavirus, and the nature of “Covid-safe” conditions that will emerge in each 
industry setting. There may be some cross-industry isomorphism opportunities behind 
each sectors response in the workforce context spanning NTS, risk characterisation, 
and organisational learning. 
 
 
4.8.2 Covid-19 Result Analysis 
 
This result analysis took a cue from what was already established in the main 
research. SPSS was used as analytical tool to determine to what extent Covid-19 will 
have on organisations in the use of NTS, organisational learning, isomorphic lessons 
and risk characterisation; and how new rules will affect workers environment in the UK 





The online survey produced the following results: 
 
Q1: Currently work in the following industry 
 
Details of how each responded is indicated on Figure 31. 
 










I work in the following industry




Q2: What position do you hold within your company? 
 
Table 36 is a crosstab of Q1 and Q2, which illustrates how each sector responded. 
 
Table 36: Position respondents hold in various sectors 
 
    Senior 
Manager 






Nuclear Count 8 2 2 0 8 2 2 24  
[%] of 
Total 
33 8 8 0 33 8 8 100 
Aviation Count 0 0 2 1 1 0 13 17  
[%] of 
Total 
0 0 12 6 6 0 77 100 
Oil & 
Gas 




17 33 25 25 25 0 0 100 
Total Count 11 7 7 2 12 3 26 57 
  [%] of 
Total 
19 12 12 6 21 5 15 100 
 
 
Q3: Total years of service 
 
Detail of how each sector responded is indicated in Figure 32 on the bar chart below. 
 
 






















1-5 years 6-9 years 10 years & above
Years of Service




Q4: Has the impact of post Covid-19 CHANGED the following NTS in your work 
environment either positive or negative? 
 
Detail of how each sector responded is indicated on Table 37 – 43. 
 
A. Situation Awareness 
 
Table 37: Indicating impact of Covid-19 on situation awareness 
Industry Strongly 
Agree 




Nuclear 29% 38% 21.0% 8% 4% 
Aviation 18% 59% 6% 6% 6% 
Oil and 
gas 





Table 38: Indicating impact of Covid-19 on decision-making 
Industry Strongly 
Agree 




Nuclear 9% 39% 26% 13% 13% 
Aviation 12% 35% 6% 24% 12% 
Oil and 
gas 





Table 39: Showing impact of Covid-19 on communication 
Industry Strongly 
Agree 




Nuclear 25% 33% 25% 13% 4% 
Aviation 35% 29% 6% 24% 0% 
Oil and 
gas 










Table 40: Indicating impact of Covid-19 on teamwork 
Industry Strongly 
Agree 




Nuclear 13% 50% 13% 21% 4% 
Aviation 29% 35% 6% 24% 0% 
Oil and 
gas 





Table 41: Showing impact of Covid-19 on leadership 
Industry Strongly 
Agree 




Nuclear 8% 38% 42% 8% 4% 
Aviation 25% 31% 19% 13% 8% 
Oil and 
gas 
33% 8% 42% 8% 8% 
 
 
F. Managing stress 
 
Table 42: Indicating impact of Covid-19 on managing stress 
Industry Strongly 
Agree 




Nuclear 25% 38% 29% 4% 4% 
Aviation 24% 59% 6% 12% 0% 
Oil and 
gas 






G. Coping with fatigue 
 
Table 43: Showing impact of Covid-19 on coping with fatigue 
Industry Strongly 
Agree 




Nuclear 17% 49% 29% 8% 0% 
Aviation 18% 35% 29% 12% 6% 
Oil and 
gas 




















Q4a: Respondents comment on impact of post Covid-19 on NTS elements 
 
Table 44: Comments on impact of Covid-19 on NTS elements 
Nuclear Aviation Oil & Gas 
Remote operation means less social 
interaction which is a way of seeking 
opinions and forming coalitions. 
Changed our communication 
methods the way we operate 
because we must adopt mitigations 
for COVID-19. 
How staff will work after post 
Covid-19 will change drastically 
because of social distancing 
and work pattern. 
More work than before.  More video 
myths less thinking time. More bids 
and strategy planning. 
Most communication are done 
online, and it can't be a replacement 
for dealing with people face to face. 
A of lot communication isn't verbal 
alone. And at times team cohesion is 
affected. 
I saw the changes in managing 
stress and fatigue prior to all 
the jobs being suspended and I 
think this will carry through 
however the others are too 
early to say. 
Communication is more 
cumbersome especially working 
remotely without keeping situational 
awareness with site presence. 
Lack of operational exposure. 
However, there is no fatigue element 
because I am not working. 
Increased awareness on 
interactions (i.e. critical review 
of meeting schedules). 
We are good at communicating and 
this has stayed the same and lucky 
to be able to work from home with 
little change to the business we work 
in. 
As a professional, it is important to 
not allow external events impact 
operational concerns like decision 
making or teamwork, especially 
where safety is also concerned.  
However, with more personal NTS 
like stress and fatigue, the worries 
that are associated with the COVID-
19 pandemic, do have a small 
impact. 
Basically, no work available 
since Covid 19. 
Communication have generally 
improved due to widespread audio 
and video conferencing. Biggest 
issue is isolation that has impacted 
situational awareness negatively. 
Communication through PPE, 
differing work cycles pre and post 
flight. Fatigue unable to comment, 
yet to operate. 
I work from home. I've stopped 
travelling.  We have regular 
tele-conferences.  I reach out 
to customers through IM 
emails, phone, tele conference. 
My environment at work has 
remained unchanged as social 
distancing is something that can be 
easily incorporated. Changes to shift 
patterns and family circumstances 
(school closure) means fatigue is 
certainly factoring in the operational 
environment. 
Managing a crew with generally 
higher anxiety levels.  Managing 
multiple new procedures which 
change frequently.  Lack of flying 
currently makes doing the normal job 
more difficult/stressful. 
A lot of operational procedures 
have changed due to social 
distancing measures. 
Focus on protection from COVID 19 
whilst maintaining the ability to 
deliver projects. 
So long out of role means ability to 
instinctively build SA has been 
eroded - more of my concentration 
will be taken reacquainting with rusty 
manual skills/SOP’s. 
Leadership and Teamwork are 
an awesome combination. 
Awareness of restrictions on 
workforce is heightened and 
encouraged to come to the forefront. 
A reduction in meetings and more 
use of technology has freed time for 
personnel, team communication is 
more frequent and to the point. 
Communication amongst us has 
increased dramatically. But from the 
company, it’s reduced considerably. 
Everything has changed in the 
work environment. Not having 
in person meetings makes 
communication more difficult.  
Learning to handle a different 
type of stress as well as 
listening to offshore workers 
who are using situational 
awareness and feel fearful of 
causing a major accident has 




Different ways of working have 
impacted on business have to go 
through a new learning curve to 
adopt and adapt to a different 
approach. 
Aviation is hard hit. Talks about 
redundancies all over the industry. 
This increase stress slightly and thus 
impacts the stress management. 
Stress has an influence on fatigue 
and coping with fatigue. 
Working from home has meant 
a reduction in teamwork and 
communication. Not having the 
office interaction means team 
meetings and phone calls are 
sporadic by comparison.  
Covid-19 has however made 
everybody far more 
environmental aware. 
With all my co-workers working from 
home the balance of the company 
and the way in which the company 
communicates has changed in a 
positive way. I'm unable to undertake 
surveys in person and have resorted 
to using video conferencing to 
address specific risks. 
Given the effect social distancing 
measures will have going forward, I 
believe it will create barriers in 
communicating with colleagues and 
passengers. I feel there will be more 
pressure on performance, whilst 
working increased hours and worse 
working conditions particularly to do 
with easyJet’s attempts at exploiting 
our fatigue protections. 
Nevertheless, decision making 
specifically within the flight deck 
should not be impaired, although it 
may be if you acknowledge the 
effects of fatigue.  
Work continues, under careful 
mitigation. Rotations are longer 
due to travel limitations. Stress 
is of course higher due to 
greater hazards. This has led 
to greater teamwork and 
leadership. 
People are more aware of what is 
going on around them, especially 
movements of others. 
Communication and teamwork are 
hampered by the lack of face to face 
activity. 
Due to new rules implementation 
fatigue factors are very high. 
 
Remote working lacks the huge 
amount of non-verbal communication 
so everything else must be 
enhanced. 
Yes, there are new challenges and 
procedures, but all these skills were 
already entirely necessary and well 
developed to deal with the tactical 
and strategic challenges of the job. 
Yes, they are still particularly 
relevant, but I don't believe the 
current crisis has increased the use 
of these skills. They're now just 
being applied to an additional set of 
operational issues. 
 
There has been no change. 
Awareness of hazardous 
environments has always been 
present. 
Covid 19 restrictions will impact 
teamwork and communication due to 
PPE and social distancing 
requirements. Day will be longer due 
to increased boarding times or 






Q5: Using a scale of 1 – 10 (1 = lowest, 10 = highest) rate the following changes 
to your working environment. Has Covid-19 had any detrimental impact 
on NTS to the following degree: 
 
 
Details shows how sectors responded to changes in working environment on Table 
45 – 51. 
 
Social distancing (2 meters apart) 
 
Table 45: Indicating responses on social distancing 
  Count (Rating)   
Scale  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 N/A 
Nuclear 2 1 0 1 2 1 5 2 0 7 3 
[%] 8 4 0 4 8 4 21 8 0 29 13 
Aviation 1 0 1 0 2 1 0 4 1 4 3 
[%] 6 0 6 0 13 6 0 24 6 24 17 
Oil & 
Gas 
0 1 3 1 0 0 0 0 1 4 1 





Table 46: Indicating responses on reconfigured workplace(s) 
  Count (Rating)   
Scale  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 N/A 
Nuclear 1 0 3 2 3 1 4 1 1 5 3 
[%] 4 0 13 8 13 4 17 4 4 21 13 
Aviation 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 2 2 3 4 
[%] 6 6 6 0 6 6 6 12 12 18 24 
Oil & 
Gas 
2 1 2 1 0 1 0 0 1 3 1 







Table 47: Indicating responses on disinfection protocols 
  Count (Rating)   
 Scale 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 N/A 
Nuclear 2 2 3 3 1 0 2 3 2 2 4 
[%] 8 8 13 13 4 0 8 13 8 8 17 
Aviation 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 4 0 10 2 
[%] 0 0 0 0 0 6 0 24 0 59 12 
Oil & 
Gas 
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 2 5 1 





Table 48: Indicating responses on remote working 
  Count (Rating)   
 Scale 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 N/A 
Nuclear 3 0 1 2 1 1 2 0 2 12 0 
[%] 13 0 4 8 4 4 8 0 8 50 0 
Aviation 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 8 
[%] 18 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 29 47 
Oil & 
Gas 
2 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 3 5 0 






Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) 
 
Table 49: Indicating responses on personal protective equipment 
  Count (Rating)   
 Scale 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 N/A 
Nuclear 2 7 0 1     2 1 1 3 1 1 5 
[%] 8 29 0 4 8 4 4 13 4 4 21 
Aviation 0 2 0 0 1 0 1 0 5 7 1 
[%] 0 12 0 0 6 0 6 0 29 41 6 
Oil & 
Gas 
1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 4 2 
[%] 9 0 9 0 9 0 9 0 9 36 18 
 
 
Changes in shift patterns 
 
Table 50: Indicating responses on changes in shift patterns 
  Count (Rating)   
Scale  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 N/A 
Nuclear 4 3 2 1 0 0 1 3 1 4 5 
[%] 17 13 8 4 0 0 4 13 4 17 21 
Aviation 1 0 1 0 1 2 0       3 1 5 3 
[%] 6 0 6 0 6 12 0 18 6 29 18 
Oil & 
Gas 
1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 2 






Travel to and from work 
 
Table 51: Indicating responses on to and from work 
  Count (Rating)   
 Scale 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 N/A 
Nuclear 5 1 1 0 0 2 3 1 1 7 3 
[%] 21 4 4 0 0 8 13 4 4 29 13 
Aviation 4 2 4 0 1 0 1 0 0 4 1 
[%] 24 13 24 0 6 0 6 0 0 24 6 
Oil & 
Gas 
1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 3 4 1 






Q5a: Respondents comment on how Covid-19 will impact on the working 
environment 
 
Table 52: Respondents comment on possible effect post Covid-19 on work environment  
Nuclear Aviation Oil & Gas 
Remote working impacts the 
socialisation of ideas, concepts and 
arguments potentially limiting the 
broader input required to make fully 
informed decisions. 
Social Distancing not always possible 
such as on the Flight Deck or Flight 
Simulator. 
Don't think most of this will 
affect offshore work due to 
the current layout of rigs. 
Maybe will affect design of 
new installations. Travel to 
/from work may be impacted 
short term and I do think 
cleaning protocols will carry 
lessons from this forward. 
Already working from home as does 
my team. Only effect is more 
isolation. 
It is not natural for people to social 
distance. Measures had to be put in place 
to make sure social distance is adhered 
to but also as a business they had to 
mitigate risk factors by forcing people to 
work from home and for us who couldn’t, 
cleaning and disinfecting protocols came 
in.  
Operations are not as hands-
on as they used to be before 
the coronavirus. 
Remote working without visit and 
interacting with site. 
Social distancing and maintenance of 
robust cleaning protocols in the flight 
deck are very difficult. Work patterns are 
impossible to gauge until we go back to 
work. 
For my work I simply must 
make decisions on my own 
and then hope it is approved. 
Sometimes I do not know if 
the work I hand in is being 
properly reviewed. 
Working from home so kept social 
distancing. 
Having been furloughed, it is hard to 
accurately gauge some of these 
measures, however other changes are 
much more noticeable like different 
working patterns (I.e. no work) as well as 
increased cleaning and safety supplies 
onboard aircraft. 
Working from Home 
Lack of travel has been very 
beneficial in terms of productivity. 
Overall fatigue has been reduced 
even working more hours. 
It has taken time to introduce training 
protocols in simulators. 
Offshore vessels already built 
compact for minimum staffing 
levels, distancing is 
impossible, so emphasis is 
on keeping infection off 
vessel and a response for 
when it occurs onboard. 
Travel to and from port is the 
great challenge. Onshore 





My workplace has placed a 
mandatory requirement to wear face 
masks and light eye protection when 
working within 2m of another 
person.  However, clear guidance, 
training and support has not been 
appropriately provided for 
employees to ensure compliance.  
PPE needs to be readily provided 
(with masks that come in a variety of 
sizes). 
Being In aviation, it’s hard to implement 
social distancing within an aircraft. Being 
on the flight deck we get our own supply 
of air therefore PPE isn’t considered 
essential for us. 
The inherent uncertainty is 
something that can prompt 
negative responses. 
Roll out of technology for remote 
working has been slow, this has 
affected the ability to work 
constructively away from the 
workplace especially during shifts 
offsite. 
Covid has an influence on some parts of 
the job although no direct influence on 
the skills itself. For example, PPE must 
be worn in some occasions and thus has 
an influence on the job but does not 
impact the NTS. 
 
Covid-19 has introduced significant 
change to ways of working and 
hence the high scores across the 
board. PPE has only been impacted 
by the need to wear a protective 
mask, where social distancing can't 
be achieved. Guidance is subject to 
change to reflect the changing 
position and therefore can be 
subject to a level of interpretation. 
It is impossible to change the way in 
which pilots work, or seat configurations 
within an aircraft. Staff bus routes 
between the car park and the airport will 
be challenging if they enforce social 
distancing as they were often full. 
Disinfection and increased hygiene 
methods were needed a long time ago. 
 
The main disruption to my working 
environment has been travel to the 
office in London and travel to sites 
to undertake surveys. 
To adhere to new guidance all the above 
need to be considered. 
 
My work requires me to work face to 
face with clients, often in a 
classroom environment, so 
significant impact in areas indicated 
Initial guidance was rather muddled. It's 
taken time to settle down into something 
workable and sensible. 
 
Things are changing. 
  
Already setup for home working so 
just the additional personal 
behaviours that have now changed 
to reflect the constraints and how 
others are working. 
  
Working remotely is not a problem if 







Q6: Has the impact of Covid-19 CHANGED the following in your operational 
environment 
 




Table 53: Changes on NTS on post Covid-19 
Industry Strongly 
Agree 




Nuclear 0% 33% 29% 29% 8% 
Aviation 13% 47% 29% 12% 0% 
Oil and 
gas 





Table 54: Impact of post Covid-19 on isomorphic lessons 
Industry Strongly 
Agree 




Nuclear 4% 36% 33% 17% 8% 
Aviation 13% 19% 50% 12% 6% 
Oil and 
gas 





Table 55: Impact of post Covid-19 on organisational learning 
Industry Strongly 
Agree 




Nuclear 17% 42% 17% 17% 8% 
Aviation 24% 41% 29% 6% 0% 
Oil and 
gas 








Table 56: Impact of post Covid-19 on risk characterisation 
Industry Strongly 
Agree 




Nuclear 17% 38% 29% 8% 8% 
Aviation 18% 41% 35% 6% 0% 
Oil and 
gas 







Q6a: Respondents comment on Covid-19 impact in operational environment  
 
Table 57: Respondents comment on post Covid-19 
Nuclear Aviation Oil & Gas 
Loss is function of time, but it is likely 
that extension of remote work for long 
period of time will lead to some loss in 
skills and disconnect from operational 
environment although it is not the case 
at present. 
Changed the way we operate. And 
as a company as a whole changed 
our methods of communication and 
protocol. 
I do not think much will change 
once we are out of this 
pandemic 
Learning has gone online for some 
sessions, but some sessions have 
been put on hold until face to face 
sessions can resume. 
The two greatest is organisational 
learning. A lot is having to change to 
observe guidelines and 
organisations are learning but now 
most have you factor pandemics 
and public health emergencies in 
huge ways. But some roles just can't 
change. 
It feels like we entered a 
strange environment in early 
March where one day merges 
with the next.  There is no time 
off.  And the risk is different, 
and we do not even know which 
ones are most important 
COVID has impacted on risk 
compliance with social distancing - 
e.g. fewer trips to site to maintain 
equipment. 
Organisational learning would have 
definitely changed because of this 
pandemic. Greater flexibility and 
quicker responses to erroneous 
events will certainly be positives to 
come out of this.  Not too sure what 
is meant by an isomorphic lesson, 
however. 
Only able to provide advice or 
information when requested as 
opposed to the organic process 
within the office environment. 
COVID19 has impacted all areas 
because it has taken away the direct 
social interface i.e. face to face 
contact, which is so important in 
achieving these.  Risk characterisation 
now has to incorporate the additional 
facet of COVID19. 
My working environment is the 
flightdeck and the cabin. Besides 
lack of flights and passengers we 
have had some additional rules and 
protocols to adhere too. Overall 
Covid has not really had any other 
impact on the job and my work 
environment. The flightdeck is 
exactly the same and we do our job 
in exactly the same way. 
All the above are common 
components of my role/industry 
which is why this is only an 
Agree not a Strongly Agree. 
All changes described above have 
been positive changes i.e. things have 
got better. Risk characterisation of the 
facilities I visit has reduced as I'm only 
able to undertake partial surveys using 
video conferencing to receive specific 
updates on specific risks that have 
previously been identified. 
No doubt there has been changes to 
our operational environment. New 
way of working is a must. 
In my opinion existing 
behavioural characteristics and 
patterns are exaggerated. 
It is still not clear how long things will 
be going on. 
Again, Covid has been a unique and 
new problem. The processes to 
make decisions about it have, 
however, already been well 
established and have not changed. 
It's just a different problem, not a 




NTS change as a result of changed 
social interaction norms. All airlines 
re-evaluating risk, responding and 






Q7: Additional measures respondents think should be put in place at work to 
protect staff environment 
 
Table 58: Additional measures to protect staff environment 
Nuclear Aviation Oil & Gas 
None - the current social distancing is 
sufficient. 
We have put in place many measures 
and mitigations against COVID-19. 
Social distancing, face covering, 
online communication, use of sanitizer 
and higher frequency of cleaning. 
Organisations should operate 
as it suits them in this post 
covid-19 era. 
No more offices. They are an 
unnecessary expense. Less travel. 
If infection remains a threat and until 
there is a vaccine, then masks and the 
use of hand sanitizer for passengers 
and cabin crew. Sanitising wipe down 
of flight deck controls before flight. 
Improve the medical facilities 
and protocols for dealing with 
this type of issue in future, 
and the protocols for 
transporting contaminated 
staff to an onshore hospital. 
Testing and tracing should be used to 
enable some punctual interaction 
between remote worker and sites. 
As this pandemic is changing and 
developing final summations will be 
difficult. As a business we need to find 
a way to be less reliant on the 
conventional way of working. 
Review open plan office 
spaces. Promote remote 
working. Improve the 
efficiency of remote working 
by adapting existing 
technologies. 
We have a team working on this and 
we are ensuring 2-meter rules and 
keeping people safe.  We have a 
staged return once the lock down is 
lifted. 
Good quality and adequate PPE. SOP 
changes to ensure that our exposure 
to passengers and airline ground staff 
is minimised and any risks mitigated. 
Face masks, hand cleaning. 
Biggest issue is slow internet which is 
detrimental to homeworking. This is 
especially true when multi-tasking. 
This is leading to frustration that we 
will be unable to work. 
If PPE is mandatory in public where 
social distancing cannot be achieved 
(on aircraft or in airports, for example), 
then this should be provided to 
employees by the 
employer/government. 
Face masks, washing of 
hands regularly, social 
distancing, proper nutrition 
and refresher training. 
Prevention needs greater focus, 
meaning test kits readily available for 
the workforce for routine and random 
checks.  Continued efforts to reduce 
numbers going into work. 
Quarantine has not been addressed 
properly for transport workers, 
especially post global operations. 
Healthy attitude, health and 
wellbeing. Everyone focused. 
Focus on the soft skills for staff to 
create a learning organisation. 
Clear explanation of protective 
protocols being used and likely levels 
of risk. 
Testing every single worker! 
Remote working whenever possible. None - most are inhibiting and 
impractical. 
My company has put in place 
rigid protocols with regards to 
Covid when we return to 
work.  I feel people who can 
work from home should 
continue to do so until the 
virus is under control. 
IT access given to all personnel to 
work effectively offsite. Offsite work 
encouraged as a first choice. More 
social distancing measures 
introduced within the offices to 
prevent the need for shifts. 
Temperature checks at all airports 
should be mandatory. 
Testing while in isolation, 
negative results received 
before joining vessel. Avoid 
overly long rotations. Much 
more local crew - less 
seafarers from SE Asia, less 




We follow government and 
organisational guidance which are 
proportionate to the COVID19 impact, 
at any given point in time. 
Proper ventilation, opening doors on 
turn around. Wearing masks in places 
with insufficient ventilation. Get rid of 
the 1,5-metre distancing. Educate 
passengers more about Covid and 
how it spreads. 
I’m working from home. 
A reduction of nuclear safety related 
activities should be tolerated for 
minimum time, the risk presented by 
the facility must remain tolerable with 
maximum achievable defence in 
depth. 
The front toilet should be reserved for 
Pilots and cabin crew only. We 
shouldn’t be at the risk of hundreds of 
passengers. 
Monitoring of controls. This is 
a long-term issue and will be 
difficult to maintain good 
practice. 
Other than hand washing facilities, 
and cleaning of frequent contact 
points, nothing. The whole situation is 
over exaggerated. 
Full on protective suits when in 
contact with passengers. 
 
We need to build trust back into the 
work force to enable them to want to 
return to offices and be confident they 
are safe. This will require a lot of 
effort and cultural change. 
Guidance should include social 
distancing of at least one metre. No 
more than 3 in the lift at a time. 
Wearing of mask if within one metre of 
another colleague. Frequent sanitising 
of work tops. 
 
The biggest difference is to hot 
desking and associated hygiene 
issues. 
Primarily, testing for all crew. PPE, 
social distancing measures where 
possible, amended working hours and 
rest facilities. 
 
None. Externally I work in other 
people’s environment remotely I work 
self at home. 
I don't think that more additional 
measures are necessary. 
 
To be honest, where I work has been 
impressive. Signage, PPE and 
sanitisation is perfect. The change 
rooms are one-way systems, with 
areas designated to get ready 2m 
apart. 
Airport terminal congestion likely the 
largest threat area to staff and 
passengers for ongoing transmission. 
 
None further at this time, though full 
return to office work might require use 
of body temperature measures prior 













This second section of discussion is focused on whether Covid-19 has impacted on 
the four pillars (NTS, isomorphic lessons, organisational learning and risk 
characterisation) either negatively or positively across the three sectors in the working 
environment. The survey also examined how government rules on social distancing, 
reconfigured workplaces, disinfection protocols, remote working, use of personal 
protective equipment (PPE), changes in shift pattern, travel to and from work will affect 




Respondents first identified the sector they work for during the survey. The nuclear 
sector had the highest number of responses, followed by the aviation and the oil and 
gas sectors. In terms of the level of experience from each sector, the data shows that 
nuclear had more on senior manager and technical staff, the aviation had more on 
pilots, captains and cabin crew and the oil and gas had more on manager and 
supervisor respectively.  
 
Finally, on demography between sectors, respondents stated the number of years 
spent in service. From 1 – 5 and 6 - 9 years of service, the aviation sector had the 
more, followed by the oil and gas on 1 – 5 years of service. But the oil and gas and 
nuclear sectors had the same number of respondents in year 6 – 9. From 10 years 
and above, the nuclear and oil and gas had more, followed by the aviation sector. It is 
also interesting as it shows that the longer participants have worked in their sectors, 
the better the understanding of questions. 
 
Respondents were requested to determine the impact Covid-19 would have on the 
elements of NTS in operational environment in 37 - 43 (Q4). On situation awareness, 
participants across the three sectors recorded more response on ‘strongly agreed’ that 
Covid-19 will have serious effect on work activities. This shows that management will 
focus more on the health and safety of workers based on the cognitive effect the 
pandemic had created on people’s consciousness or perception, with minimal focus 




cannot substitute situation awareness for something else even if there had not been 
Covid-19, as situation awareness has no alternative on flight operations.   
 
Another NTS element that participants responded to is decision-making. The result 
suggests that decision-making in the work environment would be impacted by Covid-
19 especially in the oil and gas sectors on strongly agree, compared to aviation and 
the nuclear sectors that recorded more respondents on ‘agree’. However, because 
participants never envisaged that there will be Covid-19, therefore, they lacked 
understanding about the entire requirements and challenges it would cause in the 
workplace. Also, government view or policy was unclear on guidance, leading to 
possible confusion regarding workplace safe conditions.  
 
More so, decision-making is not expected to be easy in the work environment because 
there are so many factors to consider that should not be detrimental to workers safety 
and affect work progress. For instance, it would be difficult to ask workers to work in 
large groups as that would go against the ‘rule of six’ stipulated by the government. 
On the other hand, some of the managers may not be on hand to take decisions either 
remotely or in work environment. However, an expert from the aviation sector during 
the survey said that decision making specifically within the flight deck should not be 
impaired, although it could happen if one acknowledges the effect of fatigue. 
 
Communication was another NTS element respondent’s provided information on. The 
data revealed that communication would be negatively affected across the three 
sectors because of Covid-19. Respondents’ views were supported by comments 
provided during the online survey. For instance, a respondent from the oil and gas 
sector ‘strongly agreed’ that Covid-19 would adversely affect communication as most 
work (exploration and drilling) are executed in remote places or offshore. This he said 
could lead to delayed feedback when staff rely on emails instead on face-to-face 
discussion. A respondent in the aviation sector also said Covid-19 has changed the 
way the sector operates on communication and protocol, as a lot of communication in 
the sector is not only verbal and would have effect on team cohesion. A respondent 
from the nuclear sector noted that communication has generally improved due to 
widespread use of audio and video conferencing. 
 
Lack of digital communication platforms could have hindered the degree to which 




communication gap is likely to have been addressed, which means remote workers 
are likely to be better informed. This could have skewed the data in the early stage of 
the survey collection. 
 
The result also revealed that teamwork, which is crucial to carrying out roles 
collaboratively and effectively, would be impacted by Covid-19 across the three 
sectors in the work environment. The result is in line with what participants separately 
said during the online survey that: “Covid-19 has impacted on all areas of work 
because it has taken away the direct social interface such as face to face contacts 
which is so important in achieving work objectives.” Likewise, an oil and gas expert 
remarked that because of social distancing and the fear of spreading the disease, 
teamwork would be drastically affected. However, it is viewed that staff would find it 
difficult to integrate, creating an adverse effect on productivity. Invariably, safety can 
be compromised due to the impact of Covid-19 on teamwork. 
 
Additionally, leadership was another NTS element the result indicates would be 
affected across the three sectors in the work environment. Because lack of 
management supervision arising from Covid-19 will have impact on workers, though 
that depends on the nature of job they do. This statement is supported by an expert 
view in the oil and gas sector as he noted that he takes decisions on his own and then 
hope it is approved. Another concern was he doubts if the work he executed is properly 
reviewed by his boss. But another respondent in the nuclear sector feels the impact of 
Covid-19 on leadership would be minimal in the sector. 
 
Managing stress is essential to this survey as it directly affects workers health and 
performance. Despite responses provided by each sector, the result implies that 
managing stress will be adversely affected by Covid-19 in the work environment as it 
has the propensity to increase working hours and task on mental ability of workers. 
Mistakes committed by workers will be high due to lack of supervision because of 
social distancing. High level of redundancy which has increased across the three 
sectors since the outbreak of Covid-19 has increased workload. From a respondent 
point of view provided on a statement box during the survey, said stress has led to 
errors, while absenteeism of workers is high due to stress related cases.  
 
The last NTS element respondents were asked to provide information on whether 




agrees with an expert view in aviation that due to new rules introduced because of 
Covid-19, fatigue factors will be higher because of excessive workload. With staff 
trying to manage themselves against possible contracting of Covid-19 and managing 
their workload, there is the tendency these challenges could cause further anxiety and 
workers performance. 
 
This research also used a 10-point scale (1 = lowest, 10 = highest) to rate the changes 
recorded in working environment due to Covid-19 will have any impact on NTS as it 
relates to new government policy on social distancing, reconfigured workplace, 
disinfection protocols, remote working, use of PPE, changes to shift pattern and travel 
to and from work.  
 
Social distancing has been identified by this research to influence teamwork. The 
result demonstrates that all the sectors will be affected by the effect of social distancing 
in the workplace safety management. The result is supported by a respondent from 
the nuclear sector that social distancing will impact on socialisation of ideas and 
concepts which will potentially limit the broader input required to make fully informed 
decisions. 
 
However, another participant from the aviation sector said social distancing will not be 
possible on the Flight Deck or Flight Simulator. Though it could be practicable for 
cleaners to distance themselves during working hours. In the oil and gas sector, an 
operator said: “Offshore vessels are already built for fewer staff; therefore, distancing 
is impossible.” Nevertheless, if social distancing is practiced in some organisations, 
the tendency is that workers error will increase. It will also delimit proper supervision 
of workers especially in nuclear and oil and gas sectors as safety could be possibly 
compromised.  
 
On reconfigured workplace, the result indicates that Covid-19 will have a negative 
effect on working environment. However, statement from a pilot provided during the 
survey gave a contrary view that it is impossible to change the way in which pilots 
work, or seat re-configurations within an aircraft. He further said that because Covid-
19 was not anticipated, some high risk-industries will grapple to cope with reconfigured 
workplace which will have an overall negative effect in workplace. 
 
More so, the result revealed that disinfection protocol will have more effect in the 




reason why disinfection protocol could be high in aviation is the fact that windows in 
airplanes are closed during trips. Therefore, there is need to disinfect airplanes 
effectively. This view is supported by a pilot during the survey that noted disinfection 
and increased hygiene methods was needed a long time ago.  
 
With the adoption of remote working as another challenge, workers responded that 
Covid-19 will affect the three sectors. The data revealed that the oil and gas and the 
nuclear will be affected on remote working.  But respondents from the aviation sector 
believe that remote working will be ineffective. However, a nuclear operator said during 
the survey that roll out of technology for remote working had been slow and had 
affected the ability to work constructively away from the workplace especially during 
shifts offsite. On the contrary, another participant noted that working remotely is not a 
problem if there would be proper communication. But another participant in the nuclear 
sector said it is likely that extension of remote work for long period of time could lead 
to some loss in skills and disconnect from operational environment, which is not the 
case at present, the participant said. 
 
The use of Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) and the impact it will have on the 
three sectors in working environment was considered. The result suggests that all the 
three sectors will be impacted by PPE. However, the effect is expected to vary across 
the three sectors due to the nature of work been carried out in those sectors. A pilot 
stated during the survey that: “We get our own air in the flight deck; therefore, PPE is 
not considered essential for us.” While a respondent from the nuclear sector remarked 
that PPE has only been impacted by the need to wear a protective mask, where social 
distancing cannot be achieved. Nonetheless, even before Covid-19, the three sectors 
already had a PPE that suits their workplace activities. 
 
‘Changes in shift pattern’ was examined to assess whether there will be an effect due 
to Covid-19 in the work environment. The result implies that Covid-19 will have effect 
on the three sectors on changes in shift pattern. But the nuclear sector did not believe 
that changes in shift pattern will have serious effect on how work is carried out. Now, 
changes in shift pattern is already affecting how the aviation sector is operating, a 
participant said during a focus group discussion. 
 
On how travel ‘to and from’ work will affect work environment, the result demonstrated 




sectors. Another plausible reason was because pilots and crew members in the 
aviation sector are always on both short and long-haul flight. Because flight trips must 
be completed, provision to travel to and from work should be provided.  
 
A participant from the nuclear sector said lack of travel has been very beneficial in 
terms of productivity, reduced fatigue, but working more hours. Whereas, a participant 
from the oil and gas sector said travel to and from port is a great challenge during 
Covid-19. 
 
Lastly, respondents were requested to state whether Covid-19 has changed and 
impacted on NTS, isomorphic lesson, organisational learning and risk characterisation 
in the work environment. The result stated that across the three sectors, the oil and 
gas sector and the aviation sectors ‘strongly agree’ that NTS would be impacted due 
to Covid-19. However, the nuclear sector had more response on ‘agree’ that NTS will 
be impacted because of Covid-19. The result implies that the effect of Covid-19 across 
the three sectors will vary. Participants pointed out that managing stress and coping 
with fatigue due to staff redundancy will be unbearable in some sectors. Nevertheless, 
other elements of NTS such as teamwork will be largely affected. 
 
The next pillar the three sectors responded to was isomorphic lesson. The result 
implies that isomorphic lesson in the three sectors will change because of post Covid-
19 in operational environment. Organisations will be contending with a lot of other 
challenges such as managing personnel (keeping safe) and financial resources. But 
on the effect Covid-19 will have on organisational learning in the work environment, 
the result implies that in the three sectors, organisational learning will change. A 
participant from the aviation sector remarked that: “A lot have to change to observe 
guidelines and organisations will change because some sectors will be learning new 
ways of doing things.”  In the oil and gas sector, an expert stated during the survey 
that much will change once the pandemic is over but was not specific on what would 
change. Conversely, a respondent from the nuclear sector said Covid-19 has impacted 
all areas as it has taken away the direct social interface of face-to-face contact, which 
is so important in achieving organisational learning.   
 
Risk characterisation was the last category on which respondents’ views were sought.  
The data from the three sectors implies that risk characterisation will change in the 




workload, pressure and staff redundancy. Also, it is the conclusion of this research 
that there will be lapses in communication, leadership and decision-making, which 
consistently will affect how risk is characterised. 
 
The analysis suggests that NTS and its elements; government rules on social 
distancing, reconfigured workplace, disinfection protocols, remote working, use of 
PPE, changes in shift pattern and travel to and from work will change due to Covid-
19. Also, NTS, isomorphic lesson, organisation learning, and risk characterisation 
would not be left as it expected that there will be negatively impacted. Therefore, there 
is need for the three sectors to ensure safety is not compromised in the workplace 
because of the new rules or guidelines put in place because of Covid-19. Workers 










The Focus groups discussion carried out in this research specifically tested the validity 
of the outcome of the online results (232 respondents) gathered across the three 
sectors. The results presented focused on sectors response on NTS, isomorphic 
lessons, organisational learning and risk characterisation. Groups were selected 
based on experience and were interviewed in a relatively unstructured way after each 
presentation (Bryman 2012: 500). Participants from each group assessed the result 
and then gave objective views of how each sector responded to the online 
questionnaire.  
 
The second presentation was the conceptual framework. It comprised a six-point 
toolkit designed to aid cross industry (isomorphic) learning and to support practical 
safety solutions across the three sectors. Discussions were held via virtual meeting 
(Microsoft Team Meetings). It held twice a day and was conducted for two days (14th 
and 28th of July 2020). Each focus group comprised three experts drawn from the three 
sectors, as these possibilities mean that the group was helpful to elicit a wide variety 
of diverse views in relation to issues discussed. Thereafter, participants were emailed 
five sets of questions to answer and forward back to the researcher. (See appendix 
11 on questions emailed to participants). 
 
 
4.9.2 Sector’s Response 
 
Participants across the three sectors responded to the questions asked after each 
presentation. They brought to the fore issues that were in relation to the topics which 
they deemed significant in shaping ideas.  
 
 
4.9.3 Nuclear Sector 
 
4.9.4 Comments on Online Result Presentation 
 
Some of the participants drawn from the nuclear safety experts revealed that they have 
never heard the term Non-Technical Skills (NTS) and some of the pillars like 
isomorphic lessons within their work domain, which means terminology could be 




A participant noted that: 
“Since my years in the nuclear industry, I have not heard the terminology NTS. NTS is high in aviation 
and lower in nuclear, which means terminology used is different. Instead, in nuclear, we talk about 
excellence human performance. They are both derivative of human factor. Lexicons and language may 
be different in/ across sectors. And lexicon is invaluable because we are separated by that. “I have 
worked in the USA and we are separated from common language. How control room operate typically 
are different from other sectors.” 
 
The view stated above agrees with what this research earlier gathered during 
interviews held with some nuclear experts. They believe that NTS is not labelled as 
such in the nuclear sector but could be known as soft skills. 
 
On other pillars such as isomorphic lessons, organisational learning and risk 
characterisation, participants from the nuclear sector said the sector is a learning 
organisation and risk is carefully assessed as “ALARP” (As Low as Reasonably 
Practicable) before tasks are carried out. Whereas, on isomorphic lessons, it is 
something the industry must work on to avoid near-miss accidents. 
 
On all the seven elements of NTS, participants in the nuclear sector agreed that 
virtually all the elements are used in the sector in managing workplace safety but 
managing stress and coping with fatigue is still lacking. A participant stated that:  
 
“Situation awareness is common in nuclear. We train workers in simple tools and rule base, decision 
making in terms of individual capability, use three-way communication plan, teamwork and there is also 
a huge jump in leadership in the last couple of years on how to get results. Though managing stress 
and coping with fatigue is less in nuclear. But we use Key Performance Indicator (KPI) to monitor 
workers performance,” one of the participants said. 
 
 
Participants believed if organisations can learn from each other, perhaps accidents 
will reduce across industries. On risk characterisation, human factor tools such as: 
Nuclear ‘jewelry’ (key outcomes), pre and post job review and independent review 
were constantly used to ensure tasks were assessed properly.  
 
“There is simple human form analysis to manage safely. Safety staff were formally trained in emergency 
management both on-site and off-site events and control centers. We were observed by the regulator 





However, another participant said that questions were asked to workers from different 
career background; therefore, it is expected that different responses will be received.  
 
“There is possibility some of the respondents are engineers, safety practitioners and or operators. This 
are subject to industry scrutiny as supply chain is different.  
 
When I worked for Sellafield, training was brilliant, but in supply chain, the case was not the same. 
When you look at the career pattern, engineers go to Sellafield and get fantastic training, whereas, the 
case is not the same for others. You may get different feedback from different sectors because the 
supply chains serve many industries. 
 
Regulators learning from each other will be different, especially aviation which operates differently. The 
absolute tragedy that is far reaching is because if there is accident in aviation, it does not stop people 
entering planes. But in nuclear, it is not the same. Reeling that learning has to be set into 
contextualization,” a participant said. 
 
 
4.9.5 Comments on Conceptual Framework Presentation 
 
Participants in the nuclear sector were unanimous in agreeing that the conceptual 
framework will help high-risk industries manage safely. It will support cross-industry 
learning, collaboration and add value to industry performance. Error precursors 
(fatigue and stress), flaws and poor technical defenses, organisational witnesses 
which comes from organisational cultures and attitudes are triggering events to 
accidents. While checklists are developed to investigate full blown root cause analysis 
to determine error precursors. However, how participants reacted on each of the 






4.9.6 Aviation Sector 
 
4.9.7 Comments on Online Result Presentation 
 
Safety participants from the aviation sector noted that NTS are used in the sector. One 
participant stated that: 
 
“NTS is identified in aviation. It forms an early indicator in pilot training and used regularly, and I am not 
surprised about the result. We do not take information in, but we give it out to other industries. But it is 
a good example for the aviation sector to learn inwardly and, also from other sectors.”  
 
On the remaining three pillars used in this research, representatives from the aviation 
sector said isomorphic lessons are relatively common as they do learn from other 
organisations on other skill sets. However, they equally agreed that organisational 
learning is very relevant.  
 
“The whole organisation has changed a lot and organisations are working to learning skills which is 
more generic skills. Every year standard of operating procedures has become common in aviation. We 
have made a definite progress on operating procedures,” the participants said. 
 
On risk characterisation in the industry, the participants from the sector stated that: 
 
“Risk is characterised both formally and informally. We identify threats through error management which 
emanated from CRM. Our procedures are to consider what could possibly go wrong and which is 
somehow difficult to know. 
 
Also, a participant from the sector responded that risk characterisation relates to high number of planes, 
which is carried out using software by pick and choose method. “There should be a just culture to 
encourage quality report from flight crew and show a good analytical prowess. In flight operations crews, 
there is need for good quality risk characterisation,” a participant noted. 
 
 
On all the seven elements of NTS, aviation participants unequivocally stated that the 
sector is trained in all of them.  
 
“We are formally trained virtually in all of those elements and are covered in training exercise,” 
participants noted. But on managing stress and coping with fatigue, aviation participants explained that, 




no formal method of training staff on managing stress as it seems to be difficult. It is not a defined skill, 
though we have initiatives such as peer support.” 
 
 
4.9.8 Comments on Conceptual Framework Presentation 
 
The aviation sector commented on the toolkits as an addendum of the conceptual 
framework which also forms the interface of the research. However, aviation 
participants on the focus groups discussion noted that the concept of producing 
toolkits has a lot of validity.  
 
See Table 59 on how the aviation sector responded on the toolkits 
 
 
4.10 Oil & Gas Sector 
 
4.10.1 Comments on Online Result Presentation 
 
Participants from the oil and gas sectors noted that the online result analysis differs in 
percentage because experience differs across the three sectors. Participants from the 
sector noted that because respondents have different background, experience from 
those sectors will certainly differ especially on NTS and its elements.  
 
Participants said that: 
 
“There is difference in standard and expectations. Some of the outcome of the results are expected, 
while some are not. Other than that, the result presented is a true picture of what is obtained in the oil 
and gas industry on NTS and use of other pillars to manage safely.” 
 
The participants also noted that safety culture in oil and gas must change.  
 
“Some people are compliant to safety culture, while others are not. I work closely to some staff and 
safety performance is something we must focus on. Safety practices are not the same due to differences 
in topography, resulting to differences in standard.” 
 
On which is the NTS seven elements, participants were asked which of those elements 






“There is a lot of focus on teamwork and communication in oil and gas for the whole team. Decision-
making is more of management tool and making people more aware and we do hold a lot of team 
meetings. Leadership is not only on the position occupied in the team, but it entails encouraging other 
people.  
 
“Managing stress and coping with fatigue is not something that is used often in the industry. We only 
train new staff on communication. I don’t think there is enough going on especially on offshore.” 
 
 
4.10.2 Comments on Conceptual framework Presentation 
 
Participants from the oil and gas sector said that the concept of producing some toolkit 
is vital to helping high-risk industries learn lessons from each other. For instance, on-
site evacuation after an incident notification and escalation procedures are worth 
learning from. However, they identified that the greatest challenging would be how to 
achieve those six toolkits as information is difficult to come by, and there is no structure 
and culture of getting and sharing information in oil and gas mostly from developing 
countries. Most industries are not keen to giving out information to the public except 
on major accidents. How participants from the oil and gas responded on the toolkits is 
shown on Table 59. 
 
 
4.11 Toolkits as Research Contributions 
 
The six-pronged toolkits have been discussed in this research in the conceptual 
framework to focus groups discussion. The toolkits consist of six areas, which are: 
Lexicon (showing variation in terminology from different sectors); Benchmarking data; 
Accidents/Incidents examples which focused on lapses on the four domains to 
manage safely; Training logs; List of publications across the three sectors and 
Archiving of incidents. However, only four of the toolkits was produced as examples. 





Table 59: Participants view on toolkits 
 
Toolkits Nuclear Sector Aviation Sector Oil & Gas Sector Observations 
1. Lexicons “Lexicon is invaluable. We are 
separated by common language in 
these sectors and to be able to put 
some form of translation mechanism in 
place will be very helpful.  
"Lexicon of language has been a 
barrier to learning between the three 
sectors as there are unique markers 
that represent something different. 
Therefore, language is important as it 
will track difference in meaning," all the 
participant said. 
“This has led to some challenges and 
difficulties communicating to colleagues 
from different countries.”  
Another participant noted that: “Because 
aviation operates globally, there is need 
to communicate using a common 
language that mean the same thing, as it 
is imperative because of shuttle 
differences." 
Agreed with what other 
sectors said. 
The Lexicon could be used in all training 
materials in point 4 (Training logs) to 
facilitate a common sector language. 
However, lexicon will not be a panacea that 
will create success in some of the sectors, 
especially the nuclear sector.  
 
Therefore, the onus is on the sectors to 
ensure that parlance does not become a 
barrier to safety management. Also, 
regulators between the three sectors can 
make it mandatory that NTS should have 
the same meaning irrespective of sectors. 
2. Benchmarking Data Participant in the nuclear sector noted 
that: “Benchmarking data is good 
because it will create the willingness to 
adapt, understand and learn key data 
sects. Data should be well documented 
for reference purposes and will be 
valuable.” 
“It is something that will be helpful to 
compare metrics and the difference in 
industries management.  There is need to 
benchmark organisations on stress 
management and coping with fatigue and 
see what others have done,” participants 
explained. 
Participants noted that: "Data 
gathering is very difficult as 
most organisations do not 
easily give out information."  
Benchmarking of data stimulates other 
organisations to see the gap they need to 
fill to achieve safety purposes and explore 
some of the human factors in Point 4 
(Accident/Incident).   
 
For example, benchmarking data could 
include data and processes tied to the 
storage of hydrocarbons in OGM and the 
storage of Jet fuels in aviation and 
chemicals in aviation and nuclear. In 
addition to this, the process of handling 
fuels might be useful in curtailing fire 




3. Accident/Incidents “Exploring some of the human factors 
that triggered either accidents or 
incidents, or due to design error is 
worth investigating. When smaller 
incidents are controlled, the likelihood 
of bigger accident occurring will be 
reduced.  
Accident/incidents investigation will 
also compare triggering effects that led 
to those accident and which are 
designed to draw out lessons,” 
participants said. 
“In the aviation, we look at what went right 
and not what went wrong. So, the three 
accidents and incidents will give a clue on 
how they are managed,” aviation 
participants said. 
Participants from the oil and 
gas sector said: "The 
concept of producing some 
toolkit is vital to helping high-
risk industries learn lessons 
from each other." 
Understanding causes of 
accidents/incidents are vital 
to managing future 
occurrences successfully. 
Understanding of accidents/incidents is 
expected to contribute and help 
organisations fine-tune its trainings logs in 
Point 4. 
 
• The purpose of having three 
minor incidents and three major 
accidents would allow for 
assessing the potential 
escalatory risks, however these 
are all “accident” based events, 
and not malicious, criminal or 
terrorist scenarios meaning an 
incomplete comprehension of 
the wider risk potentials could 
skew learning to some degree. 
Example Germanwings co-pilot 
suicide was a deliberate 
accident caused by human. 
  
For instance, the Tenerife airport disaster of 
two Boeing 747 aircraft which collided on 
the runway at Los Rodeos airport on the 
island of Tenerife. 
4. Training Logs A participant noted that: “In nuclear we 
have a model cite license. The 36 
conditions on regulations are identical 
and UK nuclear has a goal setting 
regime. Training is an element within 
that and shall appoint Duly Authorised 
Person (DAP) for training and Suitably 
Qualified and Experienced Person 
 Training is very valuable especially in the 
advocation of safety culture and sharing 
of information to learn from previous 
incidents," participants said. 
"Some sectors will be 
reluctant to share any 
information they have 
because most of them do not 
have training budgets, and if 
at all, budgets are low or 
slashed," participants from 
the sector stated.  
The importance of sharing training logs will 
help organisations share relevant 
information and build up a robust safety 
contents geared towards achieving 
managing safely and understanding of 





(SQEP) to perform. They have their 
training defined and records kept.” 
“NTS training is not as rigorous in the 
nuclear sector which should be looked 
at. If the aviation is good at that, then 
the nuclear sector should also perform 
in that too, while a reflection log 
approaches to get the value of learning 
can emanate from that.”  
"Learning has to do with a lot of things. 
Organisations need to put their heads 
down and learn, but sometimes there 
are resistance in the industries.” 
“High-risk industries are 
sacrificing learning for blame, 
leading to workers been 
penalised because there is 
no just culture. There is no 
incident reporting in most 
sectors and that makes it 
difficult for organisations to 
learn and no field report 
except on major accidents.  
However, the plausible challenges 
highlighted could be e.g.  
 
• regulatory specific requirements 
unique to each industry. 
• Unique terminologies and 
process systems such as Failure 
Mode and Effect Analysis 
(FMEA), Air Safety Case 
Reporting etc 
• KPI’s for training etc 
• Willingness to share training 
logs for competitive reasons and 
Intellectual property reasons.  
 
For recommendations – note that only 
regulators could share as gatekeepers of 
this sensitive information between 
themselves and draw up lessons for 
industry. 
5. List of Publications "Peer reviewed publication across the 
three sectors is expected to add value 
in industry learning. It is also a directory 
of key publications which allows people 
to explore other systems and make 
their own cognitive understanding and 
learn from it," a participant said. 
Is to allow the cross-sectors see some 
publications of interest on the critical four 
areas of the research. It will provide 
opportunity for further learning across 
sectors, this, participants said. 
No comment. Industry learning will be highly facilitated if 
sectors have access to directory of key 
publications which allows people to explore 
other systems (Point 4) and make their own 
cognitive understanding and learn from it.  
 
• Too many publications might be 
problematic and overkill.  
• Documents might be out of date 
in future or have amendments 
that need reviewing for the latest 




publications list) requiring 
frequent updates to list 
 
Recommendation – There would be benefit 
in developing a companion list of key 
legislative and regulatory requirements for 
each sector (in a condensed summary). 
This also would need to be considered in 
Benchmarking activities (see point 2). 
6 Archiving of incidents “Some people are not willing to share 
information because of competition. 
Any event in nuclear would have had a 
tremendous effect on everyone; and 
the biggest barrier to learning is an 
emotional one and how it affects 
individual is a real challenge. 
Therefore, there is hostile resistance to 
sharing information, something more 
emotional, biggest barrier to learning 
and there is some form of emotional 
bond to an event,” a participant noted. 
“Where poor learning does not match 
across sectors, will be a challenge in 
another sector. That is, where an 
organisation is trying to solve a problem 
but ends up creating another problem will 
be a great challenge,” the participants 
explained. 
Participants from the sector 
remarked that: "There is no 
structure and culture of 
getting and sharing 
information in oil and gas 
mostly from developing 
countries." 
Archiving of incidents will serve as a 
reference point to error correction (point 4) 
across sectors. It will also serve as 
'knowledge reserve' for sectors to draw 
from when needed. 
 
• Challenged with hermeneutics 
or interpretation during 
extrapolation processes leading 






4.12 Validation of the Online Results and Toolkits 
 
Participants across the three sectors validated the online result and the toolkits 
designed to help the three sectors improve on safety cases. Almost all the participants 
admitted that the online result which focused on NTS, isomorphic lessons, 
organisational learning and risk characterisation are true representation of activities in 
their various sectors. For instance, participants in the aviation sector noted that the 
use of NTS and its elements are common practice in the sector, while the use of 
isomorphic lessons and organisational learning to manage safely are not common 
features of the sector.  
 
In the nuclear and oil and gas sectors, participants stated that NTS are not known as 
Non-technical Skills but referred to as soft skills. On isomorphic lessons and 
organisational learning, both sectors said that it is not a common feature of the 
organisations. However, participants from both sectors admitted that learning from 
past accidents will reduce future occurrences.  
 
Though, one of the participants from the nuclear sector who did not accept the result 
on risk characterisation maintained that: 
 
“In all the four operations that exists in nuclear, we quantify risk, even though it varies. It is centered on 
identification of hazards and operability issues. Deterministic and probabilistic analysis are involved, 
scrutinized and discussed ranging from projects, individuals and industry meetings. I am surprised the 
result was 77%, as it supposed to be higher than that.” 
 
Though the participant warned that there are benefits to be derived in the toolkits, but 
the research should be cautious.  
 
“There should be better understanding of the toolkits according to cultural makings. Also, culture is 
embedded on what the organisation is set to achieve. If an organisation is commercial focused, culture 






4.13 Justifications of the Results and Toolkits 
 
The toolkits produced from this thesis are contributions to knowledge across the three 
sectors investigated. It was equally designed and intended to improve learning, share 
ideas on safety and training exercises across the three regulators. The result and the 
toolkits went through rigorous scrutiny from participants during the focus group 
discussion. There is also merit in the toolkits having followed the processes in level 3 
in the conceptual framework and has been tested by experts across the three sectors. 
 
Participants admitted that the toolkits might not solve most of the safety challenges 
facing the three sectors, especially the nuclear sector. However, will give a direction 
on how organisations could look at those six areas and remodel their safety plans to 
suit organisations safety needs. For instance, one of the participants from the nuclear 
sector noted that having a common language may not be the panacea that will create 
success in these sectors. On the other hand, another participant from the aviation 
sector said because the toolkits have gone through many layers of analysis, it will have 











5.2  Research Conclusion 
 
This research has a wide-ranging objective. They are categorised as follows: (i) To 
critically evaluate and benchmark non-technical skills and their values in achieving 
workplace safety in the UK nuclear power industries. (ii) To investigate the extent to 
which isomorphic lessons, organisational learning and risk characterisations derived 
from approaches used in safety-critical industries such as aviation and oil and gas 
informed and/or added value to the resilience practices undertaken in nuclear industry. 
(iii) To design and create a holistic framework (with key processes, principles, terms, 
and toolkits) to support isomorphic lesson opportunities, optimise and benchmark NTS 
capabilities, risk characterisations, and organisation learning in the nuclear industry 
within the UK. 
 
Key findings relevant to addressing the research questions and gaps were highlighted 
in this research. The most crucial question was: To what extent does the nuclear sector 
use non-technical skills, isomorphic lessons, organisational learning and risk 
characterisation in training and managing safety across the three sectors in the UK?  
 
The three main research objectives are explained as follows: 
 
 
5.2.1 To critically evaluate and benchmark Non-Technical Skills and their values 
in achieving workplace safety. 
  
The analysis revealed that potential gaps exist in the use of the four mentioned areas 
or pillars to manage workplace safety for the nuclear sector. Of all the industry specific 
data collected, the results show that the nuclear sector has not fully familiarised itself 
at promoting all the elements of NTS in the workplace environment. In addition, it is 
hard to find evidence of any other comparable system used in the nuclear sector that 
would suffice. It is further believed that the nuclear sector has different understanding 





However, the results showed how feed-forward thinking and proactive organisations 
such as the aviation sector mitigated accidents, errors and near misses using non-
technical skills to manage the industry effectively. As a result, it is pertinent to state 
that the nuclear and the oil gas sectors should learn lessons from the aviation sector 
in the use of NTS to manage safety; as the aviation sector has demonstrated wide use 
of NTS and its entire elements to promote strong safety culture.  
 
 
5.2.2 The investigate the extent to which isomorphic lessons, organisational 
learning and risk characterisation informed and/or added value to the 
resilience practices undertaken in nuclear industry. 
 
From what was observed on the result, the three sectors lacked comprehensive 
understanding of isomorphic learning. This was anticipated by the researcher and 
hence definitions were provided in the questionnaire to assist participants. Even with 
this provision of support in place, it was noted that no respondent could offer 
substantive comprehension of how isomorphism works in practice. Further 
observation of respondents’ lack of understanding was further revealed during the 
focus group discussion conducted in this research. This could be the result of an 
inability to grasp academic and theoretical concepts. 
 
Another limitation of this research is how the three sectors responded on 
organisational learning. Even though the question could have been largely understood 
by participants, the result revealed that the three sectors are not comprehensively 
using organisational learning as strong features to promote safety environment. 
However, the result could have shown the aviation sector had high respondent in 
organisational learning, that did not in any way indicate that the sector uses 
organisational learning better than other sectors in safety management.  
 
Therefore, the aviation sector is also still a learning organisation as accidents can 
occur any time.  On the other hand, the nuclear sector can further learn from mistakes 
made in the oil and gas sector especially on communication, organisational learning 
and risk characterisation. These were errors identified to have caused some avoidable 
accidents in the sector such as Piper Alpha and the Macondo Well Blowout.  
 
On risk characterisation, though the three sectors responded that risk is characterised, 




in using the pillar for safety management. Therefore, it is imperative for the three 
sectors to adequately characterise risk and make it a common feature of 
organisational practice.  
 
Since the nuclear sector identified human factor as a primary cause of accident in one 
of the questions asked respondents, the onus is on the nuclear sector to look inward 
and step up strategies to improve human training. The result from NTS elements 
validates literature findings that emotional stress, mental workload, or physical 
breakdown (coping with fatigue) contributes to error if not properly managed (Flin et 
al. 2008). 
 
Provision of formal training strategies is essential to the development of knowledge, 
attitudes and skills of workers. This statement further reinforced information 
participants independently provided during the online survey. They said formal training 
of workers on safety culture, risk management backed by nuclear management will 
impact positively on the entire safety practices in the sector. However, the research 
does not conclude that the nuclear sector has no knowledge of (NTS) safety 
management. As a matter of fact, respondents in the nuclear sector suggested that 
the use of NTS should be made compulsory to new entrants in the industry, which is 
applicable in the aviation sector.  
 
Additionally, organisational learning is not adopted as a formal method for workers to 
learn from other sectors. Learning needs to occur as part of a routine system before 
during and after an incident with effective counter-factual thinking and consequential 
management process. However, it is understandable that how work is performed 
differs across the three sectors. Nonetheless, the nuclear sector should address the 




5.2.3 To design and create a holistic framework (with key processes, principles, 
terms, and toolkits) to support isomorphic lesson opportunities.  
 
To solve some of the NTS challenges facing the nuclear sector, producing a 
framework, principles and toolkits is expected to make significant changes to the 




highlight of the result is the kind of human analysis framework that will be most suitable 
to manage safety in the UK nuclear power plant.  
 
Equally, having identified some changes that have occurred in the working 
environments across the three sectors because of Covid-19, the onus is on the sectors 
to develop plans to accommodate some of the rules set out by the government to 
manage safety. Some of the guidelines have direct or indirect influence on the four 
pillars. Active learning and risk mitigation strategies, mandatory wearing of PPE such 
as face masks, and marking out of spaces for social distancing in the workplace should 
not be undermined. Ultimately, risk is about the effect of uncertainty on objectives, 
therefore continuous learning may be vital for managing uncertainty and maintaining 
the objectives of “Covid-19 safe” conditions. 
 
In conclusion, the research objectives identified by this research were critically 











The recommendations which stemmed from the outcome of this research is designed 
to benefit the nuclear industry in the UK. It is expected that when some of the 
recommendations are applied, it will help facilitate and reduce accidents and near-
misses in the nuclear sector.  
 
The recommendations will be categorised using numbers for easy reading and 
understanding. The first set of recommendations will be based on results from the 
online survey, as it helped to address the research questions. Other recommendations 
will be derived from findings from interviews and secondary data collections.  
 
6.1 Recommendations from Online Survey (232 Respondents) and the entire 
Framework 
 
These recommendations are new insights the data has contributed and the 
consequences they have for both theory and practice. It is also targeted at ensuring 
humans are properly trained and managed using NTS, isomorphic lessons, 
organisational learning and risk characterisation to avert some avoidable accidents in 




The UK nuclear sector should train staff formally in the workplace, as opposed to using 
informal training strategy which leaves staff with no in-depth knowledge.  
 
Recommendation 1.2 
NTS should become organisational practice to further enhance worker’s performance. 
It should be holistically incorporated effectively into training, exercises and safety 
practices to boost workers knowledge.  
 
How effective individuals working in high-risk environment depends on the quality of 






The nuclear sector should work to absorb isomorphism into formal training and ensure 
staff encounter isomorphic lessons in workplace environment, instead of relying on 
informal approach. With this, staff would be able to learn from past errors or incidents 
and proffer solutions early enough to curtail a repeat of such events. 
 
Recommendation 1.2 
The UK nuclear sector may seek to examine the impact of industry and adopt a cross 




A detailed organisational learning system should be developed for the nuclear industry 
to include review and learning at individual, group and organisational levels. 
 
Recommendation 1.2 
Organisational learning should be incorporated through training, exercise and safety 





The UK nuclear sector should ensure workers encounter risk characterisation within 
working environment; and incorporate risk characterisation effectively into training, 
exercises and safety practices. 
 
Recommendation 1.2 
Tasks should be properly assessed, and risks classified as it will help establish 







Recommendation 1.1  
Training should draw on aviation based NTS principles for frontline nuclear workers in 
critical safety settings. 
 
Recommendation 1.2 
Examination of critical incidents should be compared to other sector approaches as a 
platform for informing risk-based safety systems in the nuclear sector. 
 
Recommendation 1.3  
The nuclear industry should develop a continuous supervision and development 
system to engender safety factors spanning isomorphic lessons imbedded in linear 
and non-liner failure modes within complex systems. 
 
Recommendation 1.4 
The nuclear industry should develop counter measures connected to human based 
agents operating in complex settings. 
 
Recommendation 1.5  
A better fatigue management strategy should be put in place and special attention 
should be paid to stress in the nuclear sector, especially where stress could be a result 
of changed Covid-19 working practices.  
 
Recommendation 1.6 
Contractors and third parties will need to have a basic comprehension of NTS where 
they manage or operate critical safety infrastructure. 
 
Toolkit 
Recommendation 1.1  
The nuclear industry should develop a toolkit for all four pillars and apply it in 
coordination with other high-risk sectors such as aviation. 
 
Recommendation 1.2  
Nuclear safety case planning should be integrated into the toolkits as a means of 





On-going research  
Recommendation 1.1 
Accident investigation data should be used in a pooled data format and reside with the 
Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR), Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) and the Oil and 
Gas Authority (OGA). 
 
Future Technology  
Recommendation 1.1  
New technologies for countering risks and hazard events can be better shared 
between each industry sector. 
 
Recommendation 1.2  
Artificial Intelligence (AI), replacing human with robots could reduce accidents; and 
improving cooperation and communication between similar organisations around the 
globe. This idea will increase the understanding on how new safety measures could 
impact existing safety measures, as well as learn from other industries.  
 
 
6.2 Limitations and Recommendation for Further Research 
 
Security implications attached to the UK nuclear power plants, however, affected this 
research. The researcher could not gain access to any NPP to possibly examine 
training or accidents documents related to the research area. Furthermore, the 
recently introduced General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) almost thwarted data 
collection in this research, as industry operators literally refused to attend to the online 
survey nor share the link to colleagues.  
 
Nonetheless, ongoing research should match the recommendations as listed above, 
spanning the four pillars, and this may engender academic and practice language 
barriers. The research should also focus on all NTS elements to determine which of 
them are adequately used by operators. Additionally, some of the toolkits developed 
in this research could be further expanded to serve industry interest in a more holistic 
way and capable of managing workplace safety. 
 
Further research could be undertaken to specify the exact training exercise and 
awareness needs for nuclear operators. The need for a spine of workplace training 




nuclear regulators, supply chain and other key stakeholders. This is beyond the scope 
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Appendix 2: Interview questions across the three sectors 
 





Appendix 3: Interview Responses 
 

















































































Appendix 6: Pearson’s Correlation (HFACS) 
 





Table 63: Chi-square test results for HFACS analysis for nuclear industry 
 
 Pearson chi-square Value 
Asymptotic 
Significance 
DE * PhE 4.744 0.029 
PE * PML 5.839 0.016 
PE * CRM 7.669 0.006 
PE * PR 14.545 0.000 
EV * PhE 15.668 0.000 
EV * PML 8.981 0.003 
EV * CRM 14.520 0.000 
EV * PR 14.545 0.000 
PhE * PIO 4.607 0.032 
TE * FCP 5.771 0.016 
PML * PIO 8.246 0.004 
CRM * PIO 6.449 0.011 
PR * PIO 5.258 0.022 
FCP * RM 16.127 0.000 





First, accident data were inputed into Microsoft Excel, and thereafter imported into the SPSS 
software, which was then coded with 1 and 0 as being present and absent (accident) 
respectively for different years. After the coding, it was then analysed. All human factor 
components (levels) of the HFACS framework were loaded into separate columns, according 
to their hierarchy in the framework. Unsafe acts formed the first set of human factors, 
preconditions for unsafe acts formed the second batch, the third stream of human factors was 
formed by unsafe supervision, while the last category was formed by organisational influences. 
See Appendix 6 for Pearson correlation.  
 
The data were analysed for different active and latent causal factors that prompted the 
accidents using information from their incident descriptions. In order to codify the results using 
the HFACS taxonomy, the HFACS event description worksheet was used to understand the 
various events in each accident that could aid in determining each human factor that played a 





A deductive approach was engaged by this research for the secondary data analysis, Creswell 
(2013) submits that it establishes the connections and differences between a given set of data 
to respond to any stated research questions and fill knowledge gaps.  
 
On analysing the accidents in the nuclear sector which occurred between 1998 – 2018.  
Pearson’s correlation was used to determine the relationship that existed in two causal factors 
in the accident (Clarke 2006), The statistical technique aided to establish the extent of 
connection between two pairs of variables, which otherwise are human factors (Sneddon, 
Mearns, and Flin 2013). Pearson’s correlation provided the covariance of examining two 
variables as a ratio to the product of their standard deviations, therefore was used to establish 
the relationship between two human factors in accident causation (Clark 2006). See appendix 
6 for Pearson correlation. 
 
Subsequently, a bivariate correlation test was carried out with the years selected that served 
as independent variables and the human factors selected as the dependent variables. And 
then two levels of significance were chosen for the hypothesis test on human factors, which 
was selected at p < 0.05. It implied that any Pearson’s r-value gained after the analysis is 
significant as it is < 0.05 and 0.01. Completely, all significant human factor relationships were 
symbolised with one and two stars, where one star is significance at < 0.05- and two-stars 
meaning significance at 0.01. Positive values indicated a progressive or linear relationship 
between two human factors, while the negative values indicated the strength of inverse 
relationships also between two human factors. See appendix 6 for Pearson’s Correlation.  
 
Pearson’s chi-square test was used to indicate the effect each level of HFACS had on the 
lower level (Siu, Phillips, and Leung 2004). It was adopted by this research to gauge the 
level of independence of various human factor levels on each other in the HFACS framework 
(Agresti and Kateri 2013). A chi-square ‘p’<0.005 justifies that there is significant relationship 
between two human factor levels (Restrepo, Simonoff, and Zimmerman 2009). The 
accident data was analysed using descriptive statistics in SPSS and crosstabs analysis 
selected. Chi-square tests and correlation options were selected as the statistical tools 
displayed in the results and only the significant relationships with ‘p’ < 0.05 were selected for 












































































Appendix 10: Focus Group Questionnaire/Participant Information Leaflet 
 
Focus Group Discussion  
 
Research topic:  
 
“Non-Technical Skills: A Critical Evaluation of Organisational Learning for the UK Nuclear Industry from 
Aviation and Oil & Gas Sectors.” 
 
Definition of terms (investigative tools) used in this research across the three sectors 
(Nuclear, Aviation and Oil & Gas) 
 
Non-Technical Skills (NTS):  
 
NTS as stated by Flin et al. (2008) comprise cognitive, social, and personal resource skills that underpin 




Isomorphic learning as advocated by Toft and Reynolds (2006) is the ability of organisations to learn 
from similar experiences of others. They argue that lesson learned from different events or organisation 




Organisational learning is an effective procedure to process, interpret and respond to internal and 




Risk characterisation is geared towards a decision-driven activity, aimed at informing choices and 






Participant Information Leaflet 
 
Research Topic: “Non-Technical Skills: A Critical Evaluation of Organisational Learning for the UK 
Nuclear Industry from the Aviation and the Oil and Gas Sectors.” 
 
The aim of the research: The aim of this research is to undertake a critical evaluation of organisational 
learning for the UK nuclear sector and benchmark the current and potential gains that could be made 
from Non-Technical Skills (NTS), Isomorphic lessons, Organisational learning and Risk 
characterizations between nuclear, aviation and the oil and gas industries. The research will develop a 
combined framework, guiding principles, and toolkit to inform on the management of 
accidents/incidents, and emergencies specifically engineered to benefit the UK’s nuclear industry. 
 
This project initiated primary research hosted on Bristol Online Survey (which you participated in) as a 
means of gathering data to support each of the four research questions and objectives listed. Therefore, 
some of the online survey results and a toolkit will be presented to this focus group for individual critique 
and inputs.  
 
Kindly respond to the email stating your availability and time to enable us set up a Microsoft Team 
invitation. You may choose from the following days: Tuesday 14th or Tuesday 28th July 2020 either 
for morning session (11am-12 noon) or afternoon session (2-3pm) respectively. Part A (review of 
findings) and Part B (inter-industrial learning system). Each session will last approximately 30 minutes. 
 





Researcher contact details 
  




Appendix 11: Feedbacks from the Three Sectors 
 
 
Focus Group Discussion (Nuclear) 
 
Research topic:  
 
“Non-Technical Skills: A Critical Evaluation of Organisational Learning for the UK Nuclear Industry from 
Aviation and Oil & Gas Sectors.” 
 
Definition of terms (investigative tools) used in this research across the three sectors 
(Nuclear, Aviation and Oil & Gas) 
 
Non-Technical Skills (NTS):  
 
NTS as stated by Flin et al. (2008) comprise cognitive, social, and personal resource skills that underpin 




Isomorphic learning as advocated by Toft and Reynolds (2006) is the ability of organisations to learn 
from similar experiences of others. They argue that lesson learned from different events or organisation 




Organisational learning is an effective procedure to process, interpret and respond to internal and 




Risk characterisation is geared towards a decision-driven activity, aimed at informing choices and 





Questions to the Focus Group Members 
 
Part A (Review of findings after result presentation)  
 
 










From the presentation, do you think your 
sector has ENCOUNTERED any of the 
following four domains stated above within 
the working environment? 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Does your organisation INCORPORATE 
the four domains effectively into training, 
exercises and safety practices? 
Mostly – 5 
out of 7 
Yes Yes Yes 
Are the four domains STRONG 




Yes – via 
corrective 
active 

































Part B (inter-industrial learning system) 
 











Will producing a toolkit 
which is stated above 
help inter-industrial 
learning system 
especially in the nuclear 






Yes – we would 
benchmark 
conventional 
safety v O&G 





















Focus Group Discussion (Aviation) 
 
Research topic:  
 
“Non-Technical Skills: A Critical Evaluation of Organisational Learning for the UK Nuclear Industry from 
Aviation and Oil & Gas Sectors.” 
 
Definition of terms (investigative tools) used in this research across the three sectors 
(Nuclear, Aviation and Oil & Gas) 
 
Non-Technical Skills (NTS):  
 
NTS as stated by Flin et al. (2008) comprise cognitive, social, and personal resource skills that underpin 




Isomorphic learning as advocated by Toft and Reynolds (2006) is the ability of organisations to learn 
from similar experiences of others. They argue that lesson learned from different events or organisation 




Organisational learning is an effective procedure to process, interpret and respond to internal and 







Risk characterisation is geared towards a decision-driven activity, aimed at informing choices and 
targeted at problem solving (Stern and Fineberg 1996: 1). 
 
 
Questions to the Focus Group Members 
 
Part A (Review of findings after result presentation)  
 
 










From the presentation, do you think your 
sector has ENCOUNTERED any of the 
following four domains stated above within 









Does your organisation INCORPORATE 
the four domains effectively into training, 









Are the four domains STRONG FEATURES 




















































Part B (inter-industrial learning system) 
 











Will producing a toolkit 
which is stated above 
help inter-industrial 
learning system 
especially in the nuclear 
















Focus Group Discussion (Oil & Gas)  
 
Research topic:  
 
“Non-Technical Skills: A Critical Evaluation of Organisational Learning for the UK Nuclear Industry from 
Aviation and Oil & Gas Sectors.” 
 
Definition of terms (investigative tools) used in this research across the three sectors 
(Nuclear, Aviation and Oil & Gas) 
 
Non-Technical Skills (NTS):  
 
NTS as stated by Flin et al. (2008) comprise cognitive, social, and personal resource skills that underpin 




Isomorphic learning as advocated by Toft and Reynolds (2006) is the ability of organisations to learn 
from similar experiences of others. They argue that lesson learned from different events or organisation 




Organisational learning is an effective procedure to process, interpret and respond to internal and 




Risk characterisation is geared towards a decision-driven activity, aimed at informing choices and 




Questions to the Focus Group Members 
 
Part A (Review of findings after result presentation)  
 
 










From the presentation, do you think your 
sector has ENCOUNTERED any of the 
following four domains stated above within 
the working environment? 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Does your organisation INCORPORATE 
the four domains effectively into training, 
exercises and safety practices? 
No No Yes No 
Are the four domains STRONG 
FEATURES of your organisation’s 
practice? 
































Part B (inter-industrial learning system) 
 











Will producing a toolkit 
which is stated above 
help inter-industrial 
learning system 
especially in the nuclear 
sector. (Please tick 
YES/NO). 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Please note: The answers are yes/no however, many of the headings cannot be simply yes / no answers 














Participants suggested that there is need for sectors to have a common language (lexicon) that will cut 
across each sector. The table below shows examples of lexicons on NTS, isomorphic lessons, 
organisational learning and risk characterisation. 
 
Documents between the three regulators were checked for lexicon on either for similarities or 
differences on the four pillars used in this research. They are: The Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR); 
the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) and the Oil and Gas Authority’s (OGA).  
 
Nuclear Sector Documents Used for Lexicon 
 
For nuclear sector, the documents checked for lexicon are: 
 
1. Training and Assuring Personnel Competence, published in 2017, review date 2020. 
Document type: Nuclear Safety Assessment Guide, which contained 27 pages used. 
2. Nuclear safety in the unexpected second nuclear era. It was first published in 2019. (Peer 
review publication and published in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Science of 
the United States of America). 
3. Constructive Leadership in a Strong Nuclear Safety Culture: The Role of Leadership 
Development and Succession Planning Strategies. 
4. Organisational learning – Reflections from the nuclear industry. (Peer reviewed and published 
in 2009). 
 
On the documents perused, situation awareness was regarded as safety awareness or perception, 
while decision-making, communication, leadership, teamwork and stress were referred to as such, 
though there was no mention of fatigue in the document. There was no mention of isomorphic lessons 
in the document, while organisational learning was regarded as learning. But risk characterisation 
was simply mentioned as risk. This again suggests that not all the three pillars are common features in 
the nuclear sector. 
 
From what has been identified in the document, NTS and its elements means the same thing, but are 
not regarded as NTS. (See figure 32 below on how lexicon is referred to in different sectors and the 





Aviation Sector Document Used for Lexicon 
 
Top 20 documents were used for lexicon check in the aviation sector. It was drawn from the list of 
publications in table… In addition to that, another document titled, “Aviation Non-Technical Skills 
Handbook” was used. It was published by Defense Flight Safety Bureau (DFSB) in 2018 and contained 
263 pages. 
 
The document was examined for NTS, isomorphic lessons, organisational learning and risk 
characterisation. In the document, all the seven elements of NTS was mentioned. However, the 
document did not delve into most of the three pillars used as training tools especially on isomorphic 
lessons. Though, organisational learning was referred to as learning (31 hits), while risk 
characterisation was regarded as risk (159 hits). 
 
It is generally believed that the aviation sector use NTS in its training program as the document perused 
covered those areas extensively. Therefore, the fact remains that the sector should in future include 
isomorphic lessons and organisational learning fully into training exercise. (See figure 32 below on 
lexicons used in the aviation sector as it relates to all the four pillars). 
 
Oil & Gas Sector Document Used for Lexicon 
 
In the oil and gas sector, 20 publications were used to check differences in language. In addition to that, 
a document titled: “Introducing behavioural markers of non-technical skills in oil and gas operations” 
was equally examined. It was produced by International Association of Oil and Gas Producers (IOGP). 
It was produced in 2018 and contained 24 pages. 
 
The result from the document proved that NTS was covered, which translates that the sector is using 
NTS elements effectively in workplace practice. Though situation awareness (15 hits or times) was 
referred to as such in the IOGP document but in other documents was referred to as awareness and 
or perception. Decision-making (11 hits or times) was used interchangeably as decisions (40); 
communications (16 times or hits); teamwork (6 times or hits); leadership (11 times or hits); stress 
(1) and fatigue (1).  
 
On the other three pillars, isomorphic lesson was conspicuously not mentioned in the document, while 
organisational learning was referred to as learning (3 times or hits) and risk characterisation was 
referred to as risk (32 times or hits). 
 
The search on lexicon across the three sectors revealed that while the aviation sector is generally 
known as the ‘inventor’ of NTS, which started as Crew Resource Management (CRM), other industries 
that are learning from aviation refer to NTS as ‘soft skills’, which diminishes their importance and by 
extension its meaning. Therefore, there is need for the three sectors to adopt a common language or 





On isomorphic lesson, the three sectors need to imbibe the culture of introducing this pillar in training 
exercise, while organisational learning should focus on organisations learning from others and risk 





































A2: Benchmarking Data 
 
 
This is about the comparative systems used for human performance between different sector 
approaches on the four pillars. The focus of benchmarking is to track performance in relation to other 
systems and data. Because organisations find it difficult to share information, it will not be in the interest 






A3: 3 Accidents/3 Incidents Examples 
 
 
Introduction, analysis and conclusion of accidents and incidents examples have been discussed. This 
shows how minor incidents grow to accidents when there are lapses of NTS, isomorphic lessons, 
organisational learning and risk characterisation in managing safely. Example of this is the Piper Alpha 





B1: Training Logs 
 
 
This research will not develop a training log for the sectors as it may not be profitable to organisations 
on how its training logs should look like. However, after listening to participants view during the focus 
group discussion and recommendations they made, training logs produced by the three sectors should 
be shared within the three industry regulators. The regulators should able to see the frequency of 
trainings in the areas of NTS, isomorphic lessons, organisation learning and risk characterisation and 
the levels of formal trainings that exist. Another reason for individual sectors to develop its trainings logs 
is because of difference in operation that exists among them. Therefore, organisations should look at 










Table 64 - 70 showing top 20 publications as examples produced across the three sectors on NTS 




Table 64: List of publication on situation awareness 








A Review of 
Situation Awareness 
Assessment Approaches in 
Aviation Environments 
Situation awareness (SA) is 
an important constituent in 
human information 
processing and essential in 
pilots' decision-making 
processes.  
2019 Peer Review NTS Aviation 
Exploring the use of 
situation awareness in 
behaviours and practices of 
health and safety leaders 
An understanding of how 
health and safety 
management systems 
(HSMS) reduce worksite 
injuries, illnesses and 
fatalities may be gained in 
studying the behaviours of 
health and safety leaders. 
2018 Peer Review NTS Health & Safety 
A Cognitive Approach to 
Situation Awareness: 
Theory and Application 
The importance of 'situation 
awareness' (SA) in 
assessing and predicting 
operator competence in 
complex environments has 
become increasingly 
apparent in recent years. 
2017 Book NTS Generic 
Evaluating Situation 
Awareness: An Integrative 
Review 
Situation awareness (SA) 
refers to the conscious 
awareness of the current 
situation in relation to one’s 
environment. In nursing, 
loss or failure to achieve 
high levels of SA is linked 
with adverse patient 
outcomes. 
2017 Peer Review NTS Generic 




Human capabilities, such as 
technical/nontechnical skills, 
have begun to be 
recognized as crucial 
factors for nuclear safety. 
2016 Peer Review NTS Nuclear 
Study on operator’s SA 
reliability in digital NPPs. 
Part 1: The analysis 
method of operator’s errors 
of situation awareness. 
Situation awareness (SA) is 
a key element that impacts 
operator’s decision-making 
and performance in nuclear 
power plants (NPPs).  
2017 Peer Review NTS Nuclear 
Human performance 
metrics for the nuclear 
domain: 
The Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission (NRC) has 
developed a tool to support 
the understanding and 
evaluation of workload 




(WL), situation awareness 
(SA), and teamwork (TW)… 
Measuring Situation 
Awareness of Operating 
Team in Different Main 
Control Room… 
Environments in nuclear 
power plants (NPPs) are 
changing as the design of 
instrumentation and control 
systems for NPPs is rapidly 
moving toward fully digital 
2016 Peer Review NTS Nuclear 
Situation Awareness 
Offshore: Relevant 
Influencing Factors and 
Risks 
Offshore operations are an 
inherently hazardous 
activities that can result in 
catastrophic outcomes. The 
amalgamation of different 
hazards, constraints, and 
demands on offshore 
platforms can… 
2017 Peer Review NTS Oil and gas 
Situational awareness 
measurement in a 
simulation-based training 
framework for offshore well 
control operations 
Human factors are identified 
as the major contributor to 
oil and gas drilling and 
operations related 
accidents. 








Table 65: List of publication on decision-making 










The definition of risk introduced in 
the ISO 31000 standard of 2009 
(2018) is uncertain goal 
achievement; thus, both negative 
and positive outcomes can be 
considered. 
2018 Peer Review NTS Generic 
Risk averse decision 
making under 
catastrophic risk. 
A nonstandard probabilistic setting 
for modelling of the risk of 
catastrophic events is presented.  
2014 Peer Review NTS Nuclear 
Intellectual decision-
making system in the 
context of… 
The article deals with intelligent 
operation decision support system 
under condition of potentially 
hazardous nuclear facilities. 
2018 Peer Review NTS Nuclear 
Dynamic decision-
making of airline pilots 
in low-fidelity 
simulation. 
Dynamic decision-making in 
aviation involves complex problem 
solving in a dynamic environment 
characterized by goal conflicts… 
2019 Peer Review NTS Aviation 
Toward Evidence-
Based Decision Making 
in Aviation. 
Academic institutions and airlines 
have always worked together to 
develop and conduct research 
studies. However, most often the 
expertise or areas of interest of the 
academics have driven these 
studies. 
2015 Peer Review NTS Aviation 
Decision Errors and 
Accidents: Applying 
Naturalistic Decision 
Making to Accident 
Investigations. 
When faced with dynamic and often 
ill-structured situations, experienced 
decision makers can quickly 
recognize and respond to the 
situations they encounter, a process 
referred to as naturalistic decision 
making. 
2016 Peer Review NTS Aviation 
How role assignment 
impacts decision-
making in high-risk 
environments: 
Evidence from eye-
tracking in aviation. 
Adequate monitoring of automated 
systems is an essential aspect of 
procedure compliance, protective 
behaviour, and appropriate 
decisions in ultra-safe 
environments.  
2020 Peer Review NTS Aviation 
Intelligent decision-
making with bird-strike 
risk assessment for 
airport bird repellent. 
An intelligent decision-making 
method was proposed for airport 
bird-repelling based on a Support 
Vector Machine (SVM) and bird-
strike risk assessment. 
2018 Peer Review NTS Aviation 
Decision-making in the 
oil and gas projects 
based on game theory: 
Conceptual process 
design. 
Oil and gas projects are ruled by 
risks, uncertainties and 
opportunities within their complex 
decision-making processes. 
2013 Peer Review NTS Oil and gas 
Cognitive Bias: A Game 
Changer for Decision 
Management 
There are things happening in the 
world of psychology that may affect 
the way decision management is 
viewed and practiced. 








Table 66: List of publications on communication 








Reliability modelling of 
safety-critical network 
communication in a 
digitalized nuclear 
power plant. 
The Engineered Safety Feature-Component 
Control System (ESF-CCS), which uses a 
network communication system for the 
transmission of safety-critical information… 




aviation: Is language 
proficiency enough for 
testing purposes? 
This paper aims to identify what aviation 
experts consider to be the key features of 
effective communication by examining in 
detail their commentary on a 17-minute 
segment of recorded… 
2018 Peer Review NTS Aviation 
Discursive framing in 
private and public 
communication by 
pro-nuclear corporate, 
political and regulatory 
actors following the 
Fukushima disaster 
The purpose of this paper is to examine a 
case of companies cooperating with the 
State to prevent a public controversy over 
nuclear power following the Fukushima 
disaster and achieve mutually beneficial 
policy outcomes. 
2017 Peer Review NTS Nuclear 
When Communication 
Should Be Formal 
Informality has become ubiquitous in 
modern organizations: The use of first 
names for everyone, including executives, is 
the norm, as are… 




The Case of Aviation 
English 
Historically, applied linguistics has tended to 
shift from a theoretical approach toward a 
problem-solving approach. Intercultural 
communication as a field of study has 
gained its position through… 
2015 Peer Review NTS Aviation 
Future communication 




Significant opportunities exist to make better 
use of existing aviation spectrum. A 
combination of aviation-specific and 
commercial links will provide the broadest 
and most flexible solution but will require 
some kind of “Delivery Manager”. 
2014 Peer Review NTS Aviation 
Communicating 
Nuclear Power: A 
Programmatic 
Review. 
Civil and commercial nuclear power 
production is a material and discursive 
phenomenon posing theoretical and 
practical questions warranting further 
attention by communication scholars. 




aviation: Is language 
proficiency enough for 
testing purposes? 
This paper aims to identify what aviation 
experts consider to be the key features of 
effective communication by examining in 
detail their commentary on a 17-minute 
segment of recorded radiotelephony 
discourse between… 
2018 Peer Review NTS Nuclear 
Safety Management 
Systems as 
communication in an 
oil and gas producing 
company. 
An IT-based Safety Management System 
contains procedures, safety standards and 
checklists on how different tasks should be 
performed.  
2015 Peer Review NTS Oil and gas 
Poor Communication 
Skills Means High 
Risk for Aviation 
Safety 
This article analyses different types of 
communication used in the aviation 
operational environment. 








Table 67: List of publications on teamwork 









Human Factors and 
Non-Technical Skills: 
Teamwork 
Making mistakes is part of being human 
and human error is normal in all areas 






metrics for the 
nuclear domain: A 





The Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
(NRC) has developed a tool to support 
the understanding and evaluation of 
workload (WL), situation awareness 
(SA), and teamwork (TW) metrics used 






Evaluation of a Team 
Mutual Awareness 
Toolkit for Digital 
Interfaces of Nuclear 
Power Plant Context 
In the teamwork of nuclear power plants 
(NPPs), the maintenance of mutual 
awareness enables the operators to 
have an up-to-the-moment 
understanding of each other’s work and 








In this chapter, we describe the 
enhanced Team STEPPS® curriculum 
as fundament to creating a “culture of 








states: Findings from 
nuclear power plant 
operation 
The tasks of Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) 
operators are highly interconnected, and 
operators need to engage in teamwork 
to ensure plant safety. Traditionally, 
teamwork-competence… 
2015 Book NTS Nuclear 
The science of 
teamwork: Progress, 
reflections, and the 
road ahead 
We need teams in nearly every aspect 
of our lives (e.g., hospitals, schools, 
flight decks, nuclear power plants, oil 





teamwork skills work 
for surgeons: time for 
an ‘aviation bundle’? 
Aviation systems were developed to 
improve safety and have achieved 
remarkable results. Medicine has looked 





teamwork errors in 
royal air force air 
traffic control 
Despite the success of Crew Resource 
Management (CRM) training in aviation 
and the development and 









in Oil and Gas 
Simulation-based 
Exercises 
In recent years there has been 
increasing acknowledgement in the oil 
and gas sector about the importance of 
Non-Technical Skills (NTS) training as a 
complement to traditional technical and 
procedural training.  
2015 Peer 
Review 
NTS Oil and 
gas 
Investigating the 
Impact of Teamwork 
Quality on the 
Effectiveness of 
Managing Multiple 
Projects in the Oil & 
Gas Industry 
Managing multiple projects (MMP) is a 
current trend in project management. 
This type of management has become 
common in many industries, particularly 












Table 68: List of publications on leadership 








New Public Leadership 
Making a Difference 
from Where We Sit 
Most leadership literature stems 
from and focuses on the private 
sector, emphasizing personal 
qualities that… 




In this chapter, we describe the 
enhanced Team STEPPS® 
curriculum as fundament to 
creating a “culture of continuous 








There are more subtle changes as 
well: the culture of business 
aviation is changing; our 







program leaders: A 
four-frame analysis 
The purpose of this study was to 
examine the perceived leadership 






Teams in Aviation 
Despite air travel having become 
a widely used means of 
transportation, the technological 











The use of teams to achieve 
organizational goals requires 
companies to employ individuals 






in multi-cultural aviation 
environments 
In the last few decades, the world 
has witnessed a phenomenon 
called globalization, which has 
shortened distances and 





on aviation safety 
culture inculcation as it 
relates to Certified Non-
scheduled Air Taxi 
Operators 
A general aviation industry 
segment member known as a 
Certified Non-scheduled Air Taxi 
Operator (CNATO) conducts 





Senior Managers and 
Safety Leadership Role 
in Offshore Oil and Gas 
Construction Projects 
Recent changes in the global 
construction industry coupled with 
rising challenges because of the 
dynamic nature of offshore… 
2017 Peer 
Review 




as predictors of 
employee creativity and 
innovation in the 
Nigerian oil and gas 
service industry 
The 21st century global market 
demands highly skilled workforce 
who are intellectually active, 
creative, innovative and capable 
of critical thinking.  
2017 Peer 
Review 








Table 69: List of publications on managing stress 









Stress, fatigue, situation 
awareness and safety in 
offshore drilling crews 
Drilling for oil and gas on 
offshore installations is a 
hazardous occupation and 
requires personnel to maintain 
high levels of work situation 
awareness (WSA).  
2012 Peer 
Review 
NTS Oil & Gas 
Modelling the cardiac indices 
of stress and performance of 
nuclear power plant 
operators during simulated 
fault scenarios 
Acute stress can affect cognitive 
processing and decrease 
performance in demanding, 




15 - Management of nuclear 
crises: accidents and lessons 
learned 
The major nuclear accidents at 
Three Mile Island, Chernobyl 
and Fukushima Daiichi are 
discussed from a crisis 






NUCLEAR POWER PLANT 
DISASTERS 
The emotional consequences of 
nuclear power plant disasters 
include depression, anxiety, 
post-traumatic stress disorder, 
and medically unexplained 




Safety Culture, Resilient 
Behaviour, and Stress in Air 
Traffic Management 
n today’s rapidly changing air 
traffic management (ATM) 
environment, safety culture and 
organizational resilience are key 





Job stress and job 
satisfaction among 
managerial and non-
managerial employees of a 
public sector undertaking 
The modern world, which is a 
world of achievements, is also a 
world of stress. One finds stress 
all walks of life. Different people 
have different views about it as 
stress can be experienced from 




Stressing the importance of 
stress 
This paper aims to review the 
latest management 
developments across the globe 
and pinpoint practical 
implications from cutting-edge 




Importance of personality 
and career stress for flight 
attendants' career 
satisfaction 
We examined flight attendants' 
career satisfaction and 
addressed how career stress 
affects the relationship between 






Skills through Team 
Behavioural Markers in Oil 
and Gas Simulation-based 
Exercises 
In recent years there has been 
increasing acknowledgement in 
the oil and gas sector about the 
importance of Non-Technical 
Skills (NTS) training as a 
complement to traditional 








MORE SAFETY, LESS 
STRESS 
The oil and gas industry is a 
demanding, dangerous field. 
According to NIOSH, it has a 
fatality rate that's more than 
seven times higher than the rate 
for all US workers.  
2016 Peer 
Review 
NTS Oil & Gas 
 
 
Coping with Fatigue 
 
Table 70: List of publications on coping with fatigue 








Effects of In-Flight 
Countermeasures to 
Mitigate Fatigue 
Risks in Aviation 
Fatigue is a frequent phenomenon for 
pilots doing shift work and working in 





in the workplace 
Workers' fatigue is a significant 
problem in modern industry, largely 
because of high demand jobs, long 






for Worker Safety 
If so, then fatigue management can 
progress from a reactive state (the 
equivalent of the PPE state in a 
traditional hazard control hierarchy) to 







The fatigue conundrum: whether it's 
mild sleepiness or mind-numbing 
exhaustion, the challenge of fatigue 
on the job can be complex, 





Risk factors for 
fatigue among airline 
pilots 
The objective of this study is to 
determine risk factors for fatigue 
among airline pilots, taking into 
account 








Fatigue, often defined as a 
physiological state of reduced mental 
or physical performance capability 




Chapter 22 - 
Managing fatigue 
Fatigue is the mental, physical, or 
emotional impairment caused by 






Risk Management in 
Civil Aviation 
Operation: A Case 
Study in China Air 
Navigation Service 
Provider 
Change-oriented risk management is 
the key content of civil aviation safety 
management. Hazard identification is 
considered as one of the most difficult 











water and produced 
water management… 
he objective of this paper is to review 
different risk assessment techniques 
applicable to onshore unconventional 
oil and gas production  
2016 Peer 
Review 
NTS Oil & Gas 
Quantitative risk 
management in gas 
injection project: a 
case study from 
Oman oil and gas 
industry 
The purpose of this research was to 
study the recognition, application and 
quantification of the risks associated 
in managing projects. In this research, 
2018 Peer 
Review 





Table 71: List of publications on isomorphic lessons 








Lessons learned from 
the 2011 debacle of 
the Fukushima 
nuclear power plant 
The history of nuclear 
power generation in Japan is 
analyzed with respect to how the 





Lessons of Chernobyl: 
the cultural causes of 
the meltdown. (1986 
nuclear power plant 
meltdown) 
The disastrous meltdown was caused 
by the Soviet Union's penchant for 
secrecy. The union's interest in 
nuclear research was primarily 





Thirty years after the 
accident at the 
Chernobyl nuclear 
power plant: historical 
causes, lessons and 
legal effects 
The article offers historical, political 
and legal analysis of the causes that 
led to the accident at the Chernobyl 
nuclear power plant (NPP) 30 years 




Japanese fuel mix 
strategy after disaster 
of Fukushima Daiichi 
nuclear power plant: 
Lessons from 
international… 
On June 1, 2015, the Japanese 
government has announced that the 
fuel mix will consist of nuclear 
generation with a range between 20% 









Nuclear Power Plant 
Disaster:  
In April 2017, some of the health 
impacts of the 2011 Great East Japan 
Earthquake, tsunamis, and resultant 
Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power 
plant disaster (Okuma, Fukushima 






than a year after the 
accident, we still do 
not have any… 













This paper is an analysis of the 
international institutional isomorphic 
pressures and lessons learned from 





at a Disciplined. 
Nuclear Power Plant 
In this thesis we have examined the 
Swedish nuclear power plant 




Lessons for shale oil 
& gas development 
from that of tight oil & 
gas and coalbed 
methane gas in China 
This paper aims to explore a 
smoother way to success for shale oil 
gas development in China. Thus, a 
discussion was made focusing on the 
technological base successfully 
2014 Peer 
Review 
NTS Oil & Gas 
How many blowouts 
does it take to learn 




Accident researchers have long tried 
to understand why similar disasters 
and near misses keep recurring within 










Table 72: List of publication on organisational learning 









– Reflections from the 
nuclear industry 
Organisational learning has 
attracted scholarly interest for some 
time. In parallel a recommendation 
has been expressed to nuclear 








Learning in Nuclear 
Power Plants:  
We explore the linkages between 
naturalistic decision making, which 
examines decisions in context, and 
team and organizational learning, 
which examines how feedback from 




New Nuclear Power 
Plants - Learning from 
History to Understand 
Costs and Mitigate 
Risks 
Nuclear power is an important fuel 
source, not only because of cost 
stability factors, but also for 
protecting the environment and 
ensuring a lasting supply of clean, 





Learning from adverse 
events in the nuclear 
power industry: 
Organizational learning, 
policy making and 
normalization 
Nuclear power accidents repeatedly 
reveal that the industry has an 
incomplete understanding of the 






for nuclear safety 
Organizational learning (OL) is a 
crucial component of operational 
excellence in nuclear power plants. 








e-Learning in Aviation. e-Learning is extremely cost-
effective and therefore an attractive 





Applying research to 
save lives: Learning 
from team training 
approaches in aviation 
and health care 
In many contexts work-related 
errors result in little more than 
headaches and hassles. In other 
contexts, however, errors result in 
damages costing millions of dollars 




An Online Language 
Learning Program for 
Students in Aviation 
Departments 
This study is the first phase of a 
project that aims to improve the 
technical English level of students 
who study in 10 vocational schools 
in 10 different cities providing 








collaboration in aviation 
refuelling industry 
The literature does not explicate 
who is the subject of learning 
(individual, organisation or both) in 




The Lessons on 
Performance 
Management Oil and 
Gas Can Learn From 
Aviation 
It’s a transformative time for the oil 
and gas industry. OPEC production 










Table 73: List of publications on risk characterisation 









Risk Management after 
the Fukushima Nuclear 
Power Plant Accident 
Five years have passed since the 
Great East Japan Earthquake and 
the subsequent Fukushima 
Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant 





sensitivity analysis for 
model selection in 
nuclear power plant 
probabilistic safety 
assessment 
The safety assessment of Nuclear 
Power Plants makes use of 
Thermal-Hydraulic codes for the 
quantification of the safety 





Development of Risk 
Monitor for Nuclear 
Power Plant 
Risk Monitor is a specific 
application of probability safety 
analysis (PSA) in nuclear power 
plant. This paper introduced the 




Advances in multi-unit 
nuclear power plant 
probabilistic risk 
assessment 
The Fukushima Daiichi accident 
highlighted the importance of risks 
from multiple nuclear reactor unit 







Analysis of the 
Relationship between 
Risk Perception and 
Willingness to Pay for 
Nuclear Power Plant 
Risk Reduction 
With the adoption of new 
technologies, more risk is 
introduced into modern society. 
Important decisions about new 






and Japan’s Fukushima 
Daiichi Nuclear Power 
Plant Meltdown: Ethical 
Implications… 
The response of Tokyo Electric 
Power Company (TEPCO), which 
has been hobbled by a natural 
disaster, provides startling 
lessons in how organizations that 






Nuclear Power Plants 
Probabilistic risk assessment 
(PRA) is a systematic and 
comprehensive methodology to 
evaluate risks associated with a 




Insights into the 
Societal Risk of 
Nuclear Power Plant 
Accidents 
The elements of societal risk from 
a nuclear power plant accident 
are clearly illustrated by the 







economic risks and 
uncertainties 
This paper identifies the 
fundamental elements and critical 
research tasks of a 
comprehensive analysis of the 
costs and benefits of nuclear 







Presents systems-based theory, 
methodology, and applications in 
risk modelling, assessment, and 
management This book examines 
risk analysis… 




B3: Archiving of Incidents 
 
This research will not produce any material on archiving of incidents. However, the stand of this 
research is that the three sectors should as a matter of facts archive incidents for future referencing 
should the need arise. 
 
 
What Next for the Nuclear Industry? 
 
There is evidence to believe that the aviation industry has put a lot of measures to 
manage safely its industry especially on the use of NTS. However, this research has 
attempted to find out if the nuclear sector is at par with the aviation sector and proactive 
in their plans. The research also looked at if isomorphic lessons took place and what 








Justification for the triangulated Comparison 
  
The purpose of this tripartite survey was to determine if any valuable practices, 
lessons, or safety critical approaches could be learned and transferred into the nuclear 
industry via organisational learning attributed to the aviation and possibly oil and gas 
sectors. 
 
This study critically evaluated the nuclear industry to determine the extent of probable 
gaps using the four pillars, which are NTS, isomorphic lessons, organisational learning 
and risk characterisation, as there is no significant track of literature and research 
identifying how each of the above areas may independently oppose as challenges to 
the nuclear industry. Thus, the research undertook a critical evaluation and 
benchmarked the current and potential gains that were made from the four pillars 
between the three industries. 
 
Figure 34 is a triangulated diagram indicating the three different sectors and four pillars 


























Oil & Gas 
sector
Aviation 
sector
